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Chapter 1
General Introduction
1
1.1. PREFACE
1.1 Preface
Roughly ten years after the outbreak of the financial crisis, growth in the Euro Area seems finally
back on track. Not only the growth rates of the gross domestic product (GDP) are rising with an average
Euro Area growth rate of more than 2% in 2017, also inflation rates have recovered and are getting more
in line with the target region of the European Central Bank (ECB) at close but below 2%. Even more
reassuring is the reduction of unemployment rates in several troubled economies such as Spain where
the unemployment rate has decreased from its high in 2013 of more than 25% to roughly 16% in 2017.
However, while the recovery is still fragile in southern Euro Area countries, many northern and central
European countries are already entering the boom period of the business cycle.
Many arguments can be made when attempting to explain the current recovery. On the one hand,
some economist would stress the importance of the structural reforms undertaken by periphery countries.
On the other hand, other economist would highlight the role of the ECB and its decisive intervention
during the Euro crisis and the unconventional monetary policy (UMP) measures taken in the recent years.
While this doctoral thesis does not aim to give a fully comprehensive answer to these questions, it tries
to modestly contribute to the on-going academic discussion by investigating three aspects of the bigger
picture. Specially, this thesis consists of three self-contained chapters each examining a recent topic in
modern macroeconomics and monetary policy.
The first two chapters study different aspects of the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy measures.
Whereas the first chapter uses an event study to examine the effects of the quantitative easing (QE)
programme by the ECB on Euro Area bond yields, the second chapter considers the effect of potentially
unintended side effects of such policy measures with respect to bank profitability and bank risk-taking.
Finally, the third chapter of this dissertation looks at a very old, yet also very recent discussion in the
field of macro-economics, namely the real effects of a minimum wage introduction. Using a DSGE model
the final chapter attempts to analyse the case of Germany where a minimum wage was introduced in
2015. The remainder of this introduction outlines each chapter in more detail.
1.2 Chapter Outline
Chapter 2
In 2014, the Euro Area experienced very low inflation rates which raised concerns among policy makers
that the Monetary Union might tumble into a deflationary spiral. In order to show full commitment to
their inflation target rate the European Central Bank started a large scale asset purchase programme,
the so called Asset Purchase Programme (APP) which was gradually introduced from September 2014
onwards. The second chapter of my dissertations studies the short-term reaction of financial markets
after press releases on the APP. In doing so, the chapter uses event study methodologies to analyse the
development of bond yields and spreads around these press releases. More precisely, the chapter estimates
different asset price channels by quantifying the cumulative decrease of spreads and by running event
regressions for several Euro Area countries. While in principle several channels could be at work, the
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chapter largely focuses on the signalling channel, measured by the overnight index swap (OIS) rate, and
the portfolio rebalancing channel, which is proxied by the so called conditional bond-OIS spread. In fact,
under the regulations of the Asset Purchase Programme several government bonds are excluded from
purchases as they trade below the deposit facility. Consequently, our analysis is under the condition that
the yield of the individual bond is above this threshold.
The evidence in this chapter suggests that the effects on yield and spread reduction were most pro-
nounced for the initial announcement on the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) but declined
afterwards for additional announcements. This finding could be explained by several arguments. First,
one possible explanations is that the ECB was not able to genuinely surprise markets, especially for later
announcements. Second, while in the beginning the self-imposed regulations were not binding to a large
degree, the institutional set-up of the APP became increasingly burdensome over time. Third, as argued
by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) the closer bonds are trading to the zero lower bound (ZLB) the
portfolio rebalance channel becomes less relevant as agents become indifferent between holding cash and
bonds. In this respect, the chapter contributes to the unresolved discussion if quantitative easing is an
effective tool at the zero lower bound.
Moreover, while yield reductions were larger for periphery countries’ bonds such as Italy or Spain
than for core countries’ bonds such as German Bunds, our evidence suggests that this stronger reduction
is mostly due to a decreasing risk component of southern bonds. In fact, once controlling for this implicit
credit risk reduction we find mild effects from portfolio rebalancing for all countries. However, the results
of this chapter should be interpreted with care. While they do suggest that the portfolio rebalancing
had only mild effects on the yield of Euro Area government bonds, in particular for core country bonds,
this does not necessarily imply that the APP by the ECB in general has proven ineffective. In fact, the
announcement of the ECB’s asset purchases might still have had an impact on the real economy via the
expectation channel reducing real interest rates, the reduction of overly high risk premia in markets, or
via the exchange rate channel.
Chapter 3
After the second chapter of my dissertation examined the specific short-term impact of a quantitative
easing programme on financial markets and government bond yields, the third chapter analyses potential
unintended side effects of such unconventional monetary policy measures in a more general sense. Fol-
lowing several unconventional policies measures by the ECB (most notable being the introduction of a
negative interest rates policy (NIRP) and the start of a quantitative easing programme) many concerns
have been raised regarding the stability of banks in the Euro Area. In fact, the spread between short- and
long-term interest rates can have a systematic effect on profits, risk-taking, and the financial soundness
of banks. As a direct result of the actions by the ECB, both ends of the yield curve have been lowered.
On the one hand, breaking through the zero lower bound at the short end of the yield curve leads to
additional charges on short-term bank assets. On the other hand, the QE programme lowers the slope
of the yield curve and, thus, erodes banks’ net interest margin (NIM) over time.
To study how banks are exactly affected, the third chapter of this Ph.D. thesis employs a large micro
3
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level data set of 1600 German banks to examine the impact of these policy measures on bank profitability
and bank risk-taking. The data set is provided by the German Bundesbank and entails all monthly
balance sheet statements and all yearly profit and loss statements from every German bank holding a
banking license between 2003 and 2016. As pointed out by Eggertsson, Juelsrud, et al. (2017) and Heider
et al. (2017) there is evidence to believe that banks are differentially affected by negative interest rates
depending on their business model. In particular, banks with a large share of deposit could find it harder
to pass through negative rates to their customers. Therefore, a central contribution of this chapter is to
focus on the heterogeneity regarding different bank business models and how this affects the pass-through
of monetary policy at negative interest rates.
Indeed, negative interest rates are a mostly uncharted territory with several economists arguing that
banks should be mostly unaffected as they, for instance, could substitute deposit financing with wholesale
funding. Moreover, banks might even benefit from these unconventional measures due to lower refinancing
costs and capital gains from assets holdings (see e.g. Brunnermeier and Koby (2017) and Jobst and Lin
(2016)). Therefore, the general structure of this empirical chapter is to take all common pro and contra
arguments in the literature seriously and to study their empirical relevance.
The findings indicate that banks, on the one hand, do not engage in excessive risk-taking, benefit from
the current low refinancing rates, and face lower loan loss provisions due to the positive macro-economic
environment and low interest burden. On the other hand, only a few large banks experience capital gains
from the current high in asset prices, which is mostly due to the conservative German accounting law and
differences in banks’ business models. Moreover, smaller banks especially face an increasing short-term
liquidity overhang and a rising interest rate risk. In sum, this suggests that German banks have so far
only been mildly negatively affected as they also profit from UMP in some dimensions.
However, these results come under an important caveat. As the analysis is based on balance sheet
and profit and loss statements it is entirely backward looking. Therefore, it remains unclear how long the
positive aspects of QE and NIRP can prevail before they are outweighed by the long-term negative impact
on banks. In particular, smaller banks are subject to increasing interest rate risk which, on the one hand,
arises from increasing short-term liabilities and, on the other hand, comes from an increase in the average
interest rate fixation. Put differently, for the same reason that banks now can benefit from lower refinanc-
ing rates, in a few a years this might pose enormous challenges especially to smaller banks which typically
do not hedge their interest position on the international markets. Therefore, there is increasing evidence
that monetary policy works contractionary at negative rates if banks have a high share of deposit funding.
Chapter 4
In contrast to chapter 2 and 3, which use modern empirical methods to answer contemporary questions
of monetary policy, chapter 4 tries to answer one of the oldest questions in the macroeconomic field using
modern dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. More precisely, it uses an occasionally
binding constraint in a DSGE model to model the introduction of a minimum wage. After a very long
debate, a minimum wage of 8.50 EUR was introduced in Germany in early 2015 which so far did not lead
to large job losses. Comparing Germany to other advanced European Union (EU) countries, the most
4
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likely explanation for this is that the German minimum wage is rather low, i.e. it is often not binding
as the competitive wage rate for many tasks is higher. However, following the large influx of refugees
and migrants in late 2015 the competitive wage rate is likely to fall as a result of this positive labour
supply shock. Since it is likely that the majority of migrants first enter into the unskilled sector, standard
economic theory predicts a drop in the wage rate for the unskilled labour market making the minimum
wage binding.
Using a one sector closed economy DSGE model with skilled, medium skilled, and unskilled households
the fourth chapter studies the effects of a positive labour supply shock on an occasionally binding minimum
wage in a dynamic fashion for a competitive and a monopsony labour market. Besides the contribution
of modelling the minimum wage as only occasionally binding downward rigidity (which it is by its very
definition) using the tool proposed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015), a second novelty of our model
is that we try to generalise the static equilibrium monopsony model of Manning (2003) into a DSGE
framework.
The results suggest that a moderate minimum wage reduces macro volatility and smooths consump-
tion. In addition, the results show that due to monopsony, the wage that is offered by firms to unskilled
workers is lower in steady state relative to the neoclassical benchmark case were neither firms nor un-
skilled workers have market power. Still, the dynamics of the model are unaffected by monopsony, i.e. a
positive labour market shock still translates to a lower wage rate. However, with respect to the minimum
wage this chapter shows that a direct modelling of the monopsony approach by Manning (2003) is not
sufficient to generate a positive effect from a moderate minimum wage. In order to do so, additional
labour market frictions as in the search-and-matching literature are needed.
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Chapter 2
Quantitative Easing in the Euro Area -
An Event Study Approach*†
*This chapter is based on joint work with Sebastian Watzka
†Acknowledgements: We are thankful to Klaus Adam, Markus Brunnermeier, Guglielmo Caporale, Paul de Grauwe,
Gerhard Illing, and Michael Weber for valuable advice. We also appreciate helpful comments and suggestions by the
participants of the CESifo Macro, Money & International Finance Conference 2017, the EEA 2017 Lisbon Conference, the
VfS Annual Conference 2017, the Belgrade Young Economist Conference, the RGS Econ 10th Doctoral Conference, and
the Macroeconomics Seminar at the University of Munich. Finally, we acknowledge research assistance by David Gramke
and Patrick Weiß. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors.
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2.1. INTRODUCTION
2.1 Introduction
After a severe drop in inflation rates and medium-term inflation expectations during 2014, the Eu-
ropean Central Bank gradually introduced the Asset Purchase Programme (APP) with a total monthly
purchase volume of between 60 and 80 billion EUR1. In fact, headline inflation plunged to −0.6% in
January 2015, with core inflation, excluding more volatile goods such as oil or energy prices, showing a
clear downward trend since 2013 as outlined in Figure 2.1. Even more importantly, the 5y5y inflation
forward swaps, the ECB’s preferred measure of medium term inflation expectation, started declining in
2014, threatening inflation expectations becoming de-anchored. Being in danger of missing its inflation
target in the medium-run, the ECB gradually introduced the APP and consequently emphasised that
the ultimate aim of this quantitative easing (QE) programme is to fulfil its mandate of maintaining price
stability. Accordingly, the ECB officially stated that “[the Asset Purchase Programme] will help to bring
inflation back to levels in line with the ECB’s objective”2.
Comparing the ECB’s policy to other major central banks like the Fed or the Bank of England, both
of these institutions have introduced various conventional and unconventional monetary policy measures
during the global financial crisis of 2008-09, including large QE programmes. Whereas these central banks
purchased domestic government bonds on a large scale early on, the ECB during the financial crisis rather
focused on buying covered bonds and provided exceptional liquidity measures to banks3. Because some
member countries in the Euro Area were worried about potentially strong effects on inflation, other
unintended consequences, or the compatibility of a QE programme with European law, the European
Central Bank avoided large purchases of government bonds during the initial phase of the financial and
European debt crisis.
The early stage of unconventional monetary policy measures after 2008 has been studied intensively in
the literature. Three main conclusions can be drawn: First, the strongest reaction of financial markets is
expected to occur upon announcement of the stock of purchases, while the effects from the actual execution
of the programme are minor in comparison. These two effects are often referred to as “stock” versus “flow”
effects. Second, among several possible channels proposed by the literature “narrow channels” (targeting
just a few assets) usually seem to have stronger effects compared to “broader channels” (aiming to affect
also other market segments via spill-over effects). Finally, asset purchase programmes that were conducted
in times of stressed markets and high uncertainty seem to have a stronger impact than programmes that
were announced when market conditions were relaxed4. In this respect, it is important to note that the
European Central Bank started its QE programme in times when financial markets were relatively calm
suggesting rather minor effects from it.
1The initial size of 60 billion EUR per month was increased to 80 billion EUR in March 2016 and lowered again to 60
billion EUR in December 2016. See Section 2.2 and Section 2.5 for details.
2See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-me-more/html/asset-purchase.en.html.
3These encompassed three-year loans to eligible banks, unlimited liquidity provisions via a fixed-rate full-allotment
procedure, or lowering the deposit rate to zero. Only after the outbreak of the European debt crisis did the ECB start
to purchase government bonds in 2010 under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). However, the SMP is usually not
regarded as a full blown QE programme.
4For a more detailed discussion see, for instance, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), D’Amico and King
(2013), Joyce and Tong (2012), and Altavilla, Carboni, et al. (2015).
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Figure 2.1: Inflation and Inflation Expectation in the Euro Area
Source: Datastream. Vertical lines indicate important events.
As it remains too early to judge the wider impact of the APP on macroeconomic conditions in the
Euro Area, this chapter examines if the ECB has been successful in achieving the intermediate goal of
lowering long-term bond yields. Reducing these yields should flatten the yield curve, lead to more credit
to the real sector, increase aggregate demand, and ultimately also increase inflation. To find some first
evidence whether this necessary pre-condition has been achieved, we use an event study methodology to
examine the effects of APP press releases on bond yields. More precisely, we systematically search for key
ECB policy announcements and consider how selected Euro Area bond yields were affected by different
asset price channels. Most importantly, we examine how the conditional bond-OIS spread, a proxy for
the effect of portfolio rebalancing5, changed during our events.
Our analysis suggests that the ECB’s policy had strong and desired effects on financial markets at the
very beginning, but less so subsequently. As a result of the portfolio rebalancing channel and a potential
reduction in credit and liquidity risk premia, we estimate a cumulative reduction in yields of Euro Area
government bonds ranging from 85.80 basis points (BPS) for Portugal to only 5.91 BPS for Germany. In
our view, possible explanations for such mild effects for some Euro Area countries are the timing of the
APP and the strict self-imposed regulations by the ECB. Notably, the ECB decision to not buy bonds
5Under the assumption that assets are not perfect substitutes Tobin (1969), among others, argued that a change in the
relative supply of a specific asset, e.g. due to an intervention by the central bank, must result in a change in the relative
expected return of the asset, all else equal. Suppose the QE policy of the central bank leads to a rise in the price for a
long-term government bond and, hence, to a drop in the expected return of an investor’s portfolio. Keeping the desired
expected return of her portfolio constant, the investor now needs to buy other assets with broadly similar characteristics in
terms of risk or maturity to maintain the overall expected return of her portfolio. Thus, via the rebalancing of investors’
portfolios the price and yield of other assets are also changing.
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trading below the deposit facility could potentially dampen positive effects from the APP6. In contrast,
the much stronger reductions for periphery countries like Portugal or Italy suggest that markets implicitly
also lowered the risk premia for these countries. Put differently, countries with a higher yield reacted
stronger to APP announcements compared to countries having a low yield already near the zero lower
bound.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 describes some important insti-
tutional details of the ECB’s QE programme. Section 2.3 reviews the large and growing literature on
different QE programmes and their success so far. Section 2.4 describes the theoretical considerations for
measuring the portfolio rebalancing channel by the bond-OIS spread. Section 2.5 outlines the data set
in detail with special focus on identifying event dates. Next, the reaction of bond markets is presented
in Section 2.6 followed by event regressions in Section 2.7. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 APP Institutional Details
Due to the incomplete integration of the current monetary union in the Euro Area the Asset Purchase
Programme conducted by the ECB has some important regulations and characteristics with respect to
its design. As we will argue, some of these regulations may seriously dampen the desired effects of the
APP.
To begin with, the APP is actually an umbrella term for four different purchase programmes: the
Third Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP3), the Asset Backed Securities Purchase Programme
(ABSPP), the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), and the Corporate Sector Purchase Pro-
gramme (CSPP). In total, the ECB’s asset purchases under the APP have a target rate of 60 to 80 billion
EUR per month, which accumulated to 1,084,583 million EUR in June 2016. Table 2.1 summarises
the main features of each programme while Figure 2.2 illustrates the cumulative purchases over time,
indicating that the in terms of scale the PSPP is by far the largest.
Even though the programmes differ considerably by size and scope they also share some common
features. First of all, all APP programmes are in principal open-ended and are intended to continue until
the ECB sees the inflation rate back on a sustained inflation path in line with the ECB’s target rate of
close to but below 2%. As a benchmark the APP was initially intended to last at least until September
2016, which has already been extended twice, first, to March 2017 and, a second time, to December 2017.
Secondly, important aspects to note are the regulations concerning hypothetical losses from the ECB’s
asset purchases. Unlike a national central bank the ECB is not owned by a national government but
by all the national central banks from each member state. Taking into account this unique institutional
structure of the Euro Area, the majority of the asset purchases are conducted in the home market of
each national central bank according to its respective capital share in the ECB. Subsequently, in case of a
hypothetical default of e.g. a single Portuguese government bond bought by the Banco de Portugal, only
the Banco de Portugal would incur the respective loss for this bond7. Note, however, a smaller part of
6In fact, the ECB has eased this constraint in the monetary policy decision of December 2016 by stating that
under the APP purchases with a yield below the deposit facility “will be permitted to the extent necessary”. See
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2016/html/is161208.en.html
7Given no other national central bank bought the same bond.
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Table 2.1: Asset Purchase Programme Overview
Programme Monthly Net Purchases Total Holdings In Percent Start of Programme
CBPP3 3,258 183,377 16.02 October 2014
ABSPP 854 19,607 1.75 November 2014
PSPP 69,658 875,201 81.09 March 2015
CSPP 6,816 6,398 1.13 June 2016
Source: ECB; holdings at amortised cost, in million EUR, at month end.
Figure 2.2: History of Cumulative Purchases under the APP
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Source: ECB; holdings at amortised cost, in million EUR, at month end.
asset purchases of about 20% are conducted directly by the ECB. Hypothetical losses to these purchases
are subject to loss sharing.
Since the PSPP is by far the largest programme it is the main focus of this chapter. As the intended
goal of the programme is to lower long-term government bond yields, the ECB initially intended to buy
only mid- and longer-term bonds with a remaining maturity of 2 to 30 years8. Yet, not all bonds bought by
the ECB are government bonds. In fact, roughly 10% of bonds purchased are international organisations
and multilateral development banks such as the EU or the European Investment Bank. Also, there is
a long list of regional governments or recognised government institutions, such as the German KfW or
the French Caisse, which are eligible for the bond buying programme9. As already indicated the issue
of collective liability and risk sharing is sensitive in the case of the ECB. Therefore, in order to avoid
potential trade-offs in case of default, the ECB initially only bought bonds up to 33% per issuer and
25% per issue of a single bond, the idea being not to have a blocking minority in collective action clause
assemblies. To increase flexibility, this rule was gradually increased to 33% per issue for public entities,
subject to a case-by-case verification, and 50% of issuer and issue share for international organisations
and multilateral development banks. Since the ECB does not publish a full list of bonds (and respective
shares) bought, it remains unclear how strong this constraint might constrain the hands of the ECB10.
8Recently, the maturity has been lowered to one year.
9Also note that ECB currently does not purchase any Greek government bonds.
10Some authors predicated that the ECB could hit these limits for e.g. German Bunds around March 2017 (see for
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Additionally, another aspect jeopardising a successful implementation of the PSPP is the current
negative interest and yield environment. In order to avoid large losses from bond purchases, the ECB
vowed to a self-imposed regulation of not buying bonds trading at a yield below the deposit facility rate.
The ECB was the first large central bank to introduce negative interest rates by lowering the deposit
facility to −0.1% in June 2014. Afterwards, the deposit facility has been lowered gradually down to −0.4%
in March 2016. For details see Figure A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix. As we see in Section 2.5, under this
constraint a large and increasing number of bonds are not eligible for the APP programme11. We argue
that these tight self-imposed regulations seriously constrain the ECB in a successful implementation of
their QE programme especially for Euro Area core countries.
2.3 Literature Review
A very large and continuously growing literature exists on the effects of quantitative easing pro-
grammes. Since the start of the first QE programme by the Bank of Japan in 2001 the topic raised
increasing academic attention (see for instance Ugai (2007) for an early empiric assessment). However,
the number of academic papers exploded after the financial crisis of 2008-09 when the US Fed, the Bank
of England, the Bank of Japan, and the European Central Bank all started various kinds of asset pur-
chasing or unconventional monetary policy measures. A strict categorisation of different approaches in
the literature is obviously difficult. Nevertheless, we can loosely group the literature into three different
strands: theoretical, long-term empirical and short-term empirical.
A first stream of literature considers how large asset purchasing programmes can be built into standard
New Keynesian models, which mostly suggest the irrelevance of such a policy as in Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003)12. One such approach can be found in Cúrdia and Woodford (2011). Generalising
the findings of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), the authors show that targeted asset purchases can
be effective if financial markets are sufficiently disrupted, i.e. if private-sector financial intermediation
is inefficient. However, QE can still be irrelevant if the central bank conducts pure quantitative easing
(buying Treasury securities) rather than credit easing (lending directly to the private sector), or if the
central bank cannot change people’s believe about the future interest rate policy. A second approach
is the limitation of arbitrage, often modelled by assuming some kind of segmented asset markets, e.g.
due to preferred-habitat motives as in Vayanos and Vila (2009). One example is Chen et al. (2012)
where the authors aim to simulate the second large scale asset purchase programme by the Fed, by
augmenting a standard DSGE model (with nominal and real rigidities) with segmented bond markets.
According to the authors, their paper “wants to give QE programs a chance” [Chen et al. (2012), p. 290]
by assuming that heterogeneous preferences for assets of different maturities exist leading to such kind
of asset market segmentation. This implies that the long-term interest rate plays a role in determining
aggregate demand distinctly from the expectation of short-term rates. Therefore, even if the central
instance Claeys, A. Leandro, et al. (2015)). Yet, this early assessment does not included later changes to policies as
mentioned above. More recent studies, such as Claeys and L. Leandro (2016), suggest that purchases of German bonds
will be constraint between April 2017 and March 2018. However, in December 2016 the ECB announced that purchases for
bonds below the deposit facility “will be permitted to the extent necessary”, which again relaxes this constraint.
11See also Figure 2.3.
12The necessary condition for this is to break the Wallace’s irrelevance theorem, see Wallace (1981).
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bank has already lowered the short-term rate to zero for an extended period and, thus, is constraint
by the ZLB, its monetary policy could still have a positive impact on the macro economy by directly
influencing current long-term rates. By using a counterfactual evaluation of what would have happened
in the absence of the Fed’s QE programme Chen et al. (2012) find a modest increase in GDP of less than
a third of a percentage point while inflation barely changes with or without the intervention.
A second stream of literature focuses on the long-term impact of quantitative easing. These papers
often make use of various kinds of VAR estimators to study the effects on financial markets and the real
economy. Examples include Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) for the Bank of Japan, Boeckx et al. (2014),
and Lewis et al. (2015) for the ECB, or Kapetanios et al. (2012) for the Bank of England. An interesting
cross country analysis focusing on the long-term effects of QE is Gambacorta et al. (2014). In their
paper, the authors evaluate different unconventional monetary policies from eight advanced economies
and their effects on the real economy by estimating a panel VAR model with monthly data. Arguing
that the global financial crisis has been an important common factor in the business cycle of the sample
countries, the authors try to exploit the cross-country dimension and focus on a rather short time span
from January 2008 to June 2011. By using a mean group estimator and following the standard approach
of Pesaran and Smith (1995) to account for cross-country heterogeneity in e.g. monetary policy design
Gambacorta et al. (2014) find that, if the central bank is at the ZLB, an exogenous increase in its balance
sheet translates to a temporary increase in output and consumer prices.
Finally, a third stream of literature examines the short-term effects on financial markets. Many papers
do so by the means of event studies, or term structure models, or both. See for example Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Gagnon et al. (2011), D’Amico and King (2013), and Chodorow-Reich
(2014) for the Fed policy, Eser and Schwaab (2016) and Szczerbowicz (2015) for unconventional mone-
tary policy programmes in the Euro Area, or Christensen and Krogstrup (2014) for the Swiss National
Bank. Also, some authors focus on international spill-over effects on other financial assets due to QE
announcements such as Neely (2015) or Fratzscher et al. (2014). Our work is most closely related to
Joyce, Lasaosa, et al. (2011) who examine the impact of the Bank of England’s QE policy on British
gilts. More precisely, their event study investigates how QE announcements by the Bank of England
have affected government bond markets in the short-run and how this has translated more widely to the
prices of other financial assets. Using a two-day window, they find that asset purchases by the Bank of
England could have lowered medium- to long-term gilt yields by about 100 basis points cumulatively,
which mostly results from the portfolio rebalancing effect.
Recently, several papers have been issued on the Asset Purchase Programme by the ECB. Darracq
Paries et al. (2016) augment a DSGE model with a segmented banking sector and calibrate their model to
the Euro Area and the APP. Using a term structure model, Altavilla, Carboni, et al. (2015) find that the
impact of the APP on asset prices was sizeable. Unfortunately, their observation period ends in March
2015. In addition, the main focus of Andrade et al. (2016) and Blattner and Joyce (2016) is on the impact
of the APP on the duration risk channel and banks’ capital relieve, and on net bond supply and changes
in duration risk, respectively. Another work closely related to this chapter is De Santis (2016) who also
examines the effects on Euro Area government yield relying on Bloomberg news of the APP. In contrast
to this chapter, he focuses on the general monthly reduction in yields and his observation period ends in
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October 2015.
To summarise, many authors do seem to find a positive impact of asset purchase programmes on
financial markets at least in the short-run. This is especially the case in times of financial crisis and
general uncertainty. However, the longer-term effects on the real economy are less clear. One reason for
this is the fact that it is empirically more difficult to clearly identify the effects of a QE policy on the
macro economy separately from other policies happening at same time. Moreover, from a theoretical
point of view there is no clear consensus in the literature if and how asset purchase programmes may be
transmitted to the real economy.
2.4 Measuring Asset Price Channels
With the introduction of a full scale QE programme the ECB aims to fulfil its mandate of maintaining
price stability. Given this target of bringing inflation back on track, it might not be apparent why we
focus on financial markets. From an econometric point of view, measuring the wider impact of the APP
on general asset prices or macro-economic variables for a longer-term is a difficult task since it is very hard
to disentangle it from other influences. This is especially true for a not fully integrated monetary union of
different countries where uncoordinated national fiscal policies or regulations might support or counteract
a common monetary policy. Moreover, even in the case of a fully integrated domestic fiscal policy, the
transmission mechanism of a QE programme to the macro economy could be subject to long lags or be
polluted by other policies and developments be it domestic or international. Thus, we should expect to
see the most direct and clearest impact of the APP on the financial markets. If the QE programme by
the ECB does not prove to be effective on the financial markets, it is rather unlikely it will be effective
on the rest of the economy. Put differently, one might interpret a positive response of asset prices as
a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the APP to reach its ultimate goal of raising inflation to
normal levels via the asset price channel.
Therefore, in this chapter we try to answer the question if this necessary condition has been satisfied.
In doing so, we build on a similar methodology as in Joyce, Lasaosa, et al. (2011) and apply it to the
Euro Area taking into account the specific institutional set up of the Euro Area and large cross-country
heterogeneity. More precisely, we try to identify the strength of the portfolio rebalancing channel using
the government bond-OIS spread. In this framework, we think of four different channels from which
the Asset Purchase Programme by the ECB could have a potential impact on government bond prices,
namely the signalling channel, the portfolio rebalancing channel, the liquidity premium channel, and the
credit risk channel.
The signalling channel – sometimes also labelled as the policy news or macro news channel – reflects
all new information that market participants learn from ECB press releases or policy announcement
about the economy or the ECB’s reaction function. Typically, after a policy announcement the President
of the ECB, Mario Draghi, explains the decision of the Governing Council in a press conference and
explains how the Council sees the underlying state of the economy. Thus, this channel also captures the
expectation formation of economic agents about future ECB policy rates. Note that this definition is
rather broad and, therefore, includes the expected path of future short-term interest rates. Hence, as
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market participants are revising their perception of future term premia, this channel also directly effects
a range of other financial variables such as government bond yields, the OIS rate, or even the exchange
rate. However, the overall sign of this channel is uncertain in general. In fact, it could be either positive
or negative depending on whether market participants pay attention to the decreased policy rates in the
short-term, or, if they fear increased inflation in the future.
The second channel, which influences the yield of government bonds directly, is the portfolio rebal-
ancing channel. This channel refers directly to the response of investors who rebalance their portfolio
after the announcement of the European Central Bank to purchase government bonds on the secondary
market. The change in the relative expected return of the asset also changes the expected return of the
whole portfolio of the investor. Therefore, as a result of imperfect substitutability between long-term
government bonds and money the QE policy of the central bank can also indirectly affected the price and
yield of other assets. More specifically, the ECB purchases of mid- and longer-term government bonds are
expected to reduce yields on these bonds and, thus, also boost investors demand for alternative long-term
investments. Moreover, since investors are now certain that future ECB purchases will happen on a large
scale, the effects of this channel are likely to occur very shortly after the announcement and not just
over time when actual purchases are made. In general, this channel could be persistent and potentially
significant as it depends on the outstanding stock of bond purchases, which is considerable in the case of
the Euro Area13.
Additionally, a central bank could improve the functioning of bond markets via the liquidity and credit
risk premium channel. In principle, the potential presence of the ECB in bond markets as a major buyer
should decrease the risk premia for illiquidity of certain government bonds. The working of this channel
has been best illustrated by Mario Draghi’s famous “Whatever-it-takes” speech in July 2012 in the height
of the Euro Area debt crisis. Even though the OMT programme14 to this day never bought a single Euro
Area government bond, the very announcement was sufficient to substantially reduce the liquidity risk
premia on Spanish or Italian government bonds. Since investors knew that they could always sell their
bonds to the ECB when required, it was significantly less costly for them to acquire them in the first
place. Nonetheless, it is usually argued that this channel should be rather weak during normal times when
government bond markets are deep and liquid. Put differently, this channel is likely to be temporary
and the strength should depend on the (potential) flow of purchases. As the Public Sector Purchase
Programme was announced during calm times, we would expect only minor effects from it, especially for
Euro Area core countries.
In our assessment how the APP has influenced Euro Area government bond yields, we utilise the bond-
OIS spread. An Overnight Index Swap (OIS) is a financial contract where a predefined fixed interest
rate is swapped for a floating interest rate, which is usually linked to a compounded overnight interbank
interest rate such as the Fed funds rate or the EONIA. Since the counterparties only swap the flow of
interest payments but not the principal, credit risk is not an important factor in an OIS contract15.
13However, in traditional New Keynesian models the portfolio rebalancing channel is non-existing at the ZLB since zero
interest rate government bonds and money deposits are considered to be substitutes for investors. The only possibility how
QE could be effective in this type of models is by changing the expected path of future short-term rates via the signalling
channel. As we want to examine the strength of the portfolio rebalancing channel, we are implicitly assuming financial
markets to be incomplete or imperfect while being agnostic about the exact source of the friction.
14Formally announced two month later in September 2012.
15This feature has made it popular to interpret the LIBOR-OIS spread as a premium for overnight counterparty risk.
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Moreover, as the OIS market is very large and liquid16, and, as contracts are also collateralised we view
the OIS rate as a proxy for the risk free rate.
More importantly, as OIS contracts involve swaps of interest payments their rate should not be directly
influenced by a change in the expected supply on government bond markets (i.e. the portfolio rebalancing
channel). Instead, their rate should capture the change in the expected path of future short-term rates
(i.e. the signalling channel). Therefore, changes in the bond-OIS spread reflect the effects from the
portfolio rebalancing channel. This concept should become clearer when looking at the decomposed
standard expression for bond yields.
First, we break down the yield of a government bond into the expected path of future short-term
interest rates, an instrument specific premium, and a general term premium
y(bond)n,it =
(
1
n
) n−1∑
j=0
Et(rt+j) + ISP (bond)
n,i
t + TP (bond)
n
t , (2.1)
where y(bond)n,it represents the n−period maturity yield of the government bond from country i and
Et(rt+j) is the expected path of the one period risk-free short-term rate. Additionally, ISP (bond)
n,i
t
reflects an instrument specific term premium which is due to the bond specific effects of country i. More
precisely, this term captures any credit or liquidity premia of country i, but, also any effects from short-
term supply/demand imbalances. Furthermore, TP (bond)nt denotes a term premium due to uncertainty
about future short-term interest rates.
In a second step, we decompose the yields implied by OIS contracts in a similar fashion
y(OIS)nt =
(
1
n
) n−1∑
j=0
Etrt+j + ISP (OIS)
n
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
negligible: ≈0
+TP (OIS)nt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=TP (bond)nt
, (2.2)
where y(OIS)nt equals the n−period maturity rate of an OIS contract. Again Et(rt+j) reflects all ex-
pected future risk-free short-term rates, while ISP (OIS)nt denotes the instrument-specific premium. As
described above, the OIS rate is considered to be a risk-free rate due to the absence of credit or liquidity
risk, which is why this term is assumed to be negligible and close to 0. Finally, TP (OIS)nt refers to
a conventional term premium due to uncertainty. In general, the uncertainty about future short-term
interest rates should be same for both the OIS and the government bond market. Hence, TP (OIS)nt
equals TP (bond)nt .
Finally, subtracting (2.1) from (2.2) yields a proxy for the portfolio rebalancing effect
Spn,it = y(bond)
n,i
t − y(OIS)
n
t = ISP (bond)
n,i
t . (2.3)
As both the expected path about future short-term rates Et(rt+j) and the term premium due to uncer-
tainty TP (OIS)nt = TP (bond)
n
t cancel out, the spread yields the instrument specific premium ISP (bond)
n,i
t .
Under the assumption that credit and liquidity premia on government bonds are negligible and not di-
16This is certainly true for short and medium maturities. Indeed, the market for longer maturities is not as large and,
thus, may involve minor liquidity risk.
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rectly affected by APP announcements17 a change in the spread Sp(bond)n,it reflects demand/supply
changes from QE announcement via the portfolio rebalancing channel for any given event day.
Moreover, given the specific institutional set up of the APP and the fact many bonds cannot be
bought under current ECB regulations if the yield is below the deposit facility, we calculate the change
in Sp(bond)n,it as the conditional bond-OIS spread defined as
∆Spn,it = Sp
n,i
t+1 − Sp
n,i
t if y(bond)
n,i
t−1 > DFt. (2.4)
Suppose a one day window for a given event date t. When using daily data, a change in the spread
∆Spn,it can only be affected by APP purchases if the closing yield on the day before the announcement
y(bond)n,it−1 was above the new deposit facility DFt valid from day t onward. As Figure 2.3 reveals in
detail in the next section, on several event days specific bonds have to be excluded from our analysis
because they traded below the deposit facility and hence were not eligible for APP purchases. Note,
however, that in some instances bonds being previously ineligible in t − 1 can become eligible on event
day t if the deposit facility itself has been lowered.
2.5 Data Set and Events
In this chapter, we use daily yield data for nine different Euro Area countries: five so called core coun-
tries (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and the Netherlands) and four so called periphery countries
(Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain). More precisely, for each country we look at zero coupon benchmark
bonds ranging in maturity from 2 to 10 years. To calculate the bond-OIS spread we match each bench-
mark bond with the corresponding OIS rate18. For the regression analysis we also include daily CDS
premia and bid-ask spreads for each country and maturity. Additional control variables are the VSTOXX
volatility index and a 10 year US treasury benchmark bond. All this data is taken from Datastream.
Our data is matched with news announcements of several macroeconomic variables for each country.
The news data is taken from the calendar function of the publicly available website tradingeconomics.com.
A detailed list of these macro news variables can be found in Section 2.7.
A crucial step in any event study is to choose “the right” events. One idea could be to look at
5y5y inflation swaps as they are an important indicator of inflation expectations for central banks.
Large deviations from the inflation target could make it more likely that the ECB will introduce a QE
programme. However, the movements of inflation swaps are highly correlated with the price of oil which
makes it hard to find a direct link to QE speculations19. More commonly, authors such as Szczerbowicz
(2015) and Gagnon et al. (2011) look at official press releases, announcements, and decisions made by
the central bank to identify events. However, we believe that this approach is likely to underestimate
the number of relevant events for two reasons. First, looking only at official releases does not indicate
17Clearly, this is a crucial assumption especially for some Euro Area countries. Despite the assumption being certainly
credible for Germany it is shakier for e.g. Portugal or Italy as credit risk is higher and bid-ask spreads are more volatile
for southern countries. In fact, we have found that credit risk is influenced by our events. Thus, we cannot exclude the
possibility of a contemporaneous reduction in credit risk. This holds especially for Italy, Portugal, and Spain. We try to
tackle this issue later, see discussion below in Section 2.5 and 2.7.
18In principle, all zero coupon benchmark bonds are available also at longer maturities of up to 30 years. Unfortunately,
the longest maturity available for the OIS rate is 10 years, which limits our analysis accordingly.
19See Figure A.1 in the Appendix.
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anything about the novelty of the information. If news are already widely anticipated by the market
asset price do not tend to react too much, since the “new” information was already priced in20. Secondly,
adding to this argument, looking only at actual decision does not capture the building of expectations
prior to an announcement. In fact, expectations of market participants about an upcoming decision could
be influenced by e.g. press releases on the latest unemployment numbers or even by dinner speeches from
the central bank’s president.
An alternative popular approach in the literature to identify events is to look at news databases such as
Lexis Nexis, Factiva, or Bloomberg News and to consider only these dates which yield the highest number
of articles on a specific search query. This approach is for instance taken by Altavilla, Carboni, et al.
(2015) and De Santis (2016). Proponents of this identification strategy often argue that this procedure
better captures the expectation formation by markets and the surprise component. However, in our
view this idea might also have potential downsides. Since newspapers often have a backward looking
introduction, which might lead to a hit under a given search query despite the news article not reporting
anything new, this method is likely to overestimate the truly relevant numbers of events. In other words,
just because a central bank’s press release is newsworthy does not reveal anything about the surprise to
the new piece of information21. Therefore, a potential concern with this approach is that the number
of news articles seems to be highly correlated with any Governing Council meeting, again leading to a
potential over identification of events22.
This chapter, follows the event identification method of Fratzscher et al. (2014) to find a total of 10
event dates. In particular, we look at all ECB press releases from January 2014 to June 2016 and try to
verify the informational value by simultaneously reviewing if these releases were covered by the Financial
Times on first three pages on the next day. If this is the case, we regard this press release to be major
news and include it in our list of event days illustrated shortly in Table 2.2 and in more detail in the
Appendix in Table A.1 and A.2.
One advantage of this method is that we are more likely to consider only truly relevant event days.
Suppose a monetary decision was widely anticipated by the market, the Financial Times would most
likely report about this decision, but it would probably not do it on the first three pages containing only
the most relevant news of the day. On the contrary, even if during a ECB press conference no new decision
with respect to monetary policy was announced but, instead, Mario Draghi hinted that the Governing
Council is likely to reconsider its action in its next meeting, it is more likely that the Financial Times
would cover such an event on the first three pages23.
Given this event identification strategy we broadly distinguish between two kinds of events. The first
group being labelled as “announcement effects” refers to actual QE decisions made and covered by the
Financial Times on the first three pages. The second group of events is labelled as “speculation effects”
20Unless the new piece of information strongly surprise market participants.
21For example, the search query “Quantitative Easing <or> QE <or> Asset Purchase Programme <and> Draghi <or>
ECB <or> European Central Bank” on Lexis Nexis delivers the highest number of hits on the 22nd of January 2015 (the
day of the PSPP announcement). However, already the third highest number of hits indicates that the 05th of March 2015
(the next ECB Council Decision after the PSPP announcement) would be an important event. Yet, nothing was announced
nor expected to happen at this Governing Council meeting so shortly after the previous announcement in January 2015.
Instead, many newspapers referred to the important announcement from the previous meeting.
22Please find this alternative approach in Figure A.2 in the Appendix.
23One potential drawback of this approach could be that our events are not truly exogenous. For instance, if there are
large movements in the markets the FT could simply try to give an ex post explanation for these movements on the next
day. While we cannot fully exclude this possibility note that any news based event study would be subject to this concern.
18
2.6. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Table 2.2: Event Days from ECB Press Releases and Financial Times Headlines
 Date Kind Summary                   
05.06.2014 ECB monetary  
policy decisions 
The Governing Council decided on a combination of measures 
• Lower the deposit facility by 10 basis points to -0.10% 
• Intensify preparatory work for purchases in the ABS market  
04.09.2014 ECB monetary  
policy decisions 
The Governing Council decided to  
• Lower the deposit facility by 10 basis points to -0.20% 
• Announce the ABS Purchase Programme (ABSPP) 
• Announce the Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP3)  
14.01.2015 ECB press 
release 
We take note of the European Court of Justice Advocate General’s legal opinion in the OMT case. This is an important 
milestone in the request for a preliminary ruling, which will only be concluded with the judgement of the Court 
22.01.2015 ECB monetary  
policy decisions 
ECB announces expanded APP 
• ECB purchases bonds issued by Euro Area central governments, agencies and European institutions (PSPP) 
• Combined monthly asset purchases of €60 billion 
03.09.2015 ECB monetary  
policy decisions 
The Governing Council decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. 
• Increase the issue share limit from 25% to 33%, subject to a case-by-case verification  
22.10.2015 ECB monetary  
policy decisions 
The Governing Council decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. Draghi:  “Adjust the size, composition 
and duration of QE” 
03.12.2015 ECB monetary  
policy decisions 
The Governing Council decided to 
• Lower the deposit facility by 10 basis points to -0.30% 
• Extend the APP until the end of March 2017, or beyond  
• Include regional and local governments in the PSPP list 
21.01.2016 ECB monetary  
policy decisions 
The Governing Council decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. Draghi: “There are no limits to our 
action” 
18.02.2016 ECB press 
release 
The minutes show the Governing Council was unanimous in concluding that its current policy stance “needed to be 
reviewed and possibly reconsidered”. 
10.03.2016 ECB monetary  
policy decisions 
The Governing Council decided to 
• Lower the deposit facility by 10 basis points to -0.40% 
• Expand the monthly purchases of APP from €60 billion at present to €80 billion.  
• Increase the issuer and issue share limits from 33% to 50% for international organisations and multilateral 
development banks 
• Announce purchases of investment-grade bonds issued by non-banks in the corporate sector (CSPP) 
 
Green: announcement effects (new QE announcement and Financial Times P.1-3).
Yellow: speculation effects (no new QE announcement, but Financial Times P.1-3).
and refers to ECB press releases or announcements with no new decision which were, nonetheless, covered
by the Financial Times on the next morning on the first three pages24.
2.6 Descriptive Analysis
As a result of the prolonged (near) zero interest policy by several major central banks interest rates
around the globe are at historic lows. Some governments such as Germany or Japan have even issued 10
year bonds with a negative yield. Therefore, the general downward trend in yields observed in Figure 2.3
is not surprising. Despite yields of different Euro Area countries being at different levels, most countries
in our sample show the same strong downward trend with some 10 year bonds of Euro Area core countries
being close to 0. The temporary increase across yields for Euro Area countries during the summer of 2015
can be explained by the Greek default at that time and renewed fears of a breakup of the Euro Area. After
a new rescue package had been agreed upon by European policy makers, the general downward trend
continued for most core countries. At the end of our sample in June 2016 even bonds with a maturity of
24To illustrate this, consider for example the 14th of January 2015. On this day the ECB issued a short press release
commenting on the European Court of Justice Advocate General’s legal opinion in the OMT case. Even though the ECB
did not announce anything specific in this press release the Financial Times reported about it on the next day on page 3
with the headline “Legal ruling paves way for Euro-zone easing”. Since the Advocate General recommended the court to
approve the OMT programme many market participants interpreted this as the removal of an important legal hurdle before
the potential announcement of a QE programme on the next Governing Council decision one week later.
19
2.6. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Figure 2.3: Zero Coupon Benchmark Bonds
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Source: Datastream. Vertical lines indicate announcement dates.
Y-axis shows bond yield. Note the different Y-axis scaling.
10 years trade at a yield of below 1% for these core countries. In contrast, the yields of countries at the
periphery remained roughly stable after the Greek rescue package with 10 year yield being around 1%
to 2%. Only Portugal exhibited higher yields. The second aspect to note about Figure 2.3 is that some
core country bonds, especially the ones ranging in maturity from 2 to 5 years, trade already below the
deposit facility, which implies they cannot be bought under ECB’s regulations.
As a result of the general downward trend in yields and the main refinancing rate of the ECB being
close to or at 0%, OIS rates showed a similar development in the period investigated. Figure 2.4 illustrates
a very similar behaviour of OIS rates compared to the ones described above. Since an OIS contract is
nothing but a swap of a fixed versus a floating interest rate (such as the EONIA), the OIS rate is
predominantly influenced by the expected path of future short-term interest rates. Therefore, for a given
maturity a negative EONIA-OIS rate can be interpreted as reflecting market expectations that negative
EONIA rates remain for an extended period of time.
As shown in Section 2.4 in Equation (2.3), one can calculate the spread between Euro Area government
bonds and OIS rates to obtain a proxy for portfolio rebalancing. Figure 2.5 displays the spread over the
whole period of investigation. There are a few issues that should be highlighted.
First, the APP pushed down yields of all nine countries shortly after the announcement of the PSPP in
January 2015 and, thus, strongly narrowed the bond-OIS spread across all maturities showing the direct
impact of the portfolio rebalancing channel. Second, bond-OIS spreads for shorter maturities enter and
remain in negative territory in many core countries. In particular, this is the case for Belgium, Germany,
20
2.6. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Figure 2.4: Euro OIS Rates
Source: Datastream. Vertical lines indicate announcement dates. Y-axis shows implied OIS yield.
Figure 2.5: Daily Bond-OIS Spread by Country
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Source: Datastream, own calculations. Vertical lines indicate announcement dates.
Y-axis shows bond-OIS spread in BPS. Note the different Y-axis scaling.
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and the Netherlands. Third, in times of enhanced market stress during the Greek default in June 2015
spreads for German Bunds remained largely negative and narrow across maturities highlighting the safe-
haven role of German Bunds. On the other hand, spreads for all other countries increased again, both in
terms of bond-OIS spreads and spreads across maturities. This is most pronounced for Italy, Portugal,
and Spain. Fourth, after the enlargement of the PSPP in March 2016 from 60 billion EUR to 80 billion
EUR spreads for longer maturities narrowed again.
Most notable in Figure 2.5 is the case of Germany where spreads turn and remain negative even at a
10 year maturity. Negative bond-OIS spreads for Germany were already observed during times of high
market stress as in the financial crisis of 2008-09 or during the European debt crisis in 2012, yet, only
for shorter maturities. At that time the negative spread was largely interpreted as flight-to-liquidity25
and flight-to-safety considerations by the markets buying German short-term Bunds on a large scale26.
Taken together, we interpret this phenomenon as a mix of the direct impact from the APP, decreasing the
spread for most countries across different maturities, and flight-to-safety considerations by the markets
for the German case keeping bond-OIS spreads negative even for longer maturities and during the Greek
crisis.
Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7 take a closer look at how the yield curve of the OIS rate (signalling channel)
and the yield curve of bond-OIS spreads (proxy for portfolio rebalancing channel) developed around the
event days over a two day window. In fact, selecting the window length is subject to a trade-off in any
event study. On the one hand, we want to give markets sufficient time for revising their expectations
and to fully understand the impact of the APP on asset prices. Given the novelty of the APP and its
unique institutional set-up, we think it is appropriate not to consider high frequency data but rather
look at the broader picture. On the other hand, if windows are too large they could be polluted by other
information. In this case, we would not only measure the desired effect of the QE programme but also
other developments in the market, which are incorporated into asset prices. As a robustness test we also
consider one day or three day windows27. This changes the results quantitatively but not qualitatively.
In terms of cumulative changes over all identified events Figure 2.6, in a nutshell, illustrates that in the
beginning the APP had sizeable effects on the expected future rates but these positive effects decreased
over time with every additional QE announcement having less or even negative effects28.
To explain Figure 2.6 in greater detail, first note that each symbol illustrates the change for one matu-
rity of the OIS rate on a given event date over a two day window. Put differently, the cumulative change
in the OIS rate is plotted as the ordinate and the corresponding maturity for each rate as the abscissa with
each colour being the change in the yield curve for one event date. Secondly, as outlined in Section 2.5
we roughly distinguish between actual announcements (solid symbols) and so called speculations effects
(hollow symbols).
25Accordingly, also the spread of German Bunds against the German KfW increased significantly even though these two
have effectively the same issuer.
26Hence, one might discuss the role of the OIS rate as the risk free rate. In our view, both German Bunds and the OIS
rate can be seen as a risk free rate but more in the sense of a complementary. For a more detailed discussion see also ECB
(2014). As the purpose of this event study is to measure the impact of the APP on Euro Area bonds, and as OIS rates are
not directly affected from the portfolio rebalancing channel it would not make sense, in our view, to take German Bunds
as the risk free rate.
27See Figure A.3 in the Appendix.
28Note that in some events ECB financing rates have also changed. As these two distinct announcements happened at
the very same time, we cannot distinguish between the effects conventional and unconventional monetary policy. However,
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Figure 2.6: Signalling Channel: Cumulative Total Change in OIS Rate
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Source: Datastream, own calculations. Hollow symbols indicate speculation effects, solid indicate
announcement effects. X-axis shows maturity, Y-axis shows the reduction of OIS rate in BPS. Hence, a group of
symbols illustrates the cumulative change in the yield curve.
At first, the APP was rather efficient as each event lowered the yield curve in cumulative terms.
Not surprisingly, one of the strongest reductions in the yield curve stemming from the signalling channel
occurred after the announcement of the PSPP in January 201529 especially for longer maturities. This
trend continued until October 2015 where no policy change was announced but Mario Draghi hinted
the next Governing Council’s meeting is likely to “adjust the size, composition and duration of QE”.
However, the December announcement in 201530 proved to have largely disappointed markets as shown
by a strong rise in the cumulative yield curve to levels even above these of January 2015 for shorter
maturities. Afterwards, each event merely had a minor effect on the yield curve. Even the increase of
the APP from 60 to 80 billion EUR in March 2016 seemed to have again disappointed markets as the
cumulative yield curve rose relative to its level in February 2016.
The overall effectiveness of the APP gives similar results when examining the cumulative change
in bond-OIS spreads in Figure 2.7. In general, Figure 2.7 confirms the impression from Figure 2.6
suggesting a mildly positive impact on bond yields from QE policy which are, however, diminished with
every additional announcement over time. Importantly, we measure a stronger reduction in the yield
curve for Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, whereas the reduction is less pronounced for Euro Area
core countries of Belgium, Finland, France, and the Netherlands. For Germany we measure the weakest
as both are important for the signalling channel we do not consider this a problem.
29Denoted by the difference between green hollow diamonds and grey solid diamonds.
30Denoted by the difference between orange hollow triangles and turquoise solid squares.
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Figure 2.7: Portfolio Rebalancing Channel: Cumulative Total Bond-OIS Spread
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Source: Datastream, own calculations. Hollow symbols indicate speculation effects, solid indicate
announcement effects. X-axis shows maturity, Y-axis shows the reduction of the bond-OIS spread in BPS.
Hence, a group of symbols illustrates the cumulative change in the yield curve. Note the different Y-axis scaling.
reaction in terms of the bond-OIS spread, suggesting the reduction of bond yields stems mostly from the
signalling channel but not from the portfolio rebalancing channel.
In particular for short-term bonds of two or three years, the evidence suggests that the portfolio
rebalancing channel has lowered the yield by only 11.81 BPS for Belgium or 8.35 BPS for Finland. In the
case of Germany the cumulative change is lowest with a reduction of only 1.98 BPS. In contrast, countries
at the periphery seem to be much more affected by the portfolio rebalancing channel with 2 year Italian
and Portuguese bonds being reduced by 50.86 BPS and 62.45 BPS, respectively. For longer maturities the
portfolio rebalancing has lowered the yield curve in most core countries by roughly 25-35 BPS, with the
exception of Germany. Again, long-term bonds of Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain have been affected
much more. The strongest reduction we measure is a decrease of 95 BPS in 6 year benchmark bonds for
Portugal.
One disadvantage of this method is that we cannot directly disentangle changes in the bond-OIS
spread resulting from portfolio rebalancing from changes in the underlying credit or liquidity risk due to
potential macro spill-over effects. Both could potentially influence Sp(bond)n,it which would, therefore,
not only represent effects from the portfolio rebalancing channel. In other words, as market participants
could interpret a QE announcement by the ECB as an implicit way of easing fiscal conditions for member
states or, alternatively, as lowering the likelihood of a breakup of the Euro Area, we cannot excluded the
possibility of changes in the perceived credit risk for a given country. In particular, this is likely to be
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Table 2.3: Cumulative Impact of APP Press Releases on Selected Maturities in BPS
2 Year 5 Year 10 Year Average
Belgium -11.81 -25.14 -35.96 -26.17
Finland -8.35 -20.89 -24.34 -20.19
France -8.81 -24.89 -32.04 -23.78
Germany -1.98 -2.82 -8.23 -5.91
Ireland -21.26 -48.05 -49.54 -44.81
Italy -50.86 -75.94 -71.41 -69.67
Netherlands -9.98 -21.90 -25.88 -21.46
Portugal -62.45 -94.29 -82.68 -85.80
Spain -44.68 -69.63 -61.45 -62.11
OIS -4.35 -13.11 -19.84 -14.17
the case for periphery countries. We try to disentangle these effects in the next section.
Table 2.3 summarises the cumulative effects for all events for some selected maturities. Accordingly,
we see the strongest average (across maturities) reduction in yields from portfolio rebalancing for Portugal
(85.80 BPS), followed by Italy (69.67 BPS) and Spain (62.11 BPS). In total, German yields have only been
lowered by 5.91 BPS. Note, however, that one would expect stronger effects from portfolio rebalancing
for longer maturities of 20 or 30 years which we, unfortunately, cannot measure. Also, we find rather
small effects from the signalling channel measured as the change in OIS rates.
One explanation for the weak effects on Euro Area core countries’ bonds could be the institutional
set up of the APP such as the ECB’s regulation of not purchasing bonds below the deposit facility. Even
though we do see the expected decreases for early announcements, cumulative spreads do often not react
to later announcements, especially for German Bunds at several shorter maturities. This is due to the
imposed condition that the yield of a bond has to be above the deposit facility. Also the regulations with
respect to the issue and issuer limit described in Section 2.2 could undermine the market’s credibility
in the ECB’s ability of successfully implementing its QE programme. This might be one reason for the
weaker response at later events.
An alternative explanation for why we measure such mild effects for core countries is that the ECB
mostly bought longer-term bonds which we would not observe in our data set. Unfortunately, the ECB
does not publish much details about the bonds bought other than some aggregate information. However,
the ECB claims that its interventions are intended to be market-neutral with respect to maturity31, i.e.
there is no bias towards any specific maturities. Also, the weighted average maturity bought, which
is published by the ECB, is comparably low for counties such as Germany and mostly stable in the
observation period suggesting that this explanation is unlikely to hold32.
In our view, the most likely explanation for the weak effect on German Bunds is that the portfolio
rebalancing channel might not have worked to the same extent as for other countries. As theory suggest,
portfolio rebalancing can only work if assets are not perfect substitutes, i.e. if investors have a preferred
habitat motive, whereas, if assets are perfect substitutes quantitative easing is doomed to fail at the zero
lower bound. Given the exceptional standing of German Bunds investors might consider them as being
closer to a perfect substitute of the risk free rate than other government bonds, for which we measure
stronger effects. In contrast, countries with higher bond yields did show a more pronounced reduction
31For more details see the ECB’s website https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/pspp-qa.en.html.
32See Figure A.4 in the Appendix.
25
2.7. REGRESSION ANALYSIS
suggesting that the portfolio rebalancing channel work more effectively for these countries.
2.7 Regression Analysis
In order to provide a more detailed analysis, we run several event regressions in a similar spirit as
in Szczerbowicz (2015) and Altavilla, Carboni, et al. (2015). Event regressions assume that markets are
informationally efficient meaning that new pieces of information immediately enter into prices of stocks
or bonds. Therefore, assuming that price movements are essentially characterized by a random walk in
the absence of information using standard OLS techniques provides a reliable estimator to measure the
significance of a single event day. Following this general approach, we proceed in two steps. In a first
event regression, we measure how core and periphery bond yields were affected by each identified APP
press release separately. In fact, most APP releases positively surprised the markets, leading to a drop in
bond yields. Yet, some releases led to an increase in bond yields as markets were largely disappointed by
the new piece of information. In a second regression, we group all identified events together into a single
dummy variable to measure the average effect from QE on each country. In doing so, we also estimate
the relative strength of the different asset price channels described earlier.
More precisely, in our first model we run separate regressions on the conditional change for each bond
yield ∆y(bond)m,i
t|y(bond)t−1>DFt
over a two day window of some selected maturities taking the set of our
ten event dummies as explanatory variables. Note that the superscript m distinguishes between core and
periphery countries. Also, we include a wide range of control variables to measure the surprise effect
of other macroeconomic news announcements during our respective period of interest. This yields the
following estimator
∆y(bond)m,i
t|y(bond)t−1>DFt
=
k∑
i=1
αiAPPi,t +
k∑
i=1
βiNewsi,t + γ∆y(bond)
m,i
t−1 + ǫt, (2.5)
where APPi,t denotes all our identified APP announcement and speculation events individually, Newsi,t
represents a term for other news announcements, and ǫt is an error term. A detailed overview about other
news variables and how they are constructed is provided in the Appendix in Table A.3. Not surprisingly,
running several tests for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation suggest that both are very likely in our
data set. The F-Test for the event dummies and control variable coefficients is jointly tested and rejected
under the zero-null hypothesis. To correct for both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the error
terms, Newey-West standard errors for coefficients are used when estimating OLS. Also, ∆y(bond)m,it−1
denotes a lag to address first order auto-regression.
Table 2.4 shows the results of the basic event regressions for some selected maturities, controlling
for the surprise component of a wide range of other macroeconomic news releases. As we are mostly
interested in the relevance and general impact for each event day we only show the respective event
dummies, suppressing the output of other control variables to examine potential heterogeneous effects
among APP press releases33. Our results are mostly supportive of the conclusions drawn in the previous
33Note that due to serial correlation of the error terms the estimator are not efficient in this case. However, as serial
correlation does generally not lead to a bias we do not consider this an issue here.
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Table 2.4: Event Regression on the Conditional Change in Bond Yield
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES 2 Year 3 Year 5 Year 7 Year 8 Year 10 Year
Panel A: Core Countries
05.06.2014: First purchase hints -3.945*** -7.383*** -11.66*** -11.54*** -10.71*** -9.098***
04.09.2014: ABS and CBPP3 -5.850*** -7.146*** -8.350*** -7.823*** -6.991*** -5.137***
14.01.2015: ECJ approves OMT -0.554*** -1.092*** -2.663*** -3.944*** -4.307*** -4.700***
22.01.2015: First PSPP -3.123*** -4.552*** -7.539*** -10.43*** -11.53*** -12.70***
03.09.2015: Limit increase -3.458*** -3.754*** -7.223*** -9.956*** -10.84*** -11.86***
22.10.2015: Draghi hints -6.091*** -6.908*** -7.148*** -7.134*** -6.887***
03.12.2015: Second PSPP 15.86*** 20.71*** 23.35*** 24.13*** 24.65***
21.01.2016: Draghi hints -3.092*** -3.443*** -2.985*** -2.647*** -1.861***
18.02.2016: GC minutes release -3.245*** -4.889*** -5.564*** -6.417***
10.03.2016: Third PSPP 6.112*** 6.082*** 4.701*** 4.104*** 3.248***
Observations 2,013 2,560 3,181 3,240 3,241 3,241
Panel B: Periphery Countries
05.06.2014: First purchase hints -12.63*** -15.17*** -16.03*** -14.04*** -12.87*** -9.988***
04.09.2014: ABS and CBPP3 -11.54*** -14.60*** -16.21*** -16.65*** -16.47*** -15.79***
14.01.2015: ECJ approves OMT 1.699** 1.894** 1.162 0.374 0.236 0.567
22.01.2015: First PSPP -9.654*** -11.90*** -14.54*** -16.51*** -17.40*** -18.95***
03.09.2015: Limit increase -6.818*** -8.350*** -11.17*** -12.94*** -13.40*** -13.86***
22.10.2015: Draghi hints -9.163*** -10.65*** -12.37*** -12.43*** -12.26*** -11.97***
03.12.2015: Second PSPP 10.92*** 14.90*** 20.53*** 24.12*** 25.30*** 26.16***
21.01.2016: Draghi hints -2.455*** -3.419*** -4.740*** -5.384*** -5.475*** -5.229***
18.02.2016: GC minutes release -2.995 -5.048* -6.340* -6.268* -6.085** -5.727**
10.03.2016: Third PSPP 0.852 0.310 -1.901 -2.710 -2.724 -2.662
Observations 2,552 2,596 2,596 2,596 2,596 2,596
Notes: Conditional change of bond yield over a two day window as the dependent variable. The error terms are assumed to
be heteroscedastic and possibly serial correlated up to a lag of 250 observations (i.e. daily data). Additional control variables are
included but suppressed in output. Time frame is from 01.01.2014 - 30.06.2016. Number of observations varies as the spread is
calculated as the conditional spread. ∗ ∗ ∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, and ∗ = p < 0.1.
section. Most events show the anticipated sign of a reduction in yields both for core and periphery
countries. The coefficients for periphery countries are usually larger compared to core countries which
could be due to an implicit reduction in credit risk for periphery countries. Also consistent with previous
findings, some press releases seem to have disappointed the markets leading to an increase in yields.
In particular, the December announcement of 2015 has increased the yield for both core and periphery
countries by several basis points. For core countries, the 3rd PSPP Announcement in March has also
increased the yield whereas it is negative but not significant for periphery countries.
Another finding we can confirm from the previous section is that for the majority of cases the change
in the conditional yield is more pronounced for mid-length and longer maturities. In contrast, short-term
maturities are usually less affected, if not even excluded from purchases. For example, this is largely the
case for the first announcement of the PSPP on the 22nd of January 2015.
Finally note that there is no output produced for many two year core country bonds at later events
due to our prior imposed condition that the yield of a given bond must be above the deposit facility.
Currently, we have excluded these bonds as they cannot be bought by the ECB. However, one could also
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relax this condition34.
In order to provide a more detailed analysis on a country specific level, we also estimate the average
effect of our ten events by grouping them into one dummy. As illustrated in Section 2.4, the yield of a
country’s bond can be influenced through several channels by QE announcements. In the following, we
proxy the strength of each of these channels for all countries directly by estimating the following equation
taking the change in OIS rates (signalling channel), the change in bid-ask spreads (liquidity channel), the
change in CDS premia (credit risk channel), and the change in the bond-OIS spread (portfolio rebalancing)
over a two day window as the dependent variable. For each country n, this yields the following regression
∆yn,i
t|y(bond)t−1>DFt
= αAll Eventst +
k∑
i=1
βiNewsi,t + γ∆y
n,i
t−1 + ǫt, (2.6)
where ∆yn,i
t|y(bond)t−1>DFt
denotes each of the four dependent variables (OIS rate, bid-ask spread, CDS
premia, and bond-OIS spread), respectively. To address serial correlation of the error terms again Newey-
West standard errors are used.
As already discussed, taking the bond-OIS spread to measure the strength of the portfolio rebalancing
channel is subject to two crucial assumptions, namely no liquidity and no credit risk for any given bond.
In order to account for any unobserved changes in credit or liquidity risk, we include the contemporaneous
changes in the country specific daily CDS premia and bid-ask spreads as additional control variables in our
event regression. Moreover, to address concerns about potential macro spill-overs, which could influence
the perceived unobserved credit risk and the general market sentiment, we also include the Euro Stoxx 50
Volatility Index (VSTOXX) being sometimes referred to as the Fear Index. Including changes in both the
VSTOXX index as well as a 10 year US treasury bond also gives the benefit of controlling for any other
unobserved market news. In sum, our extended event regressions on the portfolio rebalancing channel
for each country n read as
∆Spn,i
t|y(bond)t−1>DFt
= αAll Eventst +
k∑
i=1
βiNewsi,t + γ∆Sp
n,i
t−1 +
k∑
i=1
θi∆Xi,t + ǫt, (2.7)
where, ∆Spn,i
t|y(bond)t−1>DFt
is the conditional bond-OIS spread over a two day window and ∆Xi,t denotes
all other control variables each defined as the change over a two day window. The results of these
estimators are presented in Table 2.5 and 2.6.
One disadvantage of a single event dummy is that positive and negative events can cancel each other
out, potentially leaving the average effect insignificantly different from zero. This seems to be the case
for the signalling channel proxied by the OIS rate35.
34As a robustness check, we also estimate regressions without this constraint (available upon request). The results
indicate that the yields on the excluded bonds actually often increase over the event window rather than decreases. One
reason for this unexpected result could be that some investors speculated that the ECB could lower the deposit facility
or even abolish the “no purchases below the deposit facility” rule. Thus, speculative investors would have bought such
bonds shortly before an event and then, after the unchanged policy was released, sold these bonds again creating downward
pressure on prices and increasing the yield.
35Intuitively, the signalling channel should be the same for all Euro Area countries. However, since we include several
country specific macro news announcements as explanatory variables the coefficients vary slightly among countries.
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Table 2.5: Measuring Average Effect of QE From Different Channels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES OIS Bid-Ask CDS Portfolio Portfolio
Panel A: Belgium
All Events -1.050** -0.688*** -0.505*** -2.336*** -2.194***
Delta Bid-Ask 0.0155
Delta CDS Premia 0.0682***
Delta VSTOXX 0.0610***
Delta US 10y Bond -2.626***
Panel B: Finland
All Events -0.650 0.107* -0.202*** -1.703*** -1.575***
Delta Bid-Ask -0.00462
Delta CDS Premia 0.364***
Delta VSTOXX 0.0196
Delta US 10y Bond 0.302
Panel C: France
All Events -0.943 -0.249 -0.544*** -1.843*** -1.616***
Delta Bid-Ask -0.0185*
Delta CDS Premia 0.183***
Delta VSTOXX 0.0869***
Delta US 10y Bond 0.805
Panel D: Germany
All Events -0.798 1.272*** -0.469*** -0.499* -0.796***
Delta Bid-Ask 0.0597***
Delta CDS Premia -0.0405***
Delta VSTOXX -0.116***
Delta US 10y Bond 1.493***
Panel E: Ireland
All Events -1.012* 3.836*** -0.555*** -2.219*** -1.309***
Delta Bid-Ask 0.0182**
Delta CDS Premia 0.838***
Delta VSTOXX 0.254***
Delta US 10y Bond -5.290***
Panel F: Italy
All Events -0.691 1.130*** -4.736*** -5.183*** -0.526
Delta Bid-Ask -0.0356***
Delta CDS Premia 0.620***
Delta VSTOXX 0.305***
Delta US 10y Bond -4.050***
Notes: Change in OIS rate (signalling channel), bid-ask spread (liquidity channel), CDS premia (credit risk channel), and
conditional change in bond-OIS rate (portfolio rebalancing channel) each over a two day window as the dependent variable. The
error terms are assumed to be heteroscedastic and possibly serial correlated up to a lag of 250 observations (i.e. daily data).
Additional news control variables are included but suppressed in output. Extended model is used for the regression on the bond-
OIS spread. Time frame is from 01.01.2014 - 30.06.2016. Numbers of observations vary between 5805 and 5030 because the spread
is calculated as the conditional spread. ∗ ∗ ∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, and ∗ = p < 0.1.
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Table 2.6: Measuring Average Effect of QE From Different Channels - Cont’d
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES OIS Bid-Ask CDS Portfolio Portfolio
Panel G: Netherlands
All Events -0.977* 0.844*** -0.424*** -2.247*** -2.192***
Delta Bid-Ask -0.0115
Delta CDS Premia 0.0839***
Delta VSTOXX -0.0122
Delta US 10y Bond -0.701*
Panel H: Portugal
All Events -0.881 -0.104 -5.262*** -6.704*** -1.632***
Delta Bid-Ask 0.0305**
Delta CDS Premia 0.641***
Delta VSTOXX 0.505***
Delta US 10y Bond -9.785***
Panel I: Spain
All Events -1.011** -4.581*** -3.857*** -5.270*** -0.895
Delta Bid-Ask 0.00455**
Delta CDS Premia 0.752***
Delta VSTOXX 0.260***
Delta US 10y Bond -5.206***
Notes: Change in OIS rate (signalling channel), bid-ask spread (liquidity channel), CDS premia (credit risk channel), and
conditional change in bond-OIS rate (portfolio rebalancing channel) each over a two day window as the dependent variable. The
error terms are assumed to be heteroscedastic and possibly serial correlated up to a lag of 250 observations (i.e. daily data).
Additional news control variables are included but suppressed in output. Extended model is used for the regression on the bond-
OIS spread. Time frame is from 01.01.2014 - 30.06.2016. Numbers of observations vary between 5805 and 5030 because the spread
is calculated as the conditional spread. ∗ ∗ ∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, and ∗ = p < 0.1.
Decomposing the different effects of APP press releases provides interesting insights in the relative
strength of each channel. While the effects resulting from the signalling channel have the expected sign,
but are mostly insignificant, the heterogeneous effects of changes in credit and liquidity premia channel
are more pronounced in different Euro Area countries. In general, changes in bid-ask spreads and CDS
rates are usually smaller for Euro Area core countries, while countries at the periphery have reacted
stronger. Portugal, for example, shows an average reduction in CDS rates of roughly 5.3 BPS whereas
Finnish CDS premia have been lowered by only 0.2 BPS. While all changes in the CDS premia are
significant and show the anticipated sign, this is not true for changes in the bid-ask spread.
Finally, our main variable of interest, the bond-OIS spread as a proxy for portfolio rebalancing in
the basic regression, roughly confirms an earlier finding with respect to the average reduction per event
day36. However, we cannot directly interpret column (4) as the effects from portfolio rebalancing as the
instrument specific premium could also be affected by a reduction in credit risk. In fact, the extended
model indicates that after controlling for contemporaneous changes in liquidity premia, credit risk premia,
and the general market sentiment, yields were on average lowered by only 1.6 BPS for Portugal or 0.9 BPS
for Spain via the portfolio rebalancing channel. While for Euro Area core countries the basic and extended
regression models do not provide largely different coefficients, suggesting the irrelevance of changes in
36See Figure A.3 for comparison.
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Table 2.7: Effect of higher Total Purchase to Total Debt ratio
VARIABLES Change in Bond-OIS Std. Err. t-stat
Total Purchases to Total Debt -2.744*** 0.241 -11.38
Change in CDS 0.0305*** 0.00229 13.28
Change in bid-ask -0.580*** 0.137 -4.246
Observations 243
R2 0.669
Notes: Change in the conditional bond-OIS rate over a two day window as the dependent variable. Only the PSPP announce-
ments in January 2015, December 2015, and March 2016 are regarded here using pooled OLS. ∗ ∗ ∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, and
∗ = p < 0.1.
credit and liquidity premia for core countries, the differences in coefficients are more pronounced for
periphery countries. This evidence indicates that the stronger yield reduction for periphery countries has
not only resulted from stronger portfolio rebalancing. Instead, the QE policy of the ECB has reduced
the credit risk premia for these countries.
A potential concern with this regression approach could be endogeneity in our regression specification,
i.e. high spreads on Euro Area bonds could have induced the ECB to announce the APP. Yet, we believe
that this is unlikely to hold for the APP dummy variable for two reasons. First, unlike in previous
announcements the ECB has been stressing a lot that the explicit aim of the APP is to bring inflation
back on track. Second, even if one does not believe the official version and rather assumes potentially
hidden motives in the ECB announcement, such as easing fiscal conditions for some member states, we do
not believe that this is likely to be the case. Starting already in 2012 after the “Whatever-it-takes” speech,
spreads between Euro Area countries have narrowed significantly and also showed a clear downward trend
as exhibited in Figure 2.3. Another issue related to our extended regression could be multicollinearity.
As column (3) shows, our event days also have a significant impact on CDS rates implying a correlation
between at least two of our explanatory variables. However, the major concern about of multicollinearity,
namely an increase in standard errors and, thus, an increase in the likelihood of type II errors, is not
relevant in our case as the coefficient of the APP dummy mostly stays significant. Still, multicollinearity
could explain why the APP coefficient becomes insignificant for Italy and Spain.
As a final exercise, we examine how the relative size of purchases affected bond-OIS spreads. As
indicated in Section 2.2, the actual purchases of the APP are conducted by the national central banks
according to the respective capital key of each central bank. Relative to the total debt outstanding, this
implies that countries with a larger total purchase to total debt ratio should on average react stronger
to APP announcements than others. For comparison note that for the major APP announcement in
January 2015 this ratio was 15.37% for Portugal and 7.49% for Italy37. The evidence presented in Table
2.7 supports this idea. After controlling for the implicit reduction in credit and liquidity risk, countries
with higher purchases relative to their debt have reacted stronger on average.
37Details on these ratios can be found in the Appendix in Table A.4.
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2.8 Conclusion
In order to fight deflationary trends in the Euro Area the ECB gradually implemented the Asset
Purchase Programme from 2014 onwards. This chapter examined the effects of the ECB’s QE policy on
government bond yields in the Euro Area through an event study.
A difficult task in any event study is to include ex ante expectation formations by market participants
before an announcement. We have done so by not merely looking at actual APP decision but also
including press releases with relevant information covered by the Financial Times.
Based on an event study on different asset price channels we found that the effects of the APP
were strong in the first round but the marginal impact of every additional package decreased over time.
Especially for the QE decisions in December 2015 and March 2016 many market participants expected
larger packages or the removal of institutional constraints. In sum, we calculated a reduction in the yields
of Euro Area government bonds due to a reduction in the instrument specific premia, a potential proxy
for the portfolio rebalancing channel, ranging between 85.80 BPS for Portugal and only 5.91 BPS for
Germany relative to the absence of the Asset Purchase Programme. Core countries usually have shown
weaker responses while the reduction has been more pronounced for periphery countries. Consequently,
this finding suggests an implicit reduction of the credit premium for these countries.
In our view, one explanation for such weak effects of the ECB’s QE policy compared to the QE
programmes by other central banks is that the APP has been announced at calm times, diminishing
potential effects from the liquidity premia channel especially for core countries. For comparison Joyce,
Lasaosa, et al. (2011) find a reduction of 100 BPS from the Bank of England’s QE policy, while Gagnon
et al. (2011) find a reduction of yields between 30 and 100 BPS in the US. However, both QE programmes
were announced during the financial crisis of 2008-09.
A second explanation is the increasingly burdensome institutional set-up of the APP. In particular,
the ECB’s rule of not buying bonds trading below the deposit facility could significantly dampen the
impact of the APP for shorter maturities.
Finally, as the APP is designed to buy mostly government bonds our results could also be interpreted as
evidence in support for the theoretical argument made by Cúrdia and Woodford (2011), where large asset
purchase programmes at the zero lowered bound should be ineffective if they are designed as quantitative
easing in a narrow sense (pure purchase of government bonds) rather than credit easing (changing the
composition of the central bank’s balance sheet by lending directly to the distressed private sector, e.g.
via purchases of mortgage backed securities). In such a case, the same argument applies as in Eggertsson
and Woodford (2003). In fact, the closer Euro Area countries’ bonds were to the lower bound, the weaker
they have reacted.
However, the effectiveness of the ECB’s QE policy must ultimately be judged by the effectiveness of
returning inflation to the target rate. In contrast, our analysis suggests that the asset price channel via
portfolio rebalancing has not proven successful. Still, there could be real effects on the macro economy
via other channels such as forward guidance or the exchange rate channel.
32
Chapter 3
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly:
Impact of Negative Rates and QE on
the Profitability and Risk-Taking of
1600 German Banks†
†Acknowledgements: This paper was supported by the Research Data and Service Centre of the German Bundesbank,
which provided the data. I am thankful to several Bundesbank employees, most notably Harald Stahl, who provided
technical assistance related to several data issues. Moreover, I am thankful to Piergiorgio Alessandri, Christoph Basten,
Stefan Bender, Peter Bofinger, Markus Brunnermeier, Lukas Buchheim, Jens Eisenschmidt, Hesna Genay, Florian Heider,
Joao Granja, Christian Hirsch, Gerhard Illing, Mike Mariathasan, Farzad Saidi, Haresh Sapra, Glenn Schepens, Isabel
Schnabel, Michael Weber, Volker Wieland, Jing Cynthia Wu, and Peter Zorn for valuable advice. I also appreciated helpful
comments and suggestions by the participants of the MGSE Ph.D. Colloquium 2017, the Macroeconomics Seminar at the
University of Munich, the ifo Macro Seminar, the Bundesbank FDSZ Occasionally Research seminar, the 11th RGS Doctoral
Conference in Economics, the Chicago Booth Finance Brownbag, and the German Council of Economic Experts. Moreover,
research assistance by Eva Franzmeyer is acknowledged. Any errors are the responsibility of the author.
33
3.1. INTRODUCTION
3.1 Introduction
In order to fight deflationary tendencies in the Euro Area, the ECB announced several rounds of
unconventional monetary policy (UMP) measures since 2014. Most notable in this respect were the in-
troduction of a negative interest rate policy (NIRP) on bank deposits in June 2014 and the announcement
of a quantitative easing (QE) programme in January 2015. While most of the on-going discussion has
been focused on the impact on inflation, real GDP growth, or the financial markets, the focus of this
paper is on potential side effects of QE and NIRP with respect to bank income, risk-taking, and the
pass-through of monetary policy. From a financial stability perspective lowering both the level and the
slope of the yield curve is potentially worrisome for two main reasons. First, it could erode bank profits
over time reducing their skin-in-the-game and, second, it could lead to more risk-taking by banks.
To shed light on these concerns, this paper uses a large micro level data set of 1600 German banks.
The large number of banks allows exploiting heterogeneity as banks in the data set vary in size, degree
of internationality, and their business models. This is important for several reasons: First, many of
the smaller savings or cooperative banks are a crucial lender to small and medium sized enterprises in
Germany and other European countries. Second, these banks rely more on deposits as a funding source
and might be more severely hit by NIRP than large global players using various sources of funding. Most
importantly, the share of deposits is crucial for the pass-through at negative rates as argued by e.g.
Eggertsson, Juelsrud, et al. (2017) and Drechsler et al. (2017). However, most of the existing literature
has a much smaller sample of mainly large international banks compared to the one used in this paper1.
To estimate the effect of NIRP and QE on bank income and loan growth rates this paper proposes three
different approaches. The baseline regression uses a Fixed Effect (FE) and Dynamic System Generalised
Methods of Moments (System-GMM) estimator with an interaction term between the level of the short-
term interest rate and the bank specific ratio of overnight deposits as a source of funding. To assess if
going negative is a game changer for banks with a high deposit ratio, a simple dummy is introduced from
2014 onwards. Admittedly, this is a crude measure as these years could be special for many other reasons
such as new capital regulations. Therefore, as a second and more innovative approach, I use the implied
shadow rate estimated by Wu and Xia (2017) to better account for the strength of UMP. The idea here
is to capture both negative rates and the reduction in the slope of the yield curve via QE. Third, as an
additional robustness check, I use a difference-in-difference (diff-in-diff) estimator where banks with a
high deposit ratio are defined as the treatment group and low deposit banks serves as the control group.
In general, one can think of several channels how monetary policy can influence bank lending and
income during normal and unconventional times. The standard monetary transmission channel may
influence bank lending in the following way. After a cut in short-term interest rates, banks should
pass on lower interest rates to their customers increasing the demand for loans by firms and households
(interest rate channel). At the same time, as interest rates and asset prices are inversely correlated, asset
prices rise making firms and households more wealthy (wealth channel). Subsequently, banks are also
1In addition, German banks are particularly interesting due to the fact that Germany has been subject to vast capital
inflows in the recent years via the Target II payment system. Following the announcement of NIRP and QE policies, the
Target II imbalances have widened again indicating that most of the excess liquidity enters into the German banking system.
Therefore, holding above average excess liquidity relative to their European peers, German banks could be more severely
hit by these UMP measures.
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more willing to grant additional credit against the higher valued collateral (balance sheet channel). In
addition, the rise in asset prices should also boost bank income as they benefit from capital gains on their
profit and loss (P&L) statements2. As a result, bank equity increases relaxing their equity constraint
which facilitates further loan issuance (equity constraint channel). Moreover, with lower interest rates the
domestic currency should depreciate which leads to an increase in foreign demand (exchange rate channel).
Finally, following the positive economic outlook existing credit lines are likely to have a lower probability
of default as firms and households find it easier to roll-over debt (credit channel). Taken together, all the
described channels should increase real economic growth and, ultimately, increase inflation. Also, all these
developments should boost bank profits and, hence, foster financial stability. However, some authors,
such as Borio and Zhu (2012), argue that if rates are too low for too long bank lending could become
excessive (risk-taking channel) leading to bubbles in the real sector which in contrast may endanger
financial stability.
Although these channels are reasonably well understood in normal times, it is not clear how they
behave below the zero lower bound (ZLB). On the one hand, authors such as Brunnermeier and Koby
(2017) and Rognlie (2016) argue that there is nothing special about moderate negative interest rates per
se. This view is also shared by, for instance, the Swedish and Swiss central banks claiming that the interest
rate pass-through continues even with slightly negative rates3. The income of financial intermediaries is
not determined by the level of the interest rate but rather by the spread between the borrowing and the
lending rate, the so called net interest rate margin (NIM). Thus, we may be worried about the flattening
of the yield curve but not necessarily about NIRP.
On the other hand, Eggertsson, Juelsrud, et al. (2017) and Demiralp et al. (2017) find that the standard
mechanisms of monetary policy cease to function at negative interest rates due to several frictions4. While
central banks can lower their deposit facility into negative territory leading to higher costs for banks,
it is more difficult for banks to pass these additional costs on to their clients and introduce negative
interest rates on their deposits. Put differently, whereas the short-term asset side of banks’ balance
sheets can follow into negative territory, the short-term liability side is floored at zero leading to a under
representation of the true refinancing cost for banks5. In particular, this is a concern for retail banks with
large deposit holdings as a source of financing. In contrast, larger investment banks with greater market
power might find it easier to raise other sources of short-term funding, e.g. from wholesale funding or
the corporate bond market. Aggregate data from Germany presented in Figure 3.1 suggests that deposit
rates on households are in fact constrained by the ZLB whereas interbank lending rates can follow in to
negative territory.
Still, the wider impact of negative interest rates is a mostly uncharted territory with several economists
2Yet, in practice not all banks benefit equally from capital gains due to different business models and the accounting
standards at hand. For example, smaller banks often hold assets to maturity and are thus less likely to benefit from capital
gains compared to larger investment banks having a sizeable trading portfolio which is mark-to-market.
3See Riksbank (2015) and Jordan (2016).
4These frictions can come in various forms. While the existence of currency as cash is the most important one, offering
a zero yield outside alternative store of value, some authors also mention institutional constraints such as tax restrictions,
legal concerns about negative interest rates for households, or IT barriers in dealing with negative rates. However Bech and
Malkhozov (2016) find that most of these technical constraints have been resolved shortly after the introduction of negative
rates.
5As a rule of thumb the storage costs of cash is lower for smaller amounts. In this context, Scheiber et al. (2016) find
that some banks have already introduced negative interest rates for larger firms, which typically need great amounts of
liquidity, but not for households.
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Figure 3.1: Euribor and Household Deposit Rates
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Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse, MIR data set. Aggregate overnight household deposit rate for
Germany.
making conflicting predictions. Therefore, the general structure of this empirical paper is to take the
common pro and contra arguments in the literature seriously and to study their empirical relevance.
The spread between short- and long-term interest rates has a systematic effect on bank profits. It
is well understood that banks’ intrinsic business model is to borrow short and to lend long. Hence, a
positive-sloped yield curve leads to a positive NIM via the classic maturity transformation. It is usually
the case that lowering short-term interest rates helps to boost bank profits, since the spread between
short-term liabilities and long-term assets widens. Figure 3.2 illustrates the change in the yield curve
after a reduction in short-term policy rates in a stylised way. Suppose, as in panel A, a bank with a
long-term asset legacy holds only fixed interest paying assets. As these assets continue to pay the old
higher interest rates, a decline in the short end of the yield curve increases the profits of this bank due
to reduced refinancing costs and a higher margin. In contrast, if the same bank would hold only floating
interest paying assets and liabilities, as in panel B, profits are practically unaffected assuming assets and
liabilities have the same size, as found by Busch and Memmel (2015). Since the long end of yield curve
typically follows the short-term rate over time, a reduction in short-term rates leads to a simple parallel
shift of the yield curve. Also note that in the long run, all fixed assets are replaced or rolled over by new
assets paying the current market interest rate. Hence, panel A usually applies to the short run whereas
panel B captures the long run effects all else equal.
However, as for instance argued by Kerbl and Sigmund (2017), breaking through the zero lower bound
is a game changer since short-term assets can follow into negative regions while overnight deposits cannot.
If banks are charged with a negative interest rate when depositing excess liquidity at the central bank,
many of these banks are unable to directly pass these additional costs on to their clients. Subsequently,
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Figure 3.2: Lowering a Hypothetical Yield Curve: Impact on Net Interest Margins
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Source: Own illustration. X-axis shows maturity, Y-axis shows yield. Numbers are chosen simply for
illustrative purposes. Hypothetical old yield curve in blue. Response of yield curve to monetary policy in red.
their NIM narrows as panel C illustrates. In such a situation, banks could either try to change their
liability structure (e.g. by switching from deposits financing to wholesale financing), increase interbank
lending6, or charge additional fees (indirectly passing negative rates on to costumers). To which extent
these strategies help to mitigate adverse effects of NIRP on interest margins is largely unknown. In
addition to NIRP, the QE programme of the ECB is explicitly targeted at long-term maturities flattening
the slope of the yield curve. These two measures taken together could reduce the net interest margin
of banks considerably as shown in panel D. Therefore, bank profits might be strongly impaired by low
NIMs potentially inducing banks to greater risk-taking.
According to the notion of the risk-taking channel7 an increase in the quantity of credit could be
accompanied by a simultaneous decline in the quality of credit. More precisely, several sources of risk-
taking can be identified. Traditional portfolio allocation models predict a negative relationship between
risk-taking and monetary policy. Since a lower interest rate on safe assets gives incentives to investors
to reallocate their portfolio towards securities with higher yields, the overall riskiness of the portfolio
rises. At the same time, a lower risk-free rate also lowers the hurdle rate for some investment projects
6However, banks cannot be able to change the aggregate excess liquidity in the system. In fact, some banks might
successfully reduce their short-term funding overhang via interbank lending. Yet, this strategy cannot be feasible for the
system as a whole. Someone inevitably ends up holding the excess liquidity which is best illustrated by the “hot potato
effect”.
7See Borio and Zhu (2012), Adrian and Shin (2010), or Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014).
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which may have a high risk profile. As an increasing number of risky projects are financed by banks
the overall quality of the investment pool worsens. In addition, banks could engage in more extensive
maturity transformation or raise their leverage due to limited liabilities considerations. The temptation
for a hazardous behaviour could be stronger if banks find it hard to generate enough profits via reasonably
safe credits. Heider et al. (2017) stress that this behaviour is likely during negative interest rate periods
due to a decline in banks’ net worth. This undermines their incentives for prudent behaviour and careful
screening of borrowers. Moreover, Demertzis and Wolff (2016) point out that when banks earn a smaller
margin on credits, they may try to increase volume of credits to counteract the drop in margins. This
provides an additional incentive for banks to excessively expand their supply of loans.
However, the good news from the evidence presented in this paper is that banks overall do not engage
in high risk-taking by granting an excessive amount of credit or by reducing their lending standards.
Moreover, following the recent changes in the Basel requirements the majority of banks have improved
their leverage ratio over the last years. Regarding their income situation, NIRP does not pose a large
cost burden on banks; instead they benefit from the current low refinancing rates and face lower loan
loss provisions due to the positive macro-economic environment and low interest burden for borrowers.
On the other hand, the bad news is that banks neither benefit from increased fee income (as fees are
not proportional to deposits) nor from capital gains following high asset prices, which is among others
due to the conservative German accounting law. In addition, banks face increasing excess liquidity on
the asset side and increasing overnight deposits on the liability side of their balance sheets highlighting
the fact that the aggregate liquidity overhang in the system does not vanish. Taking this fact together
with the extended interest rate fixation period by banks creates a potential source of risk as the maturity
mismatch rises. Moreover, higher deposit ratios are problematic as especially these banks on average
have a lower net interest income calling into question the pass-through of monetary policy. While it is
true that average credit growth rate has increased, this macro-view misses a reshuffling of credit growth
from banks with high- to banks with low deposit ratios, which is only revealed by micro level bank data.
Therefore, this paper argues that the ugly truth is that NIRP and QE are starting to get contractionary
for banks with high deposit ratios as they have already reduced their lending growth rates. Also, as many
benefits are short-lived it remains unclear how long the positive aspects of QE and NIRP can prevail
before they are outweighed by the long-term negative impact on banks and the monetary pass-through.
In other words, for the same reason that banks now can benefit from lower refinancing rates, in a few a
years when interest rates rise again this might pose great challenges for banks with a large share of low
yield and high maturity assets.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 gives an overview on the literature
of bank profitability and risk-taking. Afterwards, Section 3.3 provides details about the German banking
system and the data set at hand. A descriptive analysis from this data set is presented in Section 3.4
followed by a more in depth regression analysis in Section 3.5 and a simple robustness check in Section
3.6. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes.
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3.2 Literature Review
This paper is related to three broadly defined strands of the literature: Bank risk-talking, bank
profitability, and the impact of conventional and unconventional monetary policy (mostly NIRP and
QE) on both. In contrast to much of the existing literature examining large international banks, this
paper focuses on exploiting the heterogeneity among different bank business models within a single major
European economy. Also, focusing on just one country makes banks largely independent from varying
business cycles in different countries, which is a usual concern with international bank data.
First of all, important contributions on how low interest rates affect bank risk-taking via the risk-
taking channel have been made by Borio and Zhu (2012), Adrian and Shin (2010), and Dell’Ariccia et al.
(2014). In addition to these theoretical work, many studies examine empirically how bank risk-taking
is affected if conventional monetary policy keeps interest rates too low for too long, including Ioannidou
et al. (2015), Maddaloni and Peydró (2011), Jiménez et al. (2014), and Dell’ariccia et al. (2017). Despite
many studies find a negative relationship between the level of short-term interest rates and bank risk-
taking, there is no clear consensus whether less capitalised banks are more or less prone to risk-taking.
For example, Dell’ariccia et al. (2017) find that risk-taking is more pronounced for well capitalised banks
due to risk shifting. On the other hand, Jiménez et al. (2014) argue that least capitalised banks react
stronger to changes in monetary policy by taking more risk when monetary policy is eased. They find
that in times of low interest rates, banks with less capital are those which are more prone to agency
problems and, thus, grant more credit to ex ante risky firms.
The second important strand of the literature relates to bank income or bank profitability. Several
authors have made important contributions to the topic of bank profitability both theoretically and
empirically, see for instance English (2002) on bank interest rate risk and the NIM, English et al. (2014)
showing that in the short run the capital gains channel outweighs changes in the net interest margin,
Alessandri and Nelson (2015) indicating that large banks try to reduce yield curve risk by hedging
against changes in income margins through interest rate derivatives, Bolt et al. (2012) on the impact of
the business cycle on bank income, and Busch and Memmel (2015) who examine how the level of interest
rates affects banks’ net interest margin. In a related paper, Busch and Memmel (2016) decompose the
different components of this margin.
While all these papers focus on normal times, this paper relates to several recent contributions on the
impact of unconventional monetary policy on bank profitability and risk-taking8. Interesting theoretical
models on the exact level of the lower bound come from Rognlie (2016) and Brunnermeier and Koby
(2017) on the reversal interest rate. At some tipping point, lowering the short-term interest rate reduces
banks’ NIM and squeezes their profits. Since banks are equity constrained, a decline in profits might force
banks to reduce their loan business which makes an expansionary monetary policy contractionary. Note
that the level of the reversal interest rate does not necessarily have to be zero but rather can be higher
or lower depending on various factors such as banks’ balance sheet structure, their dividend policies, or
the general economic environment.
8This third strand of the literature is growing fast, especially since the introduction of NIRP by the Danish Nationalbank
(July 2012), the European Central Bank (June 2014), the Swiss National Bank (January 2015), the Swedish Riksbank
(February 2015), and by the Bank of Japan (February 2016).
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So far, most of the empirical studies examine the impact of low or negative interest rates on a more
aggregate level, such as Jobst and Lin (2016) or on large international banks as in Altavilla, Boucinha,
et al. (2014). Using the same data set on international banks, Borio, Gambacorta, and Hofmann (2017)
focuses on the impact of low interest rates on bank profitability while Borio and Gambacorta (2017) is a
similar study but focuses more on bank lending and risk-taking. Also, there exists a growing literature on
the country specific experience with NIRP, see for instance Scheiber et al. (2016) for a study on Denmark
and Sweden, Basten and Mariathasan (2018) for Switzerland, Kerbl and Sigmund (2017) for the Austrian
banking sector, and Ahtik et al. (2016) for Slovenia. In addition to the effects of negative interest rates,
other authors focus on the effects of large scale asset purchase programmes such as Lambert and Ueda
(2014) and Demertzis and Wolff (2016) arguing that a QE policy boosts bank profits in short run, but
the flattening of the yield curve may lead to a decline of bank income over the long-term.
Similar to this paper is the work of Borio, Gambacorta, and Hofmann (2017) who examined for a
time period from 1995 to 2012 how certain profitability measures of banks (e.g. net interest income or
other non-interest income) are explained by a monetary policy indicator and the slope of the yield curve.
Their findings indicate that important non-linearities are present if interest rates are close to the ZLB.
More precisely, the impact of monetary policy on bank income is particularly large when interest rates
are unusually low and the yield curve is flat, leading to an erosion of bank profitability over time.
A second related paper from Demiralp et al. (2017) puts emphasis on bank balance sheet adjustments
following the introduction of negative interest rates. Focusing on large Euro Area banks the authors
distinguish between banks holding excess liquidity and those who do not. They find that treated banks
tend to give more loans, purchase more non-domestic government bonds, and lower their levels of wholesale
funding.
Another recent paper by Heider et al. (2017) focuses on bank risk-taking behaviour after the introduc-
tion of a NIRP. The authors argue that banks with large deposits are not able to pass negative interests on
to their customers. Using a difference-in-difference approach their paper shows that banks with a higher
share of deposit funding lend less and to riskier borrowers. This additional risk-taking would increase
the moral hazard problem of managing loans and ultimately raise financial stability issues.
More generally, there is a lively discussion to which degree monetary policy decisions should take
financial stability considerations into account which is, among others, largely influenced by the work of
Svensson (2015) and Stein (2014).
3.3 The German Banking System and the Data Set
Before describing the data set in detail, this section discusses some specialities of the German banking
sector in general. More importantly, the differences between the internationally known IFRS accounting
standards and the German GAAP (Handelsgesetzbuch - HGB) are described. While economist often
abstract from such technical details, a basic understanding of the rather conservative German accounting
standards is key to the right interpretation of the results as the HGB largely influences the underlying
data generating process9.
9One might argue that looking at banks’ balance sheets and P&L statement to identify banks profitability is potentially
misleading from an economic perspective. In fact, following a rise in asset prices, the solvency of any bank improves from an
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Several important aspects distinguish the German banking system from an Anglo-Saxon banking
system. First of all, Germany has a universal banking system which is divided into the so-called three
pillar system of private banks, cooperative banks, and public (savings) banks. Typically, private banks are
found mostly in larger cities, have more wealthy private customers, and are more active in lending to larger
firms, whereas cooperative and savings banks are dominant in the rural areas and in lending to private
households and small companies. Moreover, all three pillars can be further split into subcategories. Most
noteworthy are the four largest private banks (the so-called “Major banks”) having branches all across the
country. These are also the banks which are most active on the global markets. In contrast, the so-called
“regional banks” are smaller private banks often focusing on some regional or topical niche market such
as car financing. The second pillar of cooperative banks is mainly characterised by a special legal form
and the cooperative principle. The largest subgroup in this pillar are the so-called “Volksbanken und
Raiffeisenbanken”. Finally, the distinguishing feature of the third pillar is that public banks are fully or
partially owned by a public entity, which can be federal, regional, or county based. While most banks in
this pillar are public saving banks, usually owned by a city or a municipality, the so-called “Landesbanken”
(state banks) are owned by the German states.
A second important feature of the German banking system is the house bank principle which is widely
spread, in particular among smaller banks10. Under the house bank principle, banks are also interested
in the long-term success of their customers and might for instance be more willing to provide liquidity
when needed. However, a house bank system has several merits and drawbacks. On the one hand, long
standing credit relationships usually decrease information asymmetries between lender and borrower. This
can overcome typical micro inefficiencies such as moral hazard or adverse selection problems, leading to
lower screening costs for banks and, thus, can reduce credit rationing. Furthermore, long lasting credit
relationships often make it easier for small and medium sized enterprises to raise cash when needed. On
the other hand, the house bank principle also provides banks with some monopoly power which may
result in inefficient lending conditions for firms and households. With respect to negative interest rates,
this could in principle enable banks to more easily raise fees and commissions, effectively passing negative
interest rates on to their clients.
Finally, as pointed out by Dombret et al. (2017), several studies have shown that the German banking
system is, compared to its international peers, on average not as profitable. For instance, data by
the OECD indicates that the average cost-to-income structure is significantly higher for many German
institutions than for other international banks. As Dombret et al. (2017) argue, these high values result
from lower revenue generation rather than higher costs. Moreover, German banks seem to have the
highest dependency on interest rate income compared to banks in other OECD countries. A potential
reason for this under average performance of German banks could be the relatively high share of savings
economic viewpoint irrespective whether a bank can capitalise these gains or not. However, this pure economic view could
miss two important factors which are relevant in the real world. First of all, from an investors viewpoint it could make a
difference if capital gains enter into profits or not. On the one hand, the investor receives a potentially larger dividend and,
on the other hand, if banks seem financially more solid on their balance sheet, investors are more likely to provide fresh
funding when banks face unexpected financial difficulties. Second, and more importantly, accounting standards can have
a direct impact on banks’ regulatory equity and therefore on the borrowing constraints banks face. For example, capital
gains from asset holdings in the trading portfolio enter directly into the P&L statement. Hence, the available bank equity
increases next period, and this bank is able to lend more to the real sector. See also Beatty and Liao (2014) for a recent
survey on the effect of accounting standards at banks.
10See for instance Harhoff and Körting (1998) for an early study.
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and cooperative banks in the German banking sector. In contrast to the monopoly argument made above,
Dombret et al. (2017) argue that both kinds of banks rely heavily on deposit financing and, thus, might
find it harder to pass additional costs associated with excess liquidity onto their customers. Also, as these
smaller banks typically hold fewer assets being mark-to-market, their revenues could drop even further
potentially making them strongly impaired by UMP measures in the Euro Area.
In general, fair value accounting is not as common under the German HGB as it is under the in-
ternationally relevant IFRS rules. In contrast, the principle of prudence is very dominant in German
accounting. The basic idea of this principle is that a firm or bank should not gloss over its financial
situation to provide protection to creditors. On the other hand, this often implies that the balance sheet
representation is worse than the actual economic position. Two important concepts which materialise
the principle of prudence are the so called realisation principle and the imparity principle. Under the
realisation principle revenues can only be considered in the profit and loss statement if the cash flow has
actually realised, which is in strong contrast to IFRS or US GAAP standards where revenues only have
to be realisable. Moreover, this is complemented by the imparity principle treating profits and losses dif-
ferently. On the liability side all foreseeable and realisable risks and losses have to be taken into account.
This is put in more concrete terms by the so called lowest value principle for assets and highest value
principle for liabilities. For example, the lowest value principle requires that assets must be impaired if
the fair value is less than their carrying amount11. For long-term assets impairments can be revised if
the reasons for the initial write down do not exist anymore.
However, since the implementation of the “Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz” (Balance Sheet Mod-
ernisation Act) in 2010 fair value representation has been partially introduced in the German accounting
standards. While the Balance Sheet Modernisation Act changed the accounting rules for several balance
sheet positions such as defined benefit obligations, goodwill, or taxes, the most important two changes
for this paper concern the treatment of financial derivatives and the introduction of a trading book which
is held at fair value12. In fact, a mark-to-market trading book partially undermines both the realisation
principle and the imparity principle as gains can now enter into the profit and loss statement without
having actually realised.
While all these changes are very important for the German “Major banks” and the Landesbanken
due to their more international business model and their larger trading portfolios, they are of second
relevance for savings and cooperative banks. Capitalising financial derivatives in late 2010 effects both
the size and the composition of the balance sheet of these international banks (see Figure B.1 for total
assets, Figure B.3 for the asset composition, and Figure B.4 for liabilities in the Appendix). In contrast,
smaller banks have typically have a more conservative business models, do not engage in hedging activities,
11Due to this property of the HGB rules, ever-greening of loans is not as common among German banks as in other
jurisdictions. If loans are impaired they cannot be rolled over indefinitely to gloss banks’ balance sheets but must be
impaired instead.
12Under IFRS financial assets can be classified as either held-for-trading, held-for-sale, or held-to-maturity. While held-to-
maturity assets are not mark-to-market, held-for-trading assets do enter the P&L statement directly via fair value changes.
On the other hand, gains and losses from available-for-sale financial assets do not enter the P&L statement directly; instead
they are a component of other comprehensive income. In contrast, under the new German HGB regulations assets can be
categorised as either held-to-maturity or held-for-trading. The gains or losses from remeasurement of held-for-trading assets
enter the P&L statement directly via the net trading income. Value changes in held-to-maturity assets are accounted for
in the net income from the valuation of assets and provisions. These changes are according to the highest and lowest value
principle. The categorisation has to be made upon purchase and may not be changed at a later point in time, which is
again in contrast to the IFRS rules providing more flexibility with respect to reclassification.
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Table 3.1: Profit and Loss Statement
(A) + Net interests received
(B) +/– Net commissions received
(C) +/– Net profit or net loss from the trading portfolio
(D) +/– Net income or net charges from the valuation of assets and provisions
(E) − Staff costs
(F) − Other administrative spending
(G) +/– Net other and extraordinary income or charges
= Profit before tax
(H) − Taxes
= Total profit/loss for the financial year
and often hold a very small trading book. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the positive effects
of unconventional monetary policy measures via capital gains do not benefit smaller banks to a great
extent. To get a better understanding of the relevant income components, Table 3.1 presents the income
statements of German banks in a stylised form. Position A shows the net interest rates received which is
simply the difference between all interest rates paid and all interest rates received. As a result of banks’
role as financial intermediaries and their maturity transformation, this position is usually positive and
the major source of income for all German banks. In contrast, the position B (net commissions received)
can be either positive or negative since some banks rely heavily on brokers on the financial markets.
This is similar for position D (net income or net charges from the valuation of assets) which can also
be positive or negative. More precisely, it provides the net value adjustments with respect to loans and
securities. Note that this position also captures the important provisions (or reversals of provisions) for
loans. Other important cost components relate to staff costs and other administrative spending.
As the HGB is the relevant accounting principle in Germany, all data collected by the Bundesbank
is under HGB regulations. The total data set used in this paper ranges from January 2003 to December
2016 and is constructed by merging two distinctive data sets: the monthly bank balance sheet statistics
and the yearly profit and loss statements. Both of these data sets were provided by the Research Data
and Service Centre of the Bundesbank. As all banks holding a banking licence in Germany are obliged to
fill in these two statistics the response rate is close to 100% (only positions smaller than 1,000 EUR are
not mandatory to report)13. As each bank reports at the individual bank level, no holdings are included.
After controlling for mergers by creating pro forma institutions14, there are roughly 1600 banks left
in the data set. More precisely, these banks can be subdivided into 20 building societies, 981 cooperative
banks, 1 cooperative central bank, 10 Landesbanken, 4 Major banks, 156 regional banks, 12 private
mortgage banks, 403 savings banks, and 19 special purpose banks such as the KfW (a state owned
German development bank). For the regression analysis these banks will be regrouped and defined as
follows: large banks (Major banks, Landesbanken, and cooperative central banks), small banks (savings
banks and cooperative banks), regional banks, and all other banks15. To deal with outliers the relevant
13Also, more than 95% of all banks report over the whole observation period.
14A concern with this approach could be that mergers are endogenous. However, apart from a spike in late 2016 there
does not seem to be a clear correlation between mergers and bank income. Moreover, the vast majority of mergers are
horizontal mergers among savings or cooperative banks. As this group is by far the largest in the data set, only a small
fraction of institutions is actually affected. Under the unlikely assumption that all 111 mergers since 2014 are a direct result
of UMP, about 7% (≈ 111
1600
) of the banks in the data set would be affected. Running the regressions without pro forma
institutions has no impact on the main results. For more details see Figure B.2 in the Appendix.
15While this categorisation may seem ad hoc it captures the factual banking structure reasonable well. While only the
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variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile by bank group and year.
Finally, the data set is merged with additional control variables which are taken from Datastream
and the German Statistics Office. The macro control variables are the quarterly real GDP growth, and
a monthly house price index. Moreover, the monetary and financial control variables are the 3 month
interbank lending rate (EURIBOR), the log of the German stock index DAX, and the yield of a 10 year
German government bond. As an indicator for the strength of UMP I use the ECB implied shadow rate
as provided by Wu and Xia (2017). All financial variables are averaged over each year when working with
yearly data. A full list of variables can be found in the Appendix in Table B.1.
3.4 Descriptive Analysis
It is not trivial to answer the question how banks have reacted to the unconventional policy measures
by the ECB, which flooded the financial markets with liquidity and set the deposit rate below zero. Some
authors, such as Jobst and Lin (2016), predicted that due to the downward stickiness of deposit rates
below zero, banks were encouraged to substitute wholesale funding for deposits. Especially for larger
banks, wholesale funding could provide a cheaper alternative relative to retail deposits via the issuance
of unsecured or covered bonds. In addition, banks could also try to escape the liquidity overhang by
Figure 3.3: Average Borrowing from Households and Firms
Source: Bundesbank Balance Sheet Statistics. Own calculations. Borrowing relative to total assets by bank
group. The averages are calculated as weighted averages of total assets.
three largest “small banks” overlap with the smallest “large bank”, the residual group of “other bank” is admittedly more
diverse. However, the alternative of grouping banks by total assets would come at the disadvantage of receiving more
inconsistent groups with respect to banks’ business model. Also, while the group of “other banks” varies strongly by size,
the combining factor for these banks is a different liability structure. As Section ?? shows, all these banks have typically
only long-term liabilities and very few overnight deposits.
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pushing off some customers with large deposits. This way banks may try to lower the costs they pay to
the central bank. In contrast, the evidence presented in Figure 3.3, showing the average borrowing from
households and firms relative to total assets, suggests that short-term deposits have increased for almost
all banks. This development started already during the financial crisis in 2009, then ceased around 2011,
and resumed in 2012 when the deposit rate was set to zero. Striking is the increase for smaller cooperative
and savings banks in overnight borrowing (i.e. money on current accounts) from households relative to
longer maturities (such as savings accounts). However, the share of overnight deposits also increased for
major banks, regional banks, and the Landesbanken in the recent years. In contrast, building societies,
private mortgage banks, and special purpose banks usually borrow at longer maturities, i.e. they are not
affected to the same extend.
However, this graph should be interpreted with caution. In fact, it does not tell anything about
whether this development is driven by supply or demand effects. As this development started already
before UMP measures, one can argue that it is simply driven by low opportunity costs of holding overnight
deposits16 and liquidity preferences by households and firms. A recent paper by Drechsler et al. (2017)
supports this argument. Also, one may argue that due to the vast amount of liquidity provided by the
ECB since the financial crisis, banks on average are simply unable to escape the excess liquidity in the
system and, hence, are forced to absorb additional short-term funding17. In this respect, it is crucial
to understand that banks cannot simply “transform” short-term funding into credits to the real sector.
In fact, if a bank grants a new credit to a firm or a household new deposits are created by the bank.
Put differently, the creation of a new long-term asset (a real sector credit) goes hand in hand with the
creation of a new short-term liability (in form of deposits).
Moreover, even if banks would decline to sell government bonds to the ECB, in order to keep longer
term assets, the additional liquidity will ultimately end up on their balance sheet as a short-term asset
and a short-term liability. To illustrate this point, suppose a bank declines to sell a government bond to
the ECB under its QE programme. Instead, the ECB purchases the bond from a private agent, such as
a hedge fund or an insurance company. This transaction leads to long-for-short asset exchange on the
balance sheet of the private agent. Assuming that an ordinary private agent has a bank account, this
transaction increases the short-term deposit on the private agent’s bank account. On the flip side, from
the bank’s perspective the transaction implies an increase in short-term liabilities and short-term assets
since the private agent now has larger deposit claims (a liability) and the transaction will initially be
booked on the current account of the bank at central bank (an asset). Put differently, even if all banks
would collectively decide not to sell a single bond to the ECB to avoid excess liquidity, they will end up
holding the excess amount of short-term liquidity and would have to store it at the ECB. This explains
the logic that the ECB “forces” banks to hold excess liquidity in large amounts. While these amounts are
still rather minor relative to total assets, they are strongly increasing across all banks18. Major banks
especially hold a small amount of excess liquidity in relative terms whereas regional banks hold the largest
16In fact, some government bonds even have a negative yield providing even less incentive to invest.
17The recent widening of the TARGET imbalances suggests that much of this liquidity enters into the German financial
system leaving German banks over-proportionally affected.
18Note that the data on excess liquidity holdings are not directly observable in the monthly balance sheet. In fact, the
excess liquidity is calculated based on the daily in and outflow of payments on banks’ current accounts at the central bank.
Unfortunately, upon request the Bundesbank provided only aggregate data for some subsets of bank groups.
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Figure 3.4: Average Excess Liquidity by Bank Group
Source: Bundesbank. Own calculations. In percentage relative to total assets.
amount of excess liquidity on average as shown in Figure 3.4.
Therefore, the banking system as a whole is unable to escape the short-term liquidity overhang. As
banks are unable to transform the short-term liquidity overhang into other long-term credits, this may
lead to large extra costs for banks via the negative deposit rate. To evaluate this concern, this section first
examines the development of the most important income and cost elements from the yearly profit and
loss statements. In a second step, the current trends in some simple risk-taking measures are examined.
I begin with the average bank income structure.
Arguably, one simple way for banks to counteract the costs related to negative interest rates charged
by the ECB would be to simply increase their commission and fees. However, as Figure 3.5 indicates
this has not been the case to a large extend until the end of 2016. While the average total commission
income is usually the second most important income component it is still relatively small and remarkably
stable across all banking groups. Even though it is true that many banks have raised their account
administration charges or their fees for transferring money recently, this additional income does not play
a major role relative to total income as it is not proportional to the deposits. Unfortunately, the position
commission income in the P&L cannot be disentangled into it subcomponents of brokerage income or
fees. In contrast, the income from interest rate payments is the most crucial income component of total
income. The fluctuation in interest income largely determines the fluctuation of total income. On the
other hand, income from the trading portfolio or the reversal of provisions are rather small for most
bank groups, which is in contrast to the findings of Alessandri and Nelson (2015) who find larger trading
income for UK banks. Even for the larger banks with sizeable trading portfolios the profits from trading
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Figure 3.5: Average Income Structure
Source: Bundesbank P&L Statistics. Own calculations. Income components as percentage relative to total
assets by bank group. The averages are calculated as weighted averages of total assets.
are on average lower than 1% relative to total assets. One reason for the low income from trading is
the conservative German Commercial Code (HGB). However, also under the more market based IFRS
accounting principle the income from trading is clearly outweighed by the income from interest19.
The next natural question is how the different cost components have developed over time, which is
shown in Figure 3.6. The widespread concern that negative interest rates pose a large cost burden for
banks due to increasing interest rate costs does not seem to hold. Rather, banks have largely benefited
from declining interest rates, which is consistent with the classical view that banks borrow short and
lend long. Since the financial crisis in 2008 interest costs are characterised by a clear downward trend
across all banking groups. Again, interest rates are the most sizeable element of the total costs. Only
in recent years staff costs have been larger than interest costs for cooperative and savings banks, which
typically hold a large network of branches in rural areas. In addition, another positive effect arising from
low interest rates is the decline in write downs and provisions. Due to low interest rates and the positive
economic outlook in Germany, the relevance of write downs and provisions as a cost factor has mostly
declined. In addition, commission costs are an important cost component for some banks such as building
societies, which rely heavily on brokers. This holds also for regional banks where these costs increased
slightly in recent years, potentially due to a higher search-for-yield and the related higher brokerage
cost. With respect to the losses from the trading portfolio it is notable that only major banks suffered
mentionable losses during the global financial crisis. Otherwise these costs do not play an important role.
Combing the various cost and income elements into the total net development of the P&L statement
shows that the net interest income, which is calculated by deducting the interest payments from the
19See Figure B.5 in the Appendix for a simple comparison.
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Figure 3.6: Average Cost Structure
Source: Bundesbank P&L Statistics. Own calculations. Cost components as percentage relative to total assets
by bank group. The averages are calculated as weighted averages of total assets.
interest revenues, is remarkably constant over time. The net effect of income and cost components can
be found in the Appendix in Figure B.6 together with the evolution of the return on equity before and
after taxes, which is shown in Figure B.7.
With respect to bank risk-taking, Figure 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 provide some primary evidence by illus-
trating the change over time in bank loan growth rates, the credit to GDP ratio, and the leverage ratio,
respectively. In contrast, to what some have feared banks on average did not increase their risk-taking
in these three dimensions after the introduction of NIRP or QE until the end of 2016.
Examining the growth rates of firm and household loans in more detail, Figure 3.7 illustrates that
most bank groups have recently increased their loan rates. Interestingly, many German banks already
extended their lending to firms and households during the financial crisis from 2008 till late 2009 and
onwards. While the typical boom-and-bust credit cycles is found to be pro-cyclical to the GDP growth
rates as illustrated in the case of the Landesbanken, many smaller German banks have extended their
credit lines to their customers during the crisis. Most likely, this finding is, first, due to the house bank
principle providing fresh funding in times of crisis and, second, due to firms and households making loan
on overdrafts from their current account. However, given the visible volatility in loan growth rates, at
which point can we think of loan growth rates and risk-taking as being excessive and when are they
simply due to fundamentals of the economy?20
20As Cœuré (2016) argues, any risk-taking in terms of loan growth is “good” as long as it finances projects with a positive
net present value. In contrast, risk-taking would only be “bad” if banks would finance projects with a negative net present
value.
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Figure 3.7: Average Loan Growth to Households and Firms
Source: Bundesbank Bank Balance Sheet Statistics. Own calculations. Growth calculated as year to year
growth for each month. Averages are expressed as the median value of growth rates within each bank group.
Figure 3.8: Credit to GDP ratio
Source: Bundesbank Bank Balance Sheet Statistics. Own calculations. Growth calculated as year to year
growth for each year.
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Figure 3.9: Average Leverage
Source: Bundesbank Bank Balance Sheet Statistics. Own calculations. Leverage is defined as CET1 over total
assets. The averages are calculated as weighted averages of total assets.
It is in general not easy to define which level of risk-taking can be considered as “excessive” or “normal”.
One guideline to this question is provided by the Basel III framework (The Basel Committee (2011))
which suggests considering the development of the credit to GDP ratio. Credit growth is considered to
be excessive if the ratio deviates strongly upwards from its long-term trend. Figure 3.8 plots this ratio for
all subgroups of German banks as well as the banking system as a whole. Only cooperative and regional
banks exhibit a mild increase in the credit to GDP ratio in the recent years while the ratio is declining
for all others banks as well as the total banking system. In other words, there is little indication that
banks have taken an excessive amount of risk by issuing too much credit to risky firms or households
since the start of NIRP and QE.
Another common measure to judge risk-taking is the leverage ratio, which is calculated by dividing
a capital measure over a total exposure measure. Typically, this is done by taking core equity tier 1
(CET1) relative to total assets. In Germany, the core tier 1 capital largely consists of the paid-up capital
and the reserves of an institution as defined in the Banking Act. Thus, the leverage ratio is calculated
by the sum of subscribed capital and reserves divided by total assets21. As shown in Figure 3.9, most
German banks have strengthened their leverage ratio over the last years. In this respect, the Basel III
framework is already showing its bite even though the target rate of 3% is not yet fully phased-in.
Admittedly, examining banks’ balance sheet statements to assess financial risk building up in the
banking sector does not give a fully comprehensive picture. In fact, all measures presented until here
are backward looking and can only help to answer the question if financial risk has already materialised
21Note that this definition of the leverage ratio is only an approximation for the reported leverage ratio in banking
supervision. Due to difference in accounting standards large international banks often get acknowledged other instruments
as CET1. Put differently, the leverage ratio calculated here is a fair proxy for small German banks whereas it is a conservative
estimate for large banks.
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in banks’ balance sheets. However, they cannot serve as a forward looking predictor to detect future
financial risk. To illustrate this point, one important caveat of Figure 3.7 is that it merely captures the
quantity of loans but is ex ante silent on the quality of newly issued loans, which is only revealed at a
future point in time. For example, if banks have lowered their lending standards and issued more risky
credit, which would diminish the overall quality of their portfolio, they would be more vulnerable to
negative shocks in the future. Therefore, in the remaining part of this section I present other aggregate
statistics, which are not part of the data set I use, but can help to give a more comprehensive picture on
bank risk-taking.
First of all, the empirical evidence provided by the bank lending survey22 shown in Figure 3.10 does
not indicate that banks lowered the overall quality of their loans. Since the end of the financial crisis,
the net change in bank credit standards has mostly fluctuated around zero indicating constant lending
standards. While recently many concerns have been raised that the large increase in real estate prices in
Germany could lead to a bubble on the property market, the bank lending survey suggests that credit
standards with respect to household loans for real estate purchases have tightened over the last quarters
due to a change in the lending law. From this perspective, it is unlikely that the overall quality of bank
credits has deteriorated.
While there is little sign of an increase in bank risk-taking in terms of loan volume and loan quantity,
the recent financial stability report by the Deutsche Bundesbank (2016) highlights one important variable
which could be helpful to detect the build-up in banks’ overall risk position namely the average interest
rate fixation period. Even though it is not clear when interest rates rise again, an increase in refinancing
cost could lead to some serious problems in the future if rates will stay low for an extended period of
time. Recall the two key variables to contemporaneous bank income: banks’ asset legacy and the NIM
between long-term assets and short-term liabilities.
As shown in Figure 3.11, banks have on average increased the interest rate fixation period for house-
holds mortgage lending, which can be interpreted as an additional dimension of risk-taking since the
maturity mismatch between long run assets and short run liabilities widens. While the share of variable
or 1-year fixed interest rate contracts has declined, the share of contracts with more than 10-years fixed
interest rates has increased strongly since 2014 from roughly 30% to almost 45%. Recalling Figure 3.3,
the increase in overnight deposits combined with the large share of long-term fix assets composes an
interest rate risk which may only materialise in a few years.
22The bank lending survey is a quarterly survey among a representative sample of Euro Area banks. The questionnaire
comprises 23 qualitative questions on past and expected future lending policies and is conducted by each national central
bank.
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Figure 3.10: Overall Credit Standards of Loan Supply
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Source: Bundesbank Bank Lending Survey. Changes in the last three months as net percentage (frequency of
tightened minus that of eased or reverse). Positive values indicate tightening of credit standards, negative values
indicate a relaxation.
Figure 3.11: Households Lending for House Purchase by Interest Rate Fixation Period
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2016) Financial Stability Report. As a percentage of new business, monthly.
Within the Euro Area and including non-profit organisations serving households. Vertical line indicates change
in the extrapolation since June 2010.
In other words, suppose a scenario where the ultra-low and negative interest rates prevail for a few more
years, followed by a quick and unanticipated increase in short-term interest rates. If banks have mostly
issued fix interest rate contracts during the years of the ultra-low period, their income in the following
years is largely determined by these low interest contracts. In addition, a sudden and unexpected hike
in short-term interests would lead to high refinancing costs and a large shrinkage in the NIM. Especially
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cooperative and savings banks are subject to heightened interest rate risk. The reason for this high risk
is that these banks have seen the strongest increase in the share of overnight deposits and – unlike large
international banks – cooperative and saving banks are usually not active on the capital and wholesale
markets and do not hedge their positions with interest rates swaps23.
3.5 Regression Analysis
One essential advantage of micro level data is that it allows for a more detailed analysis beyond a simple
average as, for example, some banks might have strongly reduced their credit growth rates while other
could have strongly increased it leaving the average unaffected. This section first presents the baseline
regression for the profit and loss statements with yearly observations using a fixed effect and System-
GMM estimator. Second, a similar regression analysis measures the impact of unconventional monetary
policy on bank leverage and loan growth rates again employing a FE and System-GMM estimator. As
these two variables are based on monthly balance sheet data a slightly different specification can be used.
Note the following for both cases: As the data set contains bank balance sheets, P&L statements, and
takes macroeconomic conditions as given, the analysis is entirely backward looking and does not capture
any feedback effects of unconventional monetary policy on bank profitability and risk-taking. Still, it
provides important insights on how German banks have behaved during the first two and a half years of
NIRP and QE policy measures.
A usual starting point for firm or bank level data is the fixed effects estimator in order to take the
unobserved heterogeneity across entities into account. In the context of UMP measures, this would
capture the unobserved time invariant characteristics of an individual bank. For example, this could be
an individual bank’s business model, which may be an important factor on how good or bad a bank
can cope with negative interest rates and a flattening yield curve. However, in the case of yearly P&L
statements the estimator operates in a large N, small T world where the FE estimator is subject to the
Nickell-bias and the coefficients are downward biased relative to the true value. In contrast, the System-
GMM estimator, which was developed by the work of Blundell and Bond (1998) and Arellano and Bover
(1995), should provide unbiased and consistent estimates in this environment. Given the data at hand,
these are desirable features as the data set includes balance sheet and macroeconomic variables of which
several display autoregressive behaviour. Moreover, balance sheet data can be subject to simultaneity
which, however, should be alleviated by lagging these positions and defining the variables as endogenous
in the System-GMM estimator.
Another debatable issue arises with respect to endogeneity of monetary policy in the sense that the
central bank’s decision could be influenced by banks’ profits or, more generally speaking, by financial
stability considerations. However, this concern is somewhat eased by the fact that the data set is largely
dominated by small German bank which individually are not key to the stability of the financial system.
On the other hand, one German bank is listed among the globally systemic important financial institutions
and does play a role for financial stability.
23Figure B.3 and B.4 show the average composition of the balance sheet of each bank group. Inter alia, the position
“Other” includes financial derivatives. Following the Balance Sheet Modernisation Act in 2010, many large banks capitalised
various financial derivatives while smaller banks typically do not hold such financial instruments.
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A critical assumption of the System-GMM estimator is that there is no autocorrelation in the in the
idiosyncratic errors. Yet, due to first differencing the differenced errors have first order auto correlation
by construction. This can be tested with the Arellano-Bond test under the H0 of no first/ second order
serial correlation, i.e. we do want to reject the test for first and do not want to reject the test for second
order auto correlation of the errors. In addition, as the System-GMM estimator can easily employ a long
list of (potentially irrelevant) instruments, the Sargan test is often employed to test for overidentification,
assuming at least one of them is valid. Under the H0 that all instruments are valid the null should not be
rejected. Unfortunately, the Sargan test depends on homoscedasticity and does not work with a two-step
estimator used in this paper. Nonetheless, it is still possible to manually limit the number of instruments
employed24.
As the Sargan Test for the one-step estimator provided evidence that the instruments are valid25,
the System-GMM estimator is next specified as a two-step estimator, i.e. the inverse of the covariance
matrix of the moment vector from the first-step estimation is used in a second step as the weighting
matrix. Also, the standard errors are computed as robust standard errors using the estimator developed
by Windmeijer (2005). In the case of the FE estimator, standard errors are clustered by bank entities
allowing for intra-bank correlation. In order to assess the average impact of the interest rate level and
the slope of the yield curve on different income components, the following baseline regression is run:
yi,t = α yi,t−1 + β1 levelt + β2 level
2
t + β3 slopet (3.1)
+ φ deposit ratioi,t levelt + ϕ deposit ratioi,t UMPt levelt
+ γ Zt−1 + θXi,t−1 + vi + ui,t,
where yi,t =
Yi,t
Avg. TAt
denotes the dependent variables which are: net interest income, net income from
commissions, and net income from the valuation of assets and provisions each calculated in basis points
relative to total average asset in year t. Due to the introduction of fair value accounting in late 2010, a
structural break strongly affects the net income from trading. Therefore, for this variable the data set is
split accordingly (see below).
The most relevant explanatory variables are the levelt of short-term interest rate (three month
Euribor rate), the slopet of the yield curve (ten year German Bund − three month Euribor) and the
interaction term. To capture potential non-linearities, the squared value of the levelt of the interest
rate is also taken into account. While both the level and the slope are affected by unconventional
monetary policy in general, the former should mostly be influenced by the ECB’s choice of setting
the short-term refinancing and deposit rate (NIRP), whereas the latter is thought to be determined
by the ECB’s large scale asset purchase programme (QE). A second important aspect of this paper is
the potential heterogeneity of banks in times of unconventional monetary policy. The interaction term
deposit ratioi,t ·levelt is included to take this heterogeneity into account. The central idea behind this
approach is that at negative levels of the short-term interest rate there could be a stronger relationship
between the share of deposits and different income components. More precisely, breaking through the
24If not stated differently, the maximum number of lags used as instruments for the System-GMM estimator is capped
at three in the following analysis.
25Results for the one step estimator are omitted here for brevity.
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ZLB could make expansionary monetary policy contractionary in particular for those banks with higher
deposit ratios as a source of funding. Thus, to differentiate between average times and unconventional
monetary policy by the ECB, one interaction term is multiplied with the dummy UMPt (= 1 from 2014
to 2016)26.
Furthermore, to account for bank specific effects Xi,t−1 denotes a set of bank explanatory variables.
These variables are bank size (log of total assets), the leverage ratio (CET1 to total assets), bank efficiency
(cost-to-income ratio), bank loan ratio (non-bank loans to total assets), and the deposit ratio (overnight
deposits to total liabilities) each lagged by one period to mitigate concerns of endogeneity. Additionally,
Zt−1 represents a set of macro explanatory variables which are the same to all banks i. These are the
year on year German GDP growth rate, the log of the yearly average of the German DAX index, and a
yearly house price index. Finally, vi denotes the unobserved time invariant individual fixed effect and ui,t
is the idiosyncratic error term. The same baseline specification is used for the System-GMM estimator.
Also, to differentiate between different bank groups, separate regressions for large banks (Major
banks, Landesbanken, and cooperative central banks), small banks (cooperative and savings banks),
and regional banks are run27. Note that for the group of small and regional banks the System-GMM
estimator is employed. In contrast, for large banks the System-GMM estimator cannot be calculated as
the N dimension is reduced to only 15 banks. Also, as argued in section ?? the group of large banks
is subject to the structural break due to the Balance Sheet Modernisation Act in 2010. Thus, only a
subset from 2010 onwards is taken into account for this group of banks. Unfortunately, since only six
years are left this makes it harder to differentiate between average before and after UMP measures and
the interaction term gets automatically omitted because of collinearity in the time dimension28.
The results for the regressions on net interest income can be found in Table B.2. First of all, note that
most coefficients have the anticipated sign. There is a positive and concave relationship between the level
of short-term interest rates and bank income indicating that banks on average have higher net interest
earnings when short-term interest rates are higher. However, this finding is only weakly significant. The
only exception is the group of large banks which is arguably a special case due to few observations as
outlined above. Regarding the slope of the yield curve, all estimators show the anticipated positive
relation which is in line with the maturity transformation of banks. On the other hand, the mostly
negative sign of the estimated coefficients for GDP growth and the house prices seems surprising. In the
case of house prices, a possible explanation for this is the inverse relationship between interest rates and
asset prices. If interest rates are low, usually house prices increase as currently observed in Germany.
Also, a low interest rate correlates in general with lower net interest income as suggested by the level
coefficient.
Turning to bank specific effects and the interaction term, while in general there is a positive relation-
ship between the level of short-term interest rates and net interest income, the interaction term suggests
26The same results were obtained when directly differentiating between before and after going negative. In this case, the
two interaction were specified as deposit ratioi,t UMPt levelt and deposit ratioi,t (1 − UMPt) levelt. These results are
available upon request.
27The group of other banks was also tested. However, as this group of bank has predominately long-term obligations
and the results were mostly insignificant, they are omitted here.
28Also, for the group of large banks the DAX explanatory variable is dropped automatically due to collinearity. The
variation across bank entities is simply too small, which also makes time dummies superfluous as they are largely dropped
automatically.
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that during UMP banks with a higher share of deposits profit more when the interest rate level is higher.
More intuitively, this positive relation implies that high deposit banks face lower net interest income when
interest rates are lower. Importantly, this relationship becomes only relevant when breaking through the
ZLB as the coefficient of the interaction term gets higher and significant for UMP but not for the total
average interaction term. A stylised graphical interpretation of this result can be found in the Appendix
in Figure B.8. Also note that this result seems to be driven by the smaller banks, which usually have a
higher share of deposits and are more dependent on interest income. In addition, the coefficient of the
deposit share is mostly negative, indicating that on average banks with more overnight deposits have
fewer net interest income. However, the magnitude of this effect is still small. In other words, the results
suggest that once setting the short-term interest rate to negative levels banks have slightly lower net
interest income and this effect intensifies for banks with higher deposit ratios.
The results for net commissions are shown in Table B.3. It is important to note that this position
in the P&L captures all fees and commissions paid or collected by the bank. Therefore, in addition to
the previous estimation the log of the DAX index is included. The estimations yield a negative and
significant relationship between the log of the DAX and net commission income. This could be driven by
the fact that brokerage commissions have decreased over the last decade following increased competition
and technological advancement, whereas the DAX has increased over the same period29. In contrast,
there exists a positive relation between housing prices, which are typically a more local brokerage service,
and commission income. However, the relationship regarding the interaction term is less clear. While it
is positive and mostly significant during the years of negative interest rates it is not clear if banks with
more or less deposit benefit as the deposit ratio coefficient is only negative and significant for the subset
of small banks. This suggests that following negative interest rates small banks with larger deposits find
it harder to raise commission income, which does not support the argument that banks could simply
increase their fees to pass on negative interest rates.
The next variable of interest is the net income or the net charges from the valuation of assets, which
primarily includes write downs/ups for assets, any loan loss provisions, and the reversals of loan loss
provisions. The result can be found in Table B.4. The coefficient for the level of the interest rates
indicates that at higher levels of interest rates more loan loss provisions are needed (a cost factor) since
the interest burden is higher. Given the positive interaction term and the positive value of the deposit
ratio, we can conclude that in this case it is actually more beneficial to have a higher share of deposits.
However, the coefficient for the interest level is much higher compared to the interaction term, suggesting
that it only plays a minor role. Moreover, in this regression the GDP growth rate has the anticipated sign
that higher growth rates are correlated with fewer write down and more reversals of loan loss provisions.
As already noted above, the case of net trading income is special because fair value accounting was
only introduced into German accounting law in late 2010. Therefore, for the regressions on net trading
income the sample is split and starts only in 2010 which makes it harder to differentiate between before
and after the introduction of negative interest rates. Thus, the baseline regression is changed to
29The alternative of taking DAX volatility does not change this result.
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yi,t = α yi,t−1 + β1 levelt + β2 level
2
t + β3 slopet (3.2)
+ φ DAXt trading book assetsi,t + ϕ DAXt trading book liabilitiesi,t
+ γ Zt−1 + θ Xi,t−1 + vi + ui,t,
with additional bank specific control variable introduced, which are the share of the asset and the
liability trading book. Also, two interaction terms between the size of the two trading books and the DAX
are included. Table B.5 in the Appendix presents the outcome of this regression. Not surprisingly, as only
a few German banks are active on the trading markets on a larger scale the bank specific explanatory
variables are usually close to zero and insignificant. Not even the size of the trading book has a significant
or sizeable impact on trading income. The only variables which seem to play a role are the macro
explanatory variables, which all have the anticipated sign.
Admittedly, one potential concern with this approach is that the identification of UMP is to some
degree ad hoc via a time dummy. Using a slightly different specification as in Equation (3.3), a similar
regression is run which proxies the strength of UMP by specifying the interaction term as the deposit
share multiplied with the difference between the level of the 3 month Euribor and the implied shadow
rate.
yi,t = α yi,t−1 + β1 levelt + β2 level
2
t + β3 slopet
+ φ deposit ratioi,t · UMP strengtht + γ Zt−1 + θXi,t−1 + vi + ui,t.
(3.3)
As pointed out by Wu and Xia (2017), the various unconventional actions taken by ECB lead to a
much lower implicit policy rate, the so-called shadow rate. Therefore, taking the difference between these
two should provide a crude estimate for the strength of UMP30. Notwithstanding, the unconventional
policy actions by the ECB also push the Euribor downwards to the lower bound of the deposit facility.
Hence, taking the difference between these two is a conservative estimate as the total strength of UMP
is likely to be higher. Moreover, as the P&L variables are on a yearly basis, this difference is averaged
across each year making it even cruder. Still, the results of this estimation, which can be found in the
Appendix in Table B.6, B.7, and B.8, hint in the same direction as the regression based on a simple dummy
identification. The stronger UMP measures the weaker average net interest income which intensifies for
higher deposit ratios.
Having examined bank profitability in greater detail, the changes in bank risk-taking in terms of loan
growth and leverage ratio are considered next. According to the risk-taking channel, banks could be
induced to take more risk if interest rates are too low for too long. A potential reason for such behaviour
could be limited liability considerations. However, as we have already seen in Section ??, on average
banks have only moderately increase loan growth rates and increased their leverage ratio due to the Basel
III regulations31.
30See Figure B.9 in the Appendix for a graphical illustration.
31In the current version of the paper, I do not explicitly control for the changes in the Basel III regulations. Despite the
fact that the Basel III regulations undoubtedly have an effect on bank risk taking, it is not straight forward to control for
these regulatory changes. A simple approach would be to introduce a dummy since the start of the Basel III regulations.
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As the leverage and the loan growth rates are taken solely from bank balance sheet data, which are on
a monthly basis, the Nickell bias decreases due to the higher T dimension and the fixed effects estimator
should in principle provide unbiased estimates. Therefore, in the following all bank group regressions are
based on the fixed effects estimator while the results for the System-GMM estimator are still included as a
robustness check. Moreover, as the difference between the Euribor and the shadow rate can be calculated
on a monthly basis this variable is taken as the main indicator for UMP. Note that the baseline regression
with a dummy was also run leading to similar results32. All control variables are now based on monthly
observations with the exception of the GDP growth rate which is quarterly.
The estimation results for the leverage ratio are summarised in Table B.9. The interaction term be-
tween the strength of UMP and the deposit ratio suggests a negative relationship between unconventional
monetary policy measures and leverage ratio with a mostly positive coefficient for the deposit ratio. In
other words, the stronger the unconventional monetary policy measures the lower leverage ratio especially
for those banks with higher deposits. This does indeed indicate that high deposit banks have increased
their risk-taking in terms by reducing their leverage ratio. However, note that the magnitude of the
coefficient is quiet small and that most banks in total increase their leverage ratio due to the new Basel
regulations as outlined before. Put differently, this can be interpreted that banks with high deposit ratios
must have reduced their voluntarily capital holdings relative to the increased required capital holdings
applying to all the banks.
Finally, considering the impact of unconventional monetary policy on year on year loan growth rates
Table B.10 suggests that stronger unconventional monetary policy correlates with lower loan growth
rates for banks with higher deposits. While it is true that on average the German banking sectors has
experienced positive loan growth rates, this micro view indicates that there has been a reshuffling of
loans from high deposit banks to low deposit banks. This is an important finding as it indicates that
the monetary policy pass-through is potentially jeopardised for these banks at negative policy rates.
Consistent with early findings, smaller banks which typically have a higher share of overnight deposits
find it harder to pass on negative rates to their customers. As a consequence they reduce their loan rates
and expansionary monetary policy becomes contractionary.
3.6 Robustness
As an additional robustness check, I follow the approach by Heider et al. (2017) and Eggertsson,
Juelsrud, et al. (2017). Assuming that going negative is indeed a “game changer” employing a difference-
in-difference estimator should provide a consistent and unbiased estimate given some underlying assump-
tions. The average change for banks with high deposit ratios (treatment group) could be different at
negative rates relative to banks with low deposits (control group) as for these high deposit banks the
However, this approach would be flawed for two main reasons. First of all, Basel III is not a structural break in the classic
sense. In the European Union, most regulatory changes were decided in 2013. However, while these changes came into force
from 2014 onwards banks were given several years to adjust to the new requirements. Therefore, some banks might have
adjusted early whereas other bank could have waited longer. Second, such a dummy would very much overlap with the
time frame of UMP making it unclear which effects are actually captured. Currently, I am trying to acquire additional data
from the Bundesbank to create a distance to Basel III variable. If one, for instance, would look at the actual risk weighted
tier one core equity ratio relative to the ratio a bank should have under the Basel III rules, it might be possible to calculate
the difference between these two and to interpret the gap as the regulatory adjustment pressure.
32They are omitted here for brevity but are available upon request.
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monetary pass-through might break down at negative rates. Formally, the diff-in-diff reads as
yi,t = β UMPt + γ Deposit ratioi + δ (UMPt · Deposit ratioi) + vi + ut + ǫi,t. (3.4)
To differentiate between the treated and the untreated banks, first note that the average overnight
deposit ratio in the data set is at 35% (see also the histogram of overnight deposits in Figure B.10
in the Appendix). Therefore, high deposit banks are defined as banks with a deposit ratio of more
than 35% (Deposit ratio = 1) whereas low deposit banks are defined as banks with a lower deposit
ratio (Deposit ratio = 0). Alternative specifications of taking “other banks” (with primarily long-term
deposits) as the control group, or of taking the upper 75 percentile vs. the lower 25 percentile of the
average bank deposit ratio, yield the same qualitative result.
Following the literature, for monthly balance sheet data a time frame of 2013 to 2015 is chosen33. The
time dummy is set to be equal to one starting from June 2014 when the deposit facility was first lowered
to negative levels (UMP = 1). Hence, there are roughly one and a half years before and after the treatment.
In contrast, when working with yearly P&L data, I allow for a longer time period from 2012 to 2016 giving
two observations before the treatment and three afterwards for each bank. As an alternative starting
point of negative rates (May) 2015 was chosen when the Euribor entered into negative territory which,
however, leaves the main result unaffected. Also, in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity across
banks entities or across time, bank fixed vi and time fixed ut effects are introduced in the estimations.
All remaining influences are captured by the error term ǫi,t.
The results for the two main variables of interest (net interest income and loan growth) are shown
below in Table B.11 and B.1234. The results from these estimations hint in the very same direction as the
results shown in the previous section. Once interest rates become negative banks with larger deposits have
on average a lower net interest income. Also, banks with an above average deposit ratio have decreased
their loan growth rates relative to low deposit banks.
3.7 Conclusion
Since the announcement of a negative interest rate policy and a quantitative easing programme by the
ECB, the German banking sector exhibited a huge short-term over-funding. However, despite what many
commentators have feared the good news from the evidence given in this paper suggests that the German
banking sector performed reasonably well during the first years of unconventional monetary policy. Banks
so far have not faced a huge cost burden from negative interest rates. Rather, banks have benefited from
lower refinancing costs and shrinking loan loss provisions. In fact, profits across all banking groups have
so far been only mildly affected by NIRP and the QE programme. Furthermore, there is only little
evidence that German banks have engaged in excessive risk-taking by granting too much credit or by
lowering their lending standards in response to interest rates being too low for too long.
On the other hand, the bad news is that the often mentioned capital gains from asset holdings play
33While there is no formal test for the diff-in-diff estimator I run out of sample tests from 2005 to 2007 for monthly and
from 2003 to 2007 for yearly data to find insignificant results.
34Moreover, estimations on the other indicators discussed in this paper were also run but mostly yield insignificant
results. They are available upon request.
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little role for German banks, due to the conservative German accounting rules. Only some larger banks
with a sizeable trading portfolio may have profited from this income source whereas it is practically
irrelevant for all other banks. Also, the hypothesis that banks can increase their fees and commission to
pass on negative interest rates to their customers does not hold. Even though several banks did increase
their fees, this additional income is usually a flat rate and not proportional. Hence, it is merely a drop in
the ocean relative to total assets. Moreover, banks on average were neither able to push off large amounts
of excess funding nor to substitute deposit financing with wholesale funding. While a few banks might
have found creative ways to escape increasing short-term liabilities, the banking system as a whole has
no way to do so. In fact, the average share of overnight private deposits increased since 2013 from about
30% to 45% of total assets for smaller banks. Even major banks exhibited a mild increase from roughly
10% to 15% of total assets over the same period. In addition, especially high deposit banks have on
average a lower net interest income and they slightly decreased their leverage ratio.
While the magnitude of these negative effects is still small, one should be careful in concluding that
negative interest rate transmit just like positive rates do and that there are no risks associated to these
UMP measures. In fact, the ugly truth is that if interest rates remain on their current level and the yield
curve keeps on flattening, banks must be adversely affected at some tipping point due to their intrinsic
business model and the expansionary monetary policy stance becomes contractionary eventually. A clear
indicator for this is that banks with high deposit ratios have already decreased their lending.
Moreover, the financial stability report from the Deutsche Bundesbank (2016) highlights an import
additional source of risk-taking which is currently under-explored in the literature. The more extensive
bank maturity transformation together with rising deposit ratios exposes banks to an increasing interest
rate risks especially under a scenario of a fast and unexpected rise in short-term interest rates. As savings
and cooperative banks typically do not hold any derivatives to hedge their position, these banks are in
particular subject to this interest rate risk. A thorough examination of this finding is left for future
research.
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†Disclaimer: The views expressed in this chapter represent the authors’ personal opinions and do not necessarily reflect
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4.1 Introduction
One of the oldest questions in the field of economics concerns the impact of a minimum wage. Despite
this issue being discussed extensively for several decades in the academic world and among policy makers
no final conclusion has been reached. On the one hand, the proponents of a minimum wage argue, for
instance, that a minimum wage increases aggregate demand, reduces macro volatility1, protects employees
and, ultimately, increases social justice. On the other hand, opponents of a minimum wage stress that
it leads to inefficient markets, job losses, increases macro volatility2 and, furthermore, is a unnecessary
intervention into free labour markets by the government.
One key reason for this unresolved dispute is that theoretical models examining the minimum wage
crucially depend on the assumed labour market structure. While models with a competitive labour
market such as the traditional approach by Stigler (1946) usually find negative effects from a minimum
wage, monopsony3 models or models of monopsonistic competition as proposed by Manning (2003), which
assume some market power for the employer, tend to find positive effects from a moderate minimum wage
as it reduces the deadweight loss. In addition, also the empirical literature provides mixed evidence on
this topic. For example, one popular paper by Card and Krueger (1994) finds non-negative effects from
an increase of a minimum wage, whereas another widely cited paper by Neumark and Wascher (1992)
highlights the potential risk of job losses due to a minimum wage.
Our contribution to this ongoing discussion provides a DSGE model to quantify the dynamic macro
effects in different scenarios comparing the results between a competitive and monopsonistic labour
market. To our best knowledge, all existing papers on monopsony labour markets use static models which
lack a solid micro foundation with changes of preferences over time, or are partial equilibrium models. In
fact, many authors have examined minimum wages in a dynamic labour market with an upward sloping
labour supply curve implicitly assuming some degree of monopsony by introducing frictions through e.g. a
search-and-matching function, such as Moser and Stähler (2009), and Charpe and Kühn (2012). However,
we propose a DSGE model directly building on the work of Manning (2003) to model a monopsonistic
labour market explicitly.
A second contribution of this chapter is that we model the minimum wage as an occasionally binding
constraint in a DSGE model. In most existing papers such as Porter, Nathan and Vitek (2008) and
Heberer (2010) the minimum wage is binding at every point in time. However, being effectively an
inequality constraint the minimum wage in reality is not binding if the market wage of a representative
household is above the minimum wage. Put differently, if the exogenously set minimum wage is below
the market wage rate it would not be of high relevance. Therefore, we model the minimum wage as
an occasionally binding constraint using the toolkit provided by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015)4. In
our model, the economy is populated by three types of households. While skilled and medium skilled
households are optimising their consumption/saving decision by investing into risk-free bonds in order to
1Similar to an automatic stabiliser as in Charpe and Kühn (2012)
2See Porter, Nathan and Vitek (2008)
3The term monopsony can be tracked back at least until Robinson (1969) who proposed the notion of “monopsony” for
a market with just one buyer but many sellers as the analogous notion to a monopoly market with just one supplier but
many consumers.
4As many central banks have lowered their target rates to zero after the financial crisis of 2008-09 it has become popular
in monetary economics to model the zero lower bound as an occasionally binding constraint. See for instance Guerrieri and
Iacoviello (2015).
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smooth their inter-temporal consumption, a third type of so called unskilled households are “rule-of-thumb
consumers” without access to financial markets5.
Regarding the minimum wage, Germany is a very interesting subject of study for two reasons: the
newly introduced minimum wage in early 2015 and the large migration inflow of late 2015. Most existing
studies on the effects of the minimum wage introduction in Germany are derived from “back of the
envelope” calculations disregarding any long-term dynamic effects. In fact, examining the current low
unemployment numbers in Germany suggests that the moderate German minimum wage did not lead to
job destruction on a large scale.
In addition, no study has been made so far to systematically examine the effects of a positive labour
supply shock following the large migration inflow into the German labour market. Integrating about one
million refugees is a huge challenge for any society especially if refugees come from a different cultural
and ethnical background. One possibility often proposed to promote quick integration into a society is
integration via the labour market6. However, relatively little is known about the education and skills of
incoming refugees. A first guess would be to look at the general educational statistics of source countries
which indicate a large heterogeneity among different countries of origin7. Various studies on international
migration, such as Mattoo et al. (2008), suggest that even highly skilled workers tend to work in low-
skilled positions in the host country. This phenomenon of “brain waste” is often explained by language or
legal barriers such as the recognition of foreign educational and labour degrees. This evidence indicates
that in the short and medium run the vast majority of migrants will enter into the German low skilled
labour market, creating downward pressure on wages potentially making the minimum wage binding to
a larger degree.
Trying to shed light on this question, our model suggests that following the drop in wage rates
from a positive unskilled labour supply shock, skilled and medium skilled workers are substituted with
cheaper unskilled workers. However, due to the wage setting power of medium and skilled household
their consumption still increases over time. Interestingly, using this set-up macro volatility is actually
reduced under a binding minimum wage. While the increase in unskilled consumption is lower with
a binding constraint the substitution effect of different workers is less strong mitigating overall output
volatility. Regarding the introduction of firm monopsony power the model predicts a reduction in the
steady state level of unskilled wages. Unfortunately, this does not change the dynamics of the model
calling for additional frictions. This is left for future research.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 sketches the introduction of the
minimum wage in Germany and its effects so far. Section 4.3 reviews the literature on minimum wages
and monopsony models while Section 4.4 discusses the prediction of static models and provides some
intuition on how we think of the minimum wage and the situation in Germany. Afterwards, our dynamic
model is presented in Section 4.5 with the calibration of the model being discussed in Section 4.6. The
results of our analysis are presented in Section 4.7. Finally, Section 4.8 concludes.
5A large body of literature exists on rule-of-thumb consumers, see for instance Gali et al. (2007).
6Yet, if potentially tight and burdensome regulations keep migrants from finding employment or being hired this process
could be jeopardised. Accordingly, some policy makers have argued that refugees should be excluded from the binding
minimum wage in order to encourage their employment highlighting the policy relevance of this chapter.
7For example Iran, one major source country of refugees, has a higher education rate similar to Germany of 13.1% while
its neighbour country Afghanistan has a literacy rate of only 58%. More details are provided in the UNESCO Educational
Data Centre available at http://data.uis.unesco.org/.
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4.2 Minimum Wage in Germany
After a long debate among policy makers and academics in Germany, a binding minimum wage
of 8.50 EUR was introduced by the Grand-Coalition on 1st of January 2015. Building on standard
economic theory, some German economists predicted ex ante strong negative effects of up to 800.000
job losses especially in the low skilled sector8. In response to such adverse scenarios a comparably
moderate minimum wage was designed with some exemptions and tools to keep the adjustment flexible9.
For example, workers under 18, trainees and interns, or long-term unemployed are exempted from the
minimum wage. Also, following the traditional collective bargaining procedure in Germany, some sectors
such as the construction or cleaning sector have higher sector-specific minimum wages often regionally
differentiated between East and West Germany. Similar to the model in the UK, a minimum wage
commission has been implemented to decide about possible adjustments of the minimum wage in the
future.
In order to fully judge the long-term effects of the minimum wage introduction on employment, one
ideally needs a longer time series observing the participation rate for several years on a disaggregated
sectoral level. Nonetheless, some preliminary conclusions have already been made by for example Am-
linger et al. (2016). According to the German Federal Statistical Office it is estimated that about 10.7%
Figure 4.1: Monthly Unemployment Rate in Germany
Source: German Federal Statistical Office
8See for instance Arni et al. (2014) predicting 570.000 job losses, Peters (2015) forecasting 800.000 job losses over the
mid-term, or Henzel, Engelhardt, et al. (2014) arguing that 56.000 to 470.000 full time and up to 306.000 part time jobs
could be destroyed.
9For comparison, the minimum wage in 2016 was in France at 9.67 EUR, at 9.36 EUR in the Netherlands, and at 9.15
EUR in Ireland
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of the German work force are paid the minimum wage10, with small and medium enterprises being the
predominant companies affected especially those located in East Germany. Moreover, the minimum wage
affects the service sector stronger than the producing sector. Therefore, it seems surprising at first glance
that e.g. the hotel and restaurant industry increased their workforce by 6.6% after the introduction.
However, the reduction in so-called minor employment contracts by −4.0% suggests that the majority
of these positions have been transformed to part-time jobs. But also on a more aggregate level, the
evidence from monthly unemployment numbers in Germany illustrated in Figure 4.1 suggests no strong
contraction in employment. Instead, there is a clear downward trend in unemployment numbers following
the structural reforms in the early 2000s and the positive German GDP growth in 2014 and 2015.
However, drawing any conclusion about the effect from the minimum wage from simple correlations
could be potentially misleading as employment numbers are driven by many other factors as well. In other
words, employment numbers could increase despite the minimum wage resulting from an expansionary
business cycle.
4.3 Literature Review
There exists a very large and continuously growing literature on the minimum wage. Despite this
enormous body of literature, the impacts of the minimum wage on the economy are far from being
genuinely well understood with many authors finding conflicting results. In fact, most academics and
practitioners would agree that a very high minimum wage leads to adverse effects on the labour market
whereas a minimum wage on a very low level is usually found to have no implications. Thus, the dispute
rather concerns the question what can be regarded as “too high” or “too low”.
From a theoretical point of view, a moderate minimum wage can be welfare increasing if we assume
that labour markets are not neoclassical but are characterised by a monopsonistic labour market. In
a monopsonistic market there is just one buyer but many sellers, which is the analogous notion to a
monopoly market with just one supplier but many consumers. Due to the market power of this one buyer
in such a market, the buyer is able to set prices similar as a monopolist does in a one seller market.
However, one should not take notion of “monopsony” in the labour market literately. Monopsony should
not be interpreted in the sense of just one employer, but rather in the sense that the supply of labour to
an individual firm is less than infinitely elastic and firms face an upward sloping labour demand curve.11.
Therefore, the common feature of all monopsony or monopsonistic competition models is that labour
supply is not perfectly elastic to the firm as in the neoclassical case but to some degree upward-sloping
instead. However, the reasons for this might differ. There are various sources for monopsony power
proposed in the literature. First, monopsony power could result from various non-wage preferences of
workers about employers, such as general working atmosphere, career opportunities, or distance to work
leading to additional disutility for workers when commuting. These non-wage characteristics might lower
workers’ incentives to change jobs across different regions. Second, a firm could be a single large employer
in a certain area, such as a large coal company in a rural area, providing the firm with some discretion
10See German Federal Statistical Office.
11See Manning (2003), ch. 1 for a discussion.
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in its wage setting. Third, a somewhat more general argument of monopsony power accounts for any
information or switching costs, be it pecuniary or non-pecuniary, resulting from a job change or the
search for a new job12. In this respect, it has become popular to implicitly model monopsony in the
market via search-and-matching costs, see for example Robin (2011)13, Charpe and Kühn (2012)14, Flinn
(2006)15, and Moser and Stähler (2009)16. However, note that some important distinctions exist. First of
all, monopsony models assume that employers set wages whereas search-and-matching models often have
some kind of wage bargaining between workers and firms. Second, while in many traditional matching
models the wage bargaining process starts after the match, monopsony models have an ex ante wage
posting.
In essence, search-and-matching models examine how matches between firms and workers are estab-
lished and dissolved providing a theoretical framework to understand the effect of policy changes on these
matches. A crucial part is the modelling of time varying outside options of firms and workers since sepa-
ration is intended to occur endogenously. Roughly speaking, two broad approaches have emerged in the
literature: the job ladder model17 and the match quality model18. In the former, workers search both on
and off the job. Hence, in the case of a better offer from another firm the worker is less likely to remain in
his current job. On the contrary, in the match quality type of models the quality of a match is uncertain
when the match is made. As more information about the quality of the match becomes available over
time to both workers and the firm, each of them decides whether to remain or to separate and search for
a better match. Regarding an increase of the minimum wage, ladder models suggest a reduction in job
resignations since workers are less likely to find better paying jobs. In contrast, match quality models
predict that more matches become unprofitable ex post for the firm, potentially increasing lay-offs. How-
ever, note that the benefits from the outside option have also increased suggesting an ambiguous effect
of a higher minimum wage.
On the other hand, one should also note some of the empirical and theoretical problems associated to
the theory of monopsony. For instance, a market with just one firm (or a few firms) hiring workers is per
se not more realistic than the assumptions in the neoclassical labour market. Typically, low skilled labour
markets are characterised by similar employers in close proximity to each other and a rather high worker
turnover, suggesting a labour market of oligopsony19 or of monopsonistic competition. Put differently, if
other firms are present in the market competing for employees the reservation wage of workers is higher
and, effectively, could be driven up to the competitive wage. Search-and-matching models such as Burdett
and Mortensen (1998) offer an endogenous turnover while still allowing for the possibility of exploitation.
12An example for such switching costs are the so called non-compete clauses in the high-tech sector where highly skilled
workers have to pay fines for changing to a firm’s competitor.
13Proposing a dynamic search-and-matching model with cross sectional wage dispersion and heterogeneous abilities of
workers. Robin (2011) generates endogenous job destruction and wage inequality across sectors.
14In a DSGE model proposed by Charpe and Kühn (2012) lower bargaining power of rule-of-thumb households is
introduced via combining a search-and-matching model with Nash bargaining over income distribution. Downward wage
rigidities such as a minimum wage are found to have stabilising effects on output and employment.
15In a continuous time model of search-and-matching with Nash bargaining, Flinn (2006) finds ambiguous effects of a
minimum wage increase on unemployment with potential welfare improvements. In his model the bargaining parameter is
most crucial in determining welfare implications of changes in the minimum wage.
16Moser and Stähler (2009) present a two sector search model with heterogeneous productivity levels. In their set up, a
minimum wage leads to negative spill over effects from the unproductive sector to the productive. However, total welfare
effects are ambiguous.
17Also referred to as on-the-job search models. See for instance Burdett and Mortensen (1998).
18As in Pissarides (2000).
19Similar to an oligopol firms could collude in order to keep wages low.
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Ultimately, the question of market and bargain power in the labour market is an empirical one. In
fact, in reality the elasticity of labour supply, one popular measure of market power in the empirical
literature, may vary a lot across sectors, regions, skill levels, or preferences of employees. One obvious
case of monopsony in reality is outlined in Naidu et al. (2014) examining the migrant labour market in
the United Arab Emirates where under UAE’s visa policy migrant workers were legally prohibited to
change their employer. Such procedures are illegal in many other countries where estimated elasticities
are higher but still far from infinity. For example, estimating labour supply elasticities for the grocery
retail industry in the US Ransom and Oaxaca (2010) report elasticities raging between 1.4 to 3.0 with
strong differences between men and women. In addition, Ransom and Sims (2010) find an elasticity
of 3.7 for US school teachers, while Staiger et al. (2010) estimate a short run elasticity of only 0.1
in the nursing labour market with a natural experiment. In the case of Germany, Hirsch, Schank, et
al. (2010) estimate the labour elasticity for the entire labour market. Using linked employer-employee
data their paper estimates similarly small labour supply elasticities between 1.9 and 3.7. More recently,
Bachmann and Frings (2017) provide estimates for the wage elasticities of various typical low skilled
sectors. The authors find evidence that the retailing, hotel, and restaurant industry fit the description of
a monopsonistic labour market whereas this is not the case for agriculture, mining, and public or private
services. Moreover, evidence found by Hirsch and Jahn (2015) suggests that with a labour elasticity of
only 1.64 - 2.6 migrants in Germany are in particular subject to uneven bargaining power. As migrants
face a greater amount of information asymmetry and less collective bargaining power it is not surprising
to find stronger monopsony in their case.
Moreover, empirical studies regarding the effects of a minimum wage are again often ambiguous.
In a highly cited paper, Card and Krueger (1994) find no evidence that an increase in the minimum
wage lowered employment. The authors use a diff-in-diff estimator to examine the impact of an increase
in the minimum wage on employment in the fast-food industry in New Jersey and eastern Pennsylvania
before and after an increase of the minimum wage. In contrast, more recently Clemens and Wither (2014)
estimate a reduction in the national employment-to-population ratio by 0.7% due to the average minimum
wage in the US being increased by 30% over the late 2000s. Other recent empirical papers examining the
minimum wage for the US are for instance Dube et al. (2010); Dube et al. (2016); Neumark, Salas, et al.
(2014); Neumark and Wascher (1992) which find both negative and non-negative effects. To summarise,
these studies show the inconclusiveness of the empirical literature on the effects of the minimum wage.
One explanation for these ambiguous empirical findings might be the level of aggregation or the structural
variation both across regions and sectors, highlighting the importance to distinguish between subgroups
of low-wage workers. In this respect, Giuliano (2013) compares the effects between overall employment
for adult and teenage workers and finds an increase of teenage workers’ labour supply in response to a rise
of minimum wages, whereas adults showed a negative but insignificant response. In the case of Germany,
Bachmann and Frings (2017) and Amlinger et al. (2016) provide some first insights about the response
of the German labour market to the newly introduced minimum wage also on a disaggregate level.
Most existing studies on monopsony models are either static, partial equilibrium models, or both20.
The traditional static literature on monopsony models with a minimum wage has largely been developed
20For a literature overview see Ashenfelter et al. (2010).
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by the work of Bhaskar and To (1999) whereas the work of Manning (2003); Manning (2006) and Boal
and Ransom (1997) have provided dynamic versions of these partial equilibrium models. Our work is
conceptually most closely related to Strobl and Walsh (2014) who examine the impact of a migration
inflow in a static monopsony model with a minimum wage and methodologically to Heberer (2010) and
Porter, Nathan and Vitek (2008) who proposes a DSGE model with a competitive labour market and a
minimum wage. However, in contrast to Strobl and Walsh (2014) we use a dynamic general equilibrium
model allowing for changes in agents’ behaviour over time. Also, in contrast to Heberer (2010) proposing
a very parsimonious model and in contrast to Porter, Nathan and Vitek (2008) focusing on the effects
of minimum wage indexations and adjustment schemes, our three type labour model, first, compares
the effects of a minimum wage between a competitive and monopsony model and, second, allows for the
minimum wage to be only occasionally binding.
4.4 Static World
According to the standard textbook version of a neoclassical labour market a minimum wage leads to
welfare losses unless the minimum wage is equal or below the competitive wage rate, which would render
it redundant. This standard finding is illustrated in Figure 4.2. Suppose the government introduces a
binding minimum wage and sets the exogenously defined minimum wage wmin equal to the competitive
wage rate w0, where the labour supply curve LS and the labour demand curve LD intersect leading to
zero effects of the minimum wage initially. Next, consider the case of a shift in the labour supply curve
due to an exogenous increase in the labour force, for example due to a large increase in migrants. Now,
Figure 4.2: Static Neoclassical Labour Market with a Minimum Wage
w
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LS′
L
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for a given wage rate households offer more labour shifting the labour supply curve rightwards to LS
′
with the new competitive wage w1 being below the minimum wage wmin. Due to the binding minimum
wage at wmin employers continue to hire L∗ units of labour despite workers offering L1 units of labour
leaving the bulk of new workers unemployed.
Consequently, the textbook version of the labour market predicts negative effects and an increase in
unemployment among migrants and potentially also among domestic workers. Since it is likely that the
vast majority of refugees enter into the low skilled sector, at least in the short run, the natural policy
recommendation of this analysis would be to abolish the minimum wage or at least significantly reduce
it for refugees in order to promote their integration into the labour market.
Despite being heavily criticised for unrealistic and overly simplistic assumptions, the neoclassical
labour market is still frequently used in modern economics both in static and dynamic general equilibrium
models. One particular crucial assumption concerns the market power of employers and its implication
for policy recommendations about the minimum wage. Many have argued that especially in the low
skilled sector firms often do possess a large degree of bargaining power since the market consists of a
large number of unskilled workers whereas the number of companies is small. In order to incorporate this
idea, the monopsonistic labour market assumes that there exists only one large firm demanding labour
which, thus, has a large degree of market power facing many small workers competing among each other
for employment.
Figure 4.3 shows the basic features of the monopsonistic labour market and its implication for the
minimum wage. Suppose a market situation where just one employer demands labour offering the same
wage rate to all workers prior to the introduction of the minimum wage. In contrast to the neoclassical
model where labour supply is exogenous to the firm, a single employer now faces an upward sloping
labour supply curve denoted by LS0. Put differently, in the neoclassical model firms are price takers,
i.e. for a single firm the labour supply curve is perfectly elastic, whereas from the perspective of a
monopsonist wages are not exogenously given by the market but, instead, the wage is an increasing
function of employment. In this case, the marginal cost function of the firm becomes MC = w + ∂w
∂L
· L,
where ∂w
∂L
equals the slope of the labour supply curve. As long as the slope is positive the firm faces an
upward sloping labour supply curve, whereas if ∂w
∂L
= 0 firms can demand any labour input for a given
wage rate as in the neoclassical case. Under profit maximisation, the highest profits are reached if the
marginal costs MC equal marginal revenues MR which is at point A. In the absence of a minimum wage,
the firm offers the wage rate w
′
to workers leading to a labour supply of L
′
units of labour as in point
B, which is the monopsony equilibrium. First of all, note that the equilibrium is supply side constrained
as the firm would in principle employ a larger number of workers since the marginal revenue is higher.
Second, the economic surplus is redistributed from the workers to the firm which is characterised by a
welfare loss due to low employment levels given by the dead-weight loss from the triangle between the
points A − B − C. In contrast, perfect competition would force the firm to offer higher wages as all
workers would otherwise prefer to work for the competitor, thus, expanding their labour supply.
Again suppose that the government introduces a binding minimum wage forcing the firm to pay wmin
to all workers which is set equal to the point where the labour supply curve intersects with the marginal
revenue curve at w∗. As a result, employment is increased from L
′
to L∗ as workers receive higher wages
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Figure 4.3: Static Monopsonistic Labour Market with a Minimum Wage
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encouraging them to increase their labour supply. Note that the firm pays the same wage rate to all
workers. Thus, increasing the wage to wmin increases the wage for all workers leading to new total cost
for the firm of wmin · L∗ which reduces the firm’s profits. Yet, an even higher minimum wage above w∗
would not lead to more labour recruitment since then the total labour cost would be above the marginal
revenue. Following this policy change, the dead-weight loss has been removed and rents are redistributed
from the firm to the workers.
Still, if the economy is hit by large migration shock, shifting the labour supply curve rightwards to
LS1, workers now offer more labour for the same wage rate leading to a similar conclusion as in the
neoclassical scenario. Workers would now offer L1 units of labour supply while the firm only demands
L∗ units resulting in potential unemployment among workers. Note, however, that this is only the case
if minimum wage is set equal to the intersection of marginal revenue and labour supply. If the minimum
wage rate is below this point, i.e. w∗ > wmin > w
′
, employment can actually increase from the labour
supply chock. In other words, the height of the minimum wage relative to the unobserved market wage
rate and firm structure is most crucial to predict employment outcome.
In a nutshell, a moderate minimum wage in a monopsony labour market can increase welfare but
market forces are not suspended. A shift in the labour supply curve, for instance due to a migration
inflow, leads to a lower market wage rate which might be below the minimum wage depending on the
relative strength of the shock. In this case, the same critique as in the neoclassical labour market applies
calling for a lower minimum wage. But as this wage rate is unobserved in practice it remains unclear if
this is actually the case leaving the effects ambiguous ex ante.
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4.5 The Model
There is a continuum of infinitely lived private households of unit mass together with a continuum of
firms producing differentiated intermediate goods. Also, the model contains a central bank which is in
charge of monetary policy and a simple government with a closed budget. A fixed fraction λ of households,
which are rule-of-thumb or non-Ricardian consumers, is of type U and supplies unskilled labour. On the
labour market these household find either a perfectly competitive neoclassical labour market or are subject
to monopsony firms. An additional fixed fraction κ of households of type M supplies medium skilled
labour, while the remaining part 1 − λ − κ is of type S and offers skilled labour. Skilled and medium
skilled households are optimising or Ricardian and can trade securities on the financial markets to smooth
their consumption. Additionally, it is assumed that there is just one sector in this closed economy model.
When referring to all three types of households the subscript ℓ ∈ U,M, S is used.
4.5.1 Households
Motivated by the work of Gali et al. (2007) and the empirical findings of Campbell and Mankiw (1989),
we model a fraction λ of the total households as rule-of-thumb consumers. This type of unskilled household
can only consume their wage income and have no access to capital or financial markets. In other words,
these consumers behave in a “hand to mouth” fashion, fully consuming their contemporaneous income in
every period. This implies that these types of households are either unable or unwilling to smooth their
consumption path over time when facing fluctuations in labour income. While we in principle do not take
a stand about the source of this behaviour, possible explanations could be a combination of lack of access
to financial markets, myopia, or potentially as in the case of migrants cultural, language, or institutional
barriers. As the consumption level of these households is given by the budget constraint and not by
intertemporal optimising behaviour they are sometimes also labelled as “non-Ricardian” households.
The remaining fraction of κ and (1 − λ − κ), i.e. medium and skilled households, do not show such
behaviour. In contrast, they behave like standard optimising or Ricardian households and can trade a
set of contingent securities to smooth their consumption when facing income fluctuations.
Optimising Skilled and Medium Skilled Households
To decrease computational burden, both types of medium and skilled households faces a standard and
symmetric optimisation problem. Also, to save notation we merely discuss the case of skilled households.
While the optimisation problem is the same for both of these types of households, their parametrisation
differs slightly (see discussion below in Section 4.6). Both types of households maximise lifetime utility
according to21
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs exp(eu,t+s)
(
C1−σS,j,t+s
1− σ
− exp(eS,t+s)
N1+ϕS,j,t+s
1 + ϕ
)
, (4.2)
21Note that the period utility function for unskilled households is in similar form of
U(C,N) = exp(eu,)
(
C1−σ
U,j
1− σ
− exp(eU )
N
1+ϕ
U,j
1 + ϕ
)
. (4.1)
71
4.5. THE MODEL
where j ∈ [0, 1] is the household’s index and Cℓ,j and Nℓ,j denote individual consumption and labour
supply in working hours, respectively. β is the standard discount factor which is the same for medium
and skilled households. With respect to consumption, σ > 0 determines the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. In the case of labour supply, ϕ denotes the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply
η. Following a standard AR(1) process, eℓ,t and eu,t denote a household specific labour supply and a
general preference shock, respectively. The maximisation problem is subject to a flow budget constraint
stating that the sum of real expenditure on consumption and investment should be equal to the real
income stream
bS,j,t + CS,j,t = wS,j,tNS,j,t +
it−1bS,j,t−1C
δ
S,t
Πt
+ ΓS,j,t − TS,j,t +Υℓ,j,t, (4.3)
where S and M types of household may invests in real risk free bonds to smooth their consumption
bS,j,t = BS,j,t/Pt
22. Households pay aggregate adjustment costs of CδS,t when changing the level of
bond holdings. The corresponding risk free interest rates is it. The skill specific real wage is denoted
by wℓ,j,t = Wℓ,j,t/Pt and in the case of skilled and medium skilled households is set by household j.
Therefore, we assume that medium and skilled households are able to set a mark-up over their wages.
In addition, ΓS,j,t stands for dividends which S and M types of households receive from their ownership
of firms. Finally, TS,j,t denotes tax payments Pt denotes the nominal consumer price level to be defined
below.
As Section 4.5.3 outlines in more details, while households may differ in their actual wage income the
presence of transfer payments Υℓ,j,t, however, ensures that for any given price vector in the economy, each
type of households are identical with regard to their consumption and investment plans. Accordingly,
we can drop the household index and resort to the representative agent assumption within each of the
labour types.
The first order conditions (FOC) to this problem are as follows
∂L
∂CS,t
: µS,t = exp(eu,t)C
−σ
S,t , (4.4)
∂L
∂NS,t
: NS,t =
(
µS,twS,t
exp(eu,t) exp(eS,t)
) 1
ϕ
, (4.5)
∂L
∂bS,j,t
: µS,t = βEtµS,t+1
itC
δ
S,t
Πt+1
, (4.6)
where µS,t denotes the Lagrangian multiplier for the budget constraint of a household with a skill level S.
Equation (4.5) yields the aggregate labour supply function for medium and skilled types, which can be
restated as the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and working hours supplied by each
type of household. This gives
mrsS,t = exp(eS,t) exp(eu,t)
NϕS,t
µS,t
. (4.7)
22Accordingly, nominal risk free bonds are only traded among skilled and medium skilled households and are thus in
zero net supply.
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Rule-of-Thumb Consumers
As already described, we assume that only skilled and medium skilled households have access to
capital markets while, in contrast, the representative unskilled worker does neither have access to capital
markets nor does she have firm ownership. Thus, she can only consume her current income in each period
and her consumption level is given by their budget constraint which reads as
CU,t = wU,tNU,t. (4.8)
For analytical convenience, as in Charpe and Kühn (2012) we assume that unskilled households do not
pay any taxes.
As is standard in the literature, the labour supply of unskilled households in a competitive labour
market must satisfy
wU,t = exp(eU,t)N
ϕ
U,tC
σ
U,t. (4.9)
This implies that unskilled households do not possess any market power on the labour market. In contrast,
we also allow for monopsony power of firms with respect to unskilled labour input as discussed in the
next section.
4.5.2 Firms
To focus on the labour market, we assume that firms only use labour and technology as input factors.
More precisely, each firm i faces a standard production function using the three different types of labour
as the main input factor. In particular, we have
Yi,t = e
At
[
λ
1
ζ (eAU,tNU,i,t)
ζ−1
ζ + κ
1
ζ (eAM,tNM,i,t)
ζ−1
ζ + (1− λ− κ)
1
ζ (eAS,tNS,i,t)
ζ−1
ζ
] ζ
ζ−1
, (4.10)
where Yi,t is firm’s i production level at time t. eAt and eAℓ,t represent the general and labour type
specific technological levels, respectively, which evolve according to an AR(1) process with a stochastic
component. The labour input from each household type is denoted by Nℓ,i,t with ζ as the elasticity of
substitution for different labour inputs.
In order to maximise profits, firms solve the following problem. Note also as discussed above, we
assume that in equilibrium the minimum wage is not binding, i.e. the competitive wage is above the
minimum wage.
L = Pi,tYi,t − (wS,tNS,i,t + wM,tNM,i,t + wU,tNU,i,t)
+mci,t (Yi,t(·)− Yi,t) +Di,t
(
Yi,t −
(
Pi,t
Pt
)−ǫ
Yt
)
,
(4.11)
where mci,t and Di,t, are Lagrangian multipliers for the production and demand functions, respectively.
Given the standard interpretation of these multipliers, mci,t is equivalent to real marginal costs. Taking
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the FOCs for price setting and production yields
∂L
∂Pi,t
: Yi,t = Di,tǫ
(
Pi,t
Pt
)−ǫ−1
1
Pt
Yt, (4.12)
∂L
∂Yi,t
: Pi,t −mci,t = Di,t. (4.13)
Rearranging (4.12) to Di,t and setting this equal with (4.13) yields the well-known expression for price
setting
Pi,t =
ǫ
ǫ− 1
mci,t. (4.14)
Labour Demand in the Neoclassical World
Assuming that firms do not have market power in the labour market yields the standard neoclassical
case where firms’ labour demand simply equals the marginal product of labour. In this standard case,
the first order condition of skilled labour demand can be stated as
∂L
∂NS,i,t
: wS,t = mci,t(1− λ− κ)
1
ζ (eAteAS,t)
ζ−1
ζ
(
Yi,t
NS,i,t
) 1
ζ
. (4.15)
Note that the neoclassical case is analogous for medium and unskilled labour demand, the only difference
being the weighting parameter of λ or κ rather than (1 − λ − κ). As labour supply is infinitely elastic
in the neoclassical world and firms are able to recruit at the market wage rate as much labour input as
they wish to, and the wage equals the marginal product of labour.
Furthermore, the market clearing condition on the labour market requires that the sum of all labour
supply functions from each type of household is equal to the aggregate labour demand Nℓ,t defined as
Nℓ,t =
∫ 1
0
Nℓ,t(i)di. (4.16)
Unskilled Labour Demand under Monopsony
After the neoclassical benchmark case, we introduce monopsony where firms are assumed to have
market power but unskilled workers do not. In the case of unskilled households of type U the wages are
determined as follows. Building on Manning (2003), monopsony is implemented in the most simple form,
namely by a less then infinitely elastic labour supply curve.
Since a monopsonist is the only buyer of unskilled labour in a certain market, she is aware of the
entire unskilled labour supply curve when making her optimal decisions. In such a world where a firm is
a monopsonist, the more people it hires the higher the wage and the total labour costs. For simplicity, we
assume a non-discriminating policy of the monopsonist which implies that hiring one additional worker
means the firm has to pay all workers employed higher wages. Also note that in the case of monopsony,
a firm i is the only demander of unskilled labour input. This could for instance be the case, if each firm
i faces a regionally separated unskilled labour market while medium or skilled workers could migrate
between different regions and could work for different firms i. Thus, the i sub-index for unskilled labour
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demand can be dropped and the profit maximisation function can be restated as
L = Pi,tYi,t − (wS,tNS,i,t + wM,tNM,i,t + wU,tNU,t)
+mci,t (Yi,t(·)− Yi,t) +Di,t
(
Yi,t −
(
Pi,t
Pt
)−ǫ
Yt
)
+ Li,t

NU,t −
(
wU,t
exp(eU,t)CσU,t
) 1
ϕ

 ,
(4.17)
where Li,t denotes the Lagrangian unskilled labour supply constraint for each firm i. This is motivated
by the simple finding from the static monopsony case where the market outcome is also supply side
constrained. Note that the monopsony and competitive market outcome are equal if the individual firm
has zero monopsony power, i.e. the firm faces no additional unskilled labour supply constraint and
Li,t = 0.
Taking the FOC with respect to unskilled labour and unskilled wage in an equilibrium situation of
monopsony (i.e. no binding minimum wage) yields
∂L
∂NU,t
: wU,t = mci,tλ
1
ζ (eAteAS,t)
ζ−1
ζ
(
Yi,t
NU,t
) 1
ζ
+ Lit . (4.18)
Next, the FOC for unskilled wage is given by
∂L
∂wU,t
: Li,t = −ϕwU,t. (4.19)
Inserting (4.19) back into (4.18) and rearranging for wU,t yields the final expression
wU,t =
mci,tλ
1
ζ (eAteAS,t)
ζ−1
ζ
(
Yi,t
NU,t
) 1
ζ
(1 + ϕ)
. (4.20)
Hence, in the case of monopsony the firm offers a lower wage rate to the unskilled workers relative to the
neoclassical case. In fact, the wage is reduced by a factor of (1 + ϕ) and this gap between the wage and
the competitive wage is sometimes referred to as the rate of exploitation. Recall that ϕ = 1
η
denotes the
inverse of the Frisch labour elasticity η. Hence, as η approaches infinity we are back in the neoclassical
world with a flat unskilled labour supply curve for each firm i. In contrast, for any smaller degree of
labour elasticity we face a positive sloped labour supply curve, i.e. an increase in the market power of
firms leading to a reduction in unskilled wages in steady state. Note that the same result can be obtained
if NU,t in the optimisation problem is replaced with the labour supply curve and letting the firm choose
the optimal wU,t.
However, while this result seems appealing at first glance as it is very much in line with the basic
prediction of the static monopsony model, note that Equation (4.20) is multiplicative. In fact, when
taking the first-order Taylor approximation around the steady state, the factor (1 + ϕ) cancels out and
the dynamics of the model are the same in both worlds.
4.5.3 Wage Setting
There are three different wage setting regimes with respect to the type of labour ℓ. Whereas labour
types M and S are assumed to have some market power in their wage setting, unskilled households
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face either a perfectly competitive or monopsonistic labour market as outlined above. Furthermore, the
unskilled labour market is subject to an occasionally binding minimum wage.
To be more precise, medium skilled as well as skilled households are assumed to enjoy some degree of
market power and set their nominal wage as a mark-up over the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure. Furthermore, due to the assumption of a Calvo-type staggered wage setting,
both types of households are heterogeneous regarding their individual nominal wages and thus, with
respect to their labour supply within each type. The wage setting for skilled and medium skilled is in
essence identical. Both are able to set a mark-up the only difference being that the medium skilled mark-
up is lower. Once more, to save notation we only discuss the skilled case here, i.e. the medium skilled
case works analogously. The aggregate nominal wage index for households of type S can be written as
WS,t =
(∫ 1
0
W 1−ǫSS,j,t dj
) 1
1−ǫS
=
[
(1− θw,S)W̃
1−ǫS
S,t + θw,S(WS,t−1Π
ωS
t−1)
1−ǫS
] 1
1−ǫS , (4.21)
where ǫS denotes the elasticity of substitution between different types of skilled labour, θw,S is the Calvo
parameter, and ωS denotes the degree of indexation to past inflation in case a skilled household is not
able to adjust its nominal wage in a particular quarter.
Each skilled household faces the following labour demand function
NS,j,t =
(
WS,j,t
WS,t
)−ǫS
NS,t. (4.22)
Assuming symmetry across households of type S, we can neglect the household specific index j. The
nominal wage in period t+ k which was last adjusted in period t is given by
WS,t,t+k = W̃S,t
k−1∏
i=0
ΠωSt+i, (4.23)
where W̃S,t is the nominal wage for skilled labour set in period t. Accordingly, a skilled household who
has last adjusted her nominal wage in period t faces the following labour demand in period t+ k
NS,t,t+k =
(
WS,t,t+k
WS,t
)−ǫS
NS,t+k. (4.24)
Therefore, the typical household S solves
Et
∞∑
k=0
(βθw,S)
k
[
exp(eu,t+k)
(
C1−σS,j,t+k
1− σ
− exp(eS,t+k)
N1+ϕS,j,t+k
1 + ϕ
)]
, (4.25)
subject to the budget constraint of household S (4.3) and the labour demand function (4.24).
The FOC with respect to the adjusted nominal wage, W̃S,t, can be written as
Et
∞∑
k=0
(βθw,S)
kNS,t,t+kUCS,t+k
(
W̃S,t
∏k−1
i=0 Π
ωS
t+i
Pt+k
−
ǫS
ǫS − 1
mrsS,t,t+k
)
= 0, (4.26)
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where mrsS,t,t+k = −(UNS,t,t+k/UCS,t,t+k) and assuming that UCS,t,t+k = UCS,t+k .
It can be shown that this expression for wage setting can be restated as
(1 + β)ŵS,t = βŵS,t+1 + ŵS,t−1 + βΠ̂t+1 − (1 + βωS)Π̂t + ωSΠ̂t−1+
+
(1− βθw,S)(1− θw,S)
θw,S(1 + ǫSϕ)
(m̂rsS,t − ŵS,t) . (4.27)
For a more detailed derivation please see Section C.2 in the Appendix.
In contrast to skilled and medium skilled households, unskilled households do not have such wage
setting power and are not able to add a mark-up. In a competitive market their wage is equal to the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. However, to mitigate social imbalances
the government introduces a minimum wage w being equally paid to unskilled households if the market
wage rate falls under the exogenously defined threshold. Put differently, we think of the minimum wage as
a downward rigidity working effectively as an occasionally binding constraint with the steady state market
rate being above minimum wage level23. Accordingly, we set up our model such that the minimum wage
can only become binding in the market for unskilled labour if the market wage falls below the minimum
wage. In particular, we assume that the government sets the real minimum wage at a fraction α ∈ (0, 1)
below the competitive market wage rate wU,t. This implies that the government adjusts the real minimum
wage in a way so that it is always a fraction of the steady state level of the real wage rate in the unskilled
sector. Formally, this is defined as
w = αwU . (4.28)
The minimum wage becomes binding as soon as the real wage wU,t which unskilled households would
like to set based on a standard optimality condition falls below the steady state value of the real wage
associated with the minimum nominal wage w. In other words,
wU,t = wU,t for wU,t ≥
w − wU
wU
,
and
wU,t = w for wU,t <
w − wU
wU
.
4.5.4 Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Monetary policy is conducted via a policy function following a Taylor rule:
ît = φiît−1 + (1− φi)
(
φyŶt + φΠΠ̂t
)
+ vt, (4.29)
with φy and φπ being weights on the output and inflation gap, respectively. In addition, φi denotes
the weight of lagged interest rate deviations. In other words, the deviation of the short-term nominal
23More precisely, we use the OccBin toolkit provided by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015).
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interest rate from its steady state value depends on its deviation in the last period and the sum of the
contemporaneous deviations of output and inflation from the steady state values. Additionally, vt denotes
a monetary policy shock following a standard AR(1)-process
The government is assumed to run a balanced budget which is spent according to simple lump-sum
taxes collected from medium and skilled households
Gt = Tt, (4.30)
where Tt = TM,t + TS,t denotes the total lump-sum taxes from M and S types of households. Public
consumption Gt for goods is exogenous and in log-linear terms follows
Ĝt = ρgĜt−1 + ǫg,t.
4.5.5 Aggregation
The Consumption Index
Total consumption of a typical worker Cℓ,t of type ℓ is defined as an aggregator over a continuum of
a variety of goods. For example,
Cℓ,t =
(∫ 1
0
C
ǫ−1
ǫ
ℓ,j,tdj
) ǫ
ǫ−1
, ǫ > 1,
where ǫ denotes the elasticity of substitution. Government consumption is specified analogously and
assumed to exhibit the same degree of substitutability between individual varieties.
The implied utility-based consumer price index reads
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
P 1−ǫi,t di
) 1
1−ǫ
.
It can be shown easily that this definition implies that the sum of all good-specific expenditures equals
the product of the price index Pt and the consumption index Cℓ,t
PtCℓ,t =
∫ 1
0
Pi,tCℓ,j,tdi.
Demand Functions and Derivation of the NKPC
The typical firm producing a good i faces the following downward sloping demand function
Yi,t =
(
Pi,t
Pt
)−ǫ
Yt
=
(
Pi,t
Pt
)−ǫ
(Ct +Gt)
=
(
Pi,t
Pt
)−ǫ
(CU,t + CM,t + CS,t +Gt).
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The goods market is monopolistically competitive. A typical firm sets its optimal nominal price such
that it maximises the expected discounted present value of profits subject to the demand function and
the production function. However, the price adjustment process is constrained by a Calvo-type friction.
In each period a fraction θ ∈ (0, 1), of randomly selected firms are not allowed to optimally change their
prices. Instead, these firms partially index their prices to last period’s inflation. In particular, the price
charged by a typical ”non-adjuster” in period t is given by
Pnoni,t = Pi,t−1Π
χ
t−1, χ ∈ (0, 1),
where χ denotes the degree of indexation and Πt is the gross inflation rate of producer prices. The
remaining firms, constituting a fraction of 1 − θ, optimally reset their prices. In particular, they solve
the following problem
max
Pi,t
Et


∞∑
q=0
βqθq
µt+q
µt
Pt
Pt+q
(
Pi,t
q−1∏
k=0
Πχt+k − Pt+qmct+q
)(
Pi,t
∏q−1
k=0 Π
χ
t+k
Pt+q
)−ǫ
Yt+q

 ,
where the objective function is obtained after plugging the demand schedule into the profit function and
observing that marginal costs are independent of the scale of production and identical across firms.
The first order condition to this problem can be represented recursively as
P̃t
Pt
=
ǫ
ǫ− 1
ℑ1,t
ℑ2,t
, (4.31)
where P̃t is the optimal reset price with
ℑ1,t = mctYt + βθ
µt+1
µt
(
Πχt
Πt+1
)−ǫ
ℑ1,t+1,
and
ℑ2,t = Yt + βθ
µt+1
µt
(
Πχt
Πt+1
)1−ǫ
ℑ2,t+1.
Note that each adjusting firm sets the same optimal price. The firm price index can be written as
1 =

θ
(
Πχt−1
Πt
)1−ǫ
+ (1− θ)
(
P̃t
Pt
)1−ǫ
 . (4.32)
Combining (4.31) and (4.32) yields the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) for goods prices.
Π̂t − χΠ̂t−1 =
(1− θ)(1− θβ)
θ
m̂ct + β(1− θ)(Π̂t+1 − χΠ̂t). (4.33)
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4.6 Calibration
The calibration of the model proceeds in a standard way by fixing the steady state values of im-
portant levels or ratios of endogenous variables as well as a series of deep parameters to their empirical
counterparts. We start with a discussion of those ratios and parameters which are closely related to the
skill structure of the labour market and the production technologies. Afterwards, we briefly explain our
choice of the remaining parameters.
In the steady state, we set the overall fraction of time devoted to work N = NS +NM +NU to 1/3.
To calibrate the share of skilled, medium skilled, and unskilled labour, NS/N , NM/N and NU/N we
resort to the qualification/skill-level definition proposed by the International Standard Classification for
Education (ISCED). Under this classification standards, workers with less than primary, primary and
lower secondary education (ISCED levels 0-2) are termed low-skilled, workers with upper secondary and
post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED levels 3 and 4) are labelled medium skilled, and workers
with tertiary education (ISCED levels 5-8) are viewed as high-skilled. The latter group consists of persons
with an university or a doctoral degree. According to this data, the share of high-skilled NS/N is set
to 24%, the medium skilled share NM/N is set 56%, and the unskilled share NU/N to 20%, which
corresponds to the average values for Germany over the period from 2004 to 2014.24.
The weight of labour input for firms is fixed to the historic averages of employment. According to the
ILO statistics, the average employment of unskilled and medium skilled labour in Germany between 2004
and 2016 was about 14% and 59%, respectively25. Thus, we calibrate λ to 0.14 and κ to 0.59 implying a
share of skilled labour input of 0.27. The elasticity of substitution between differentiated labour varieties
follows the empirical estimations in Krusell et al. (2000) and we set ζ = 1.6726.
As outlined above, skilled and medium skilled households are assumed to set a mark-up above their
wages. To calibrate these mark-ups, we rely on the Income and Labour Costs27 report from 2015.Q4
published by the German Federal Statistical Office. In this report, households are grouped into 5 income
categories from “managing position” to “unskilled workers”. To calculate the mark-ups the average income
from group 1 and 2 (high skilled) and group 3 (medium skilled) is set relative to group 4 and 5 (unskilled),
to find mark-ups of 2.46 and 1.37, respectively28. We assume that consumer price inflation as well as the
skill specific wage inflation is zero in the stationary equilibrium, i.e. Π = ΠW,S = ΠW,M = ΠW,U = 1 and
π = πW,S = πW,M = πW,U = 0. The Calvo parameters and the degree of indexation for household wage
(as well as firms’ price) setting are calibrated as in Smets and Wouters (2003).
Unlike medium and skilled households, unskilled households do not set a mark-up. Instead, they can
be subject to an exogenously defined minimum wage if the competitive wage rate falls under a certain
threshold. To calibrate this threshold in steady state, we rely on the income publications by the German
Federal Statistical Office29. According to this data, the average wage rate for unskilled labour input per
hour in Germany was 11.82 EUR in 2014. Under a minimum wage of 8.50 EUR in 2015 this make a
24See OECD as well EUROSTAT, labour force indicators, employment by educational attainment level.
25For details see ILOSTAT, employment by education.
26Note that if ζ → 0 different kind of workers are Leontief and output can only be produced using fix proportions, which
is the case of perfect complements. In contrast, if ζ → 1 the production function is a Cobb Douglas production function.
As ζ → ∞ different kind of workers become perfect substitutes.
27See “Verdienste und Arbeitskosten” by the German Federal Statistical Office, website accessed on the 03.01.2018.
28This implies an elasticity of substitution of different skilled and medium skilled workers of ǫS = 1.68 and ǫM = 3.70.
29See “Verdienste auf einen Blick 2017” by the German Federal Statistical Office, website accessed on the 03.01.2018.
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Table 4.1: Calibration of Parameters
Parameters Symbol Value Source
Households:
Average total working hours N 1/3 DSGE literature
Share of skilled labour NS 0.24 Eurostat (ISCED Education level)
Share of medium skilled labour NM 0.56 Eurostat (ISCED Education level)
Share of unskilled labour NU 0.20 Eurostat (ISCED Education level)
Discount factor β 0.998 DSGE literature
Elasticity of intertemporal consumption σ 1.2 DSGE literature
Inv. Frisch labour elasticity ϕ 0.36 Hirsch, Schank, et al. (2010)
Bond adjustment costs δ 0.0015 DSGE literature
Firms:
Share of skilled labour input (1− λ− κ) 0.14 ILOSTAT, employment by education
Share of medium skilled labour input κ 0.59 ILOSTAT, employment by education
Share of unskilled labour input λ 0.27 ILOSTAT, employment by education
Labour substitution elasticity ζ 1.67 Krusell et al. (2000)
Marginal cost (=P/mark-up) mc 1/1.33 Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2012)
Calvo parameter θ 0.75 Smets and Wouters (2003)
Degree of inflation indexation χ 0.75 Smets and Wouters (2003)
Wage setting and monopsony
Skilled elasticity of substitution ǫS 1.68 German Federal Statistics Office
Calvo skilled θw,S 0.75 Smets and Wouters (2003)
Skilled indexation (wage) ωS 0.75 Smets and Wouters (2003)
Medium elasticity of substitution ǫM 3.70 German Federal Statistics Office
Calvo medium skilled θw,M 0.75 Smets and Wouters (2003)
Medium skilled indexation (wage) ωM 0.75 Smets and Wouters (2003)
Level of minimum wage α 0.72 German Federal Statistics Office
Central bank and government
Weight of lagged interest deviation φi 0.9 DSGE literature
Inflation weight φπ 1.5 DSGE literature
Output weight φy 0.5 DSGE literature
Share of government consumption gY 0.187 World Bank
threshold of roughly 0.72 (= 8.5011.82 ), to make the minimum wage binding. Moreover, the value of the
labour supply elasticity, which is important for monopsony, is taken as 2.8 which determines ϕ as 0.36.
This value is taken as the simple median from Hirsch, Schank, et al. (2010) who estimate labour elasticities
for different sectors in Germany ranging from 1.9 to 3.7.
The remaining parameters are set to the values used in the bulk of the DSGE literature. These are the
subjective discount factor β and the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity with respect to consumption σ
(see Table 4.1). The shares of government consumption G
Y
= g is set in accordance with historical averages
for Germany30. Finally, the average marginal costs mc = P/mark-up, are set in accordance with the
30See OECD and World Bank general government consumption statistic from 2004 to 2016.
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estimates for the average mark-ups in Germany provided by Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2012). In
particular, we chose the mark-up as 1.33.
4.7 Results
In the present section, we analyse the effects of shocks to unskilled labour supply and a shock to the
exogenously set minimum wage in the model economy described above. In particular, we focus on how
the output, consumption, working hours, and the wage level of different agents are affected from these
shocks. In doing so, we distinguish between the neoclassical benchmark case where neither unskilled
households nor firms have market power and the monopsony case where each firm demands labour in,
for instance, regionally separated unskilled labour markets providing them with market power. We start
with the neoclassical benchmark.
Neoclassical Benchmark
The results for the model under a neoclassical labour market are shown in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. Under
a positive unskilled labour supply shock, unskilled agents increase their labour supply leading to a rise in
the number of hours worked and a reduction in unskilled wages. As the increase in labour is higher than
the reduction in wage, the contemporaneous income for rule-of-thumb consumers increases. Also, after
a initial minor reduction, the output production of this model economy increases. Since the wage for
unskilled labour drops, firms substitute relatively cheaper unskilled workers for relatively more expensive
medium and skilled labour input. As a result, the number of hours worked from the other two agents
declines. However, due to the wage setting power of skilled and medium skilled households, the wage only
fluctuates slightly around the initial steady state value of the respective wage level and actually increases
after a few periods. Following the reduction in labour income, consumption for skilled households is
reduced initially but increases over time as the wage increases31. Note that due to optimising skilled
household behaviour and the access to bond investments, skilled households can smooth their consumption
which, thus, is less volatile compared to the stark reaction in unskilled consumption.
Comparing the non-binding regime to the binding minimum wage regime, first of all note that in
our model the occasionally binding minimum wage actually reduces macro volatility. While the general
direction of both regimes is the same, the up or down swings for each variable are not as intense under a
binding minimum wage. However, while the typical channel of macro volatility reduction comes via the
protection of unskilled labour in bad times, our model allows for an additional channel reducing macro
volatility. Once the downward moving unskilled wage hits the lower bound of the minimum wage, firms
are forced to pay the exogenously set minimum wage. On the one hand, although this implies that the
increase in labour income and consumption of unskilled households is not as strong, on the other hand,
it also implies that firms’ incentives to substitute cheaper unskilled labour with more expansive other
labour input types are reduced. Thus, the reduction in skilled and medium skilled working hours is less
pronounced as is the wage volatility of these two household types leading to an overall reduction in output
31The results for consumption of medium and skilled households are equivalent.
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Figure 4.4: Shock to Unskilled Labour Supply in a Neoclassical Market
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Notes: Estimated impulse responses to a positive unskilled labour supply shock. The Y-axis denotes periods
after the shock at t = 5. The first six panels show the deviation from steady state. In contrast, the lower three
panels on the wage development show the level and fluctuation around the steady state with a minimum wage for
unskilled labour which is set at w = αwU (with α < 1). The dashed black line plots the model of a non-existing
minimum wage whereas the red solid line plots the model with an occasionally binding minimum wage.
volatility.
Concerning the impact of an exogenous positive minimum wage shock in Figure 4.5, our model is able
to reproduce the standard findings from the static neoclassical model. First of all, note two presumably
trivial findings that a) in a model with no binding minimum wage no impulse response functions are
produced and b) in the model with a binding minimum wage one needs a rather strong minimum wage
shock to make it binding initially. Put differently, an increase of the minimum wage which is still below
the competitive market wage rate does not induce any reaction in the model. In contrast, implementing
a positive minimum wage shock, where now α is > 1, leads to a reduction in unskilled working hours.
As unskilled workers become too expensive, firms increase their demand for skilled and medium skilled
households, who smooth their consumption intertemporally. However, due to the reduction in current
income for unskilled households their consumption is lowered decreasing the overall output of the economy.
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Figure 4.5: Shock to the Minimum Wage in a Neoclassic Market
5 10 15 20 25
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
Output
5 10 15 20 25
-1
0
1
2
Consumption skilled
5 10 15 20 25
-15
-10
-5
0
Consumption unskilled
5 10 15 20 25
-5
0
5
10
Hours skilled
5 10 15 20 25
-5
0
5
10
Hours medium
5 10 15 20 25
-60
-40
-20
0
Hours unskilled
5 10 15 20 25
0.798
0.8
0.802
0.804
Real wage skilled
5 10 15 20 25
0.766
0.768
0.77
0.772
0.774
Real wage medium
5 10 15 20 25
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
Real wage unskilled
No minimum wage Binding minimum wage
Notes: Estimated impulse responses to a positive minimum wage shock. The Y-axis denotes periods after the
shock at t = 5. The first six panels show the deviation from steady state. In contrast, the lower three panels on
the wage development show the level and fluctuation around the steady state. The dashed black line plots the
model of a non-existing minimum wage whereas the red solid line plots the model with a binding minimum wage
which is shocked to a higher level than the steady state value of the competitive unskilled wage.
Monopsony
In addition to the neoclassic benchmark model, we also examine the case of direct monopsony. The
results are illustrated in Figures 4.6 and 4.7. As already indicated in Section 4.5.2, the direct modelling
of monopsony leads to a lower unskilled wage in the steady state with unchanged dynamics of the model,
however. Therefore, the only difference between Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.4 is the level of the unskilled
real wage, which is reduced by the rate of exploitation (1 + ϕ).
Unfortunately, the direct implementation of monopsony in a dynamic model does not replicate the
findings from the static model with respect to the impact of the minimum wage. Even a moderate
minimum wage above the wage rate that the monopsonist offers, leads to a reduction in number of hours
of worked. While the firm now has to pay a higher wage, it does not employ more workers, but instead
reduces output.
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Figure 4.6: Shock to Unskilled Labour Supply in a Monopsonistic Market
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Notes: Estimated impulse responses to a positive unskilled labour supply shock. The Y-axis denotes periods
after the shock at t = 5. The first six panels show the deviation from steady state. In contrast, the lower three
panels on the wage development show the level and fluctuation around the steady state, with a minimum wage
for unskilled labour which is set at w = αwU . The dashed black line plots the model of a non-existing minimum
wage whereas the red solid line plots the model with an occasionally binding minimum wage.
Note that this finding does not depend on the fact that the firm can substitute more expensive
unskilled labour with relatively cheaper medium and skilled workers. The same finding would occur if
our model would encompass just one type of household. In other words, to force the firm to employ
more workers when the minimum wage is moderately increased one needs to implement additional labour
market frictions. Most importantly, such a model needs a law of motion of labour as in the search-and-
matching literature32.
32Unfortunately, due to the upcoming deadline it was not possible to implement the huge search-and-matching literature
in this thesis. However, this is left for future research.
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Figure 4.7: Shock to the Minimum Wage in a Monopsonistic Market
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Notes: Estimated impulse responses to a positive minimum wage shock. The Y-axis denotes periods after the
shock at t = 5. The first six panels show the deviation from steady state. In contrast, the lower three panels on
the wage development show the level and fluctuation around the steady state. The dashed black line plots the
model of a non-existing minimum wage whereas the red solid line plots the model with a binding minimum wage
which is shocked to a higher level than the steady state value of the competitive unskilled wage.
4.8 Conclusion
The introduction of a minimum wage in Germany has not led to enormous job destruction so far. In
contrast, there is a clear downward trend in unemployment numbers in Germany following the positive
GDP growth rates and the labour market reforms in the early 2000s. A likely explanation for this is that
the German minimum wage is actually too low in the sense that for many sub sectors and jobs the market
wage rate is higher leading to a non-binding minimum wage. However, there has been some concern that
the large migration inflow in Germany in late 2015 could lead to wage reductions for many low skilled
jobs making the minimum wage binding to a larger degree.
This chapter has presented a one sector closed economy model which is populated by unskilled rule-of-
thumb consumers facing either a competitive neoclassical or monopsonistic labour market and Ricardian
skilled and medium skilled households, which are able to smooth their consumption intertemporally and
can set a mark-up over their wages. The minimum wage has been modelled as an occasionally binding
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constraint in which the minimum wage is only binding if the market wage rate falls below an exogenously
defined threshold.
Our model provides a first step to a more structured discussion. However, more research needs to be
done and the model could benefit from extensions along several dimensions. First of all, building on the
same modelling approach as in the static monopsony world does not lead to different policy conclusions
from the neoclassic case. In fact, while unskilled workers do get exploited in our model a minimum wage
nonetheless reduces output. Hence, additional frictions in the labour market such as in a search-and-
matching model are needed to better account for monopsony power of firms. Second, a more detailed
government sector with, for instance, unemployment benefits would be a reasonable extension to examine
how the introduction of an outside option would change our results. Third, as we currently have a closed
economy model, the notion of migration is somewhat misleading. While migration was the motivation
for this chapter it is actually not explicitly embodied in the current version of the model. In contrast,
we were bypassing an open economy version by simulating migration inflows as a positive labour supply
shock. All these extensions to our parsimonious model are left for future research.
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Figure A.1: Alternative Event Day Specification: 5y5y Inflation Swaps
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Figure A.2: Alternative Event Day Specification: Events from Lexis-Nexis
Source: Lexis-Nexis; red circles: ECB Governing Council meetings; search query: “Quantitative Easing <or>
QE <or> Asset Purchase Programme <and> Draghi <or> ECB <or> European Central Bank <NOT> Fed,
Federal Reserve, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, BoJ, BoE, U.S., Japan, England, US”
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Table A.1: Event Days – Details
 
Date Kind Summary                   
05.06.2014 ECB monetary 
policy decisions 
The Governing Council decided on a combination of measures 
• Lower the main refinancing operations by 10 basis points to 0.15%  
• Lower the marginal lending facility by 35 basis points to 0.40% 
• Lower the deposit facility by 10 basis points to -0.10% 
• Conduct a series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) 
• Announced Purchases in the ABS market  
• Continue to conduct the MROs as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment for as long as necessary 
06.06.2014 Financial 
Times, P.1 
Mario Draghi became the first major central banker to cut a key interest rate below zero as he unveiled a series of radical measures to 
stave off a crippling bout of deflation, and signalled his willingness to take further action. (…) Mr Draghi indicated that policy makers 
were still willing to embark on some kind of quantitative easing if ultra-low inflation persists.  
04.09.2014 ECB monetary 
policy 
decisions 
The Governing Council decided today to  
• Lower the main refinancing operations by 10 basis points to 0.05%  
• Lower the marginal lending facility by 10 basis points to 0.30%  
• Lower the deposit facility by 10 basis points to -0.20% 
• Start purchasing non-financial private sector assets under an ABS Purchase Programme (ABSPP)  
• Start purchases under the Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP3) 
05.09.2014 Financial 
Times, P.1 
Mario Draghi startled markets yesterday, cutting interest rates to a record low and pledging to buy hundreds of billions of Euros of 
private sector bonds in a dramatic move to save the Euro-zone from economic stagnation. The Euro fell to its lowest level in more than 
a year (…) after what amounts to the ECB’s last gambit short of full-scale quantitative easing.  
14.01.2015 ECB press 
release 
We take note of the European Court of Justice Advocate General’s legal opinion in the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) case. 
This is an important milestone in the request for a preliminary ruling, which will only be concluded with the judgement of the Court 
15.01.2015 Financial 
Times, P.3 
The removal of a big legal hurdle to government bond buying by the European Central Bank pushed the Euro to a nine-year low 
yesterday and paved the way for policy makers to press ahead with quantitative easing next week. A top adviser to the European Court 
of Justice bolstered the case for aggressive action by the ECB next Thursday, after he said an earlier, more controversial sovereign debt-
buying plan lay within the ECB’s mandate.  The final decision on the Outright Monetary Transactions programme, expected in four to 
six months, is likely to follow the advocate-general’s opinion.  
16.01.2015 Financial 
Times, P.1 
“Franken-Shock”: The European Central Bank is next week expected to embark on a sovereign bond buying programme aimed at 
reviving growth and saving the Euro-zone from the ravages of deflation. A launch of full-blown quantitative easing would precipitate 
massive demand for the Swiss franc, widely seen as one of global markets’ stronger havens — and would have made it increasingly 
difficult for the SNB to defend its currency ceiling.  
 
 
 
Date Kind Summary                   
22.01.2015 ECB monetary 
policy 
decisions 
ECB announces expanded APP 
• PSPP: ECB purchases bonds issued by Euro Area central governments, agencies and European institutions 
• Combined monthly asset purchases of €60 billion 
• Purchases at least until September 2016 
• Hypothetical losses of ECB purchases will be subject to loss sharing. The rest of the NCBs’ additional asset purchases will not be 
subject to loss sharing 
23.01.2015 Financial 
Times, P.1 
The European Central Bank launched a €60bn-a-month bond-buying programme that was far bigger than investors had expected, in its 
long-awaited bid to revitalise the Euro-zone economy and counter deflation. (…) “Expectations work only if there is a certain 
credibility,” he said at the bank’s Frankfurt headquarters. “Today we are showing that that credibility is deserved.”  
03.09.2015 ECB monetary 
policy 
decisions 
The Governing Council decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. 
• Increase the issue share limit from the initial limit of 25% to 33%, subject to a case-by-case verification  
04.09.2015 Financial 
Times, P.1 
Mario Draghi buoyed investors yesterday as he opened the door for further quantitative easing should global market tremors and the 
emerging markets slowdown threaten Euro-zone recovery. The Euro and Euro-zone government bond yields plunged after the ECB 
president indicated it stood ready to extend the “size, composition and duration” of its €1.1tn bond-buying programme. (…) In a sign of 
policymakers’ willingness to reinforce their QE package, the ECB raised the purchase limit of a single country’s debt stock from 25 per 
cent to 33 per cent.  
22.10.2015 ECB monetary 
policy decisions 
The Governing Council decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged.  
23.10.2015 Financial 
Times, P.1 
The ECB signalled it would expand its €1.1tn quantitative easing programme in December and cut its deposit rate  (…) Mario Draghi said 
policymakers’ measures would need to be “re-examined” at its December 3 vote. He said the central bank stood ready to adjust the 
“size, composition and duration” of its QE programme.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Green: announcement effects (new QE announcement and Financial Times P.1-3).
Yellow: speculation effects (no new QE announcement, but Financial Times P.1-3).
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Table A.2: Event Days – Details (cont’d)
 
Date Kind Summary                   
03.12.2015 ECB monetary 
policy 
decisions 
The Governing Council decided to 
• Lower the deposit facility by 10 basis points to -0.30% 
• The main refinancing operations and marginal lending facility remain unchanged  
• Extend the APP until the end of March 2017, or beyond  
• Include regional and local governments in the PSPP 
04.12.2015 Financial 
Times, P.1 
But these measures (…) disappointed investors who had hoped for deeper rate cuts and more monthly bond purchases. (…) 
More aggressive stimulus would probably have run into stiff German-led opposition (…). While support for the package was not 
unanimous, Mr Draghi said a “very large majority” were in favour of the measures.  
21.01.2016 ECB monetary 
policy decisions 
The Governing Council decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. 
22.01.2016 Financial 
Times, P.1 
Mario Draghi signalled that the European Central Bank was prepared to launch a fresh round of monetary stimulus as soon as March 
(…). The ECB has “the power, the willingness, the determination to act” and “there are no limits to our action” to bring inflation up to 
its target of just below 2 per cent, he said.  
18.02.2016 ECB press 
release 
The minutes show the governing council was unanimous in concluding that its current policy stance “needed to be reviewed and 
possibly reconsidered”. 
19.02.2016 Financial 
Times, P.1 
Mario Draghi, the ECB president, has won wide support for further policy action next month (…). Markets are expecting the ECB’s 
deposit rate to be cut another 10 basis points to minus 0.4 per cent next month, while the €60bn quantitative easing programme 
launched a year ago is likely to be increased in scope.  
10.03.2016 ECB monetary 
policy 
decisions 
The Governing Council decided to 
• Lower main refinancing operations by 5 basis points to 0.00%  
• Lower marginal lending facility by 5 basis points to 0.25% 
• Lower deposit facility by 10 basis points to -0.40% 
• Expand the monthly purchases of APP from €60 billion at present to €80 billion. They are intended to run until the end of 
March 2017, or beyond, if necessary 
• The issuer and issue share limits for securities issued by eligible international organisations and multilateral development 
banks will be increased to 50% 
• Include investment-grade Euro-denominated bonds issued by non-bank corporations in the list of assets (CSPP) 
• Launch a new series of TLTRO II 
11.03.2016 Financial 
Times, P.1 
The European Central Bank has unleashed a bigger-than-expected package of measures to stimulate the Euro-zone economy, with 
expanded quantitative easing, incentives to banks to increase lending and further interest rate cuts. 
  
 
 Green: announcement effects (new QE announcement and Financial Times P.1-3).
Yellow: speculation effects (no new QE announcement, but Financial Times P.1-3).
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Figure A.3: Average Impact of QE Announcement Across Maturities and Sensitivity to Window Size
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Source: Datastream. Y-Axis shows reduction in BPS for each window size. The average is calculated on the
average reduction per event across maturities for each country.
Figure A.4: Weighted Average Maturity in Years of PSPP Portfolio Holdings
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Table A.3: Overview Control Variables
Variable Belgium Finland France Germany Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain Euro Area
Business Confidence X X X X X X X X X
Consumer Confidence X X X X X X X X X X
GDP QoQ final X X X X X X X X X X
GDP QoQ flash X X X X X X X X X
GDP YoY final X X X X X X X X X X
GDP YoY flash X X X X X X X X X
Industrial Production YoY X X X X X X X X X X
Inflation MoM X X X X X X X X X
Inflation YoY X X X X X X X X X X
Manufacturing PMI X X X X X X X
Retail Sales MoM X X X X X X X X X X
Retail Sales YoY X X X X X X X X X
Unemployment Rate X X X X X X X X X X
ZEW Economic Sentiment X
Bid-Ask Spread X X X X X X X X X
CDS Premia X X X X X X X X X
VSTOXX Index X X X X X X X X X
US 10 Year Benchmark X X X X X X X X X
Source: News data is taken from the calendar function of the publicly available website tradingeconomics.com. Surprise components of news announcements are calculated as actual value − forecast
value on the day of each announcement. All non-announcement days are zero. To make different national business confidence and consumer confidence indices more comparable, the surprise component is
calculated as percentage deviation from forecast value. Euro Area news apply for all nine countries. Bid-ask spreads are calculated as the daily average bid-ask spreads for a large subset of national bonds.
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Figure A.5: CDS Benchmarks per Country
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Source: Datastream. Vertical lines indicate announcement dates. Y-axis shows CDS premia.
Table A.4: Total Purchases to Total Debt Outstanding
Jan 2015 Dec 2015 Mar 2016
Belgium 7.3389% 2.2699% 1.5099%
Germany 12.5376% 3.9621% 2.6522%
Finland 13.3378% 4.1292% 2.6328%
France 9.2687% 2.8376% 1.8614%
Ireland 8.9557% 2.9897% 1.8554%
Italy 7.4892% 2.3277% 1.5318%
Netherlands 12.1816% 3.6562% 2.6104%
Portugal 15.3784% 4.3524% 2.7553%
Spain 11.7811% 3.4739% 2.2674%
Source: County debt data is taken from Datastream. Total debt outstanding is defined as non-short term Euro denominated
debt only at the time of the announcement. Total PSPP purchases are calculated as monthly APP purchases times the share of
the PSPP times the number of month announced. In a second step, the country specific purchases are obtained by multiplying
the total PSPP purchases with each capital key. Note that for the announcements in December 2015 and March 2016 only the
additional amount of purchases is taken into account.
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Table B.1: List of Variables
Monthly balance sheet statistics Source:
Total assets Bundesbank
Cash in hand Bundesbank
Balances with central banks Bundesbank
T-bills and similar debt instruments Bundesbank
Loans to banks Bundesbank
Loans to non-banks Bundesbank
Loans to households Bundesbank
Loans to firms Bundesbank
Loans to government Bundesbank
Debt instruments Bundesbank
Bonds and notes Bundesbank
Shares and other variable-yield securities Bundesbank
Trading portfolio (assets) Bundesbank
Total liabilities Bundesbank
Capital Bundesbank
Liabilities to banks Bundesbank
Liabilities to non-banks Bundesbank
Securitised liabilities Bundesbank
Fiduciary liabilities Bundesbank
Provisions for liabilities and charges Bundesbank
Trading portfolio (liabilities) Bundesbank
Yearly banks’ profit and loss statements Source:
Net interest received/ paid Bundesbank
Net commissions received/ paid Bundesbank
Staff costs Bundesbank
Total administrative spending Bundesbank
Net profit/ loss from trading portfolio Bundesbank
Net income/ charges from valuation of assets Bundesbank
Other and extraordinary income Bundesbank
Gross earnings Bundesbank
Operating profit Bundesbank
Profit before tax Bundesbank
Taxes paid Bundesbank
Profit after tax Bundesbank
Additional control variables Source:
Real German GDP growth German Federal Statistic Office
EURIBOR, 3m Datastream
German Bund, 10 y Datastream
Stock market: DAX, log Datastream
House price index German Federal Statistic Office
ECB shadow rate Wu and Xia (2017)
Note: Several of the balance sheet variables are also available at sub aggregates, which are e.g. divided into regions (domestic,
Euro Area, non-Euro Area) or maturity (overnight, up to 1 year, 2 to 5 years, etc.). For more details about the balance sheet
statistic or the P&L statements please see the Bundesbank website.
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Figure B.1: Average Total Assets Over Time
Source: Bundesbank balance sheet statistics. In billion EUR.
Figure B.2: Number of Mergers and Average Bank Income
Source: Bundesbank. Own calculations. Number of mergers is summed over each month.
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Figure B.3: Average Composition of Total Assets Over Time
Source: Bundesbank Bank Balance Sheet Statistics. Own calculations. In percentage relative to total assets
Figure B.4: Average Composition of Total Liabilities Over Time
Source: Bundesbank Bank Balance Sheet Statistics. Own calculations. In percentage relative to total liabilities
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Figure B.5: Total Income from Interest and Trading
Source: Bundesbank. Own calculations. In billion EUR. IFRS trading income is only available as an aggregate
statistic for all banks holdings under IFRS, which is roughly equivalent to the summed income over all Major
banks, Landesbanken, and cooperative central banks.
Figure B.6: Average Net Income
Source: Bundesbank P&L Statistics. Own calculations. Net income components relative to total assets by
bank group. The averages are calculated as weighted averages of total assets.
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Figure B.7: Evolution of Return on Equity
Source: Bundesbank P&L Statistics. Own calculations. The averages are calculated as weighted averages of
total assets.
Figure B.8: Illustration of Impact of the Interaction Term on Net Interest Income
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Source: Bundesbank. Own calculations based on the results of the System-GMM estimator for all banks. As
the level of the interest rate increases, net interest income increases. However, higher levels of deposit shares
imply a lower net interest income. This relationship becomes only significant when breaking through the ZLB.
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Figure B.9: Development of Euribor and ECB Shadow Rates
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Figure B.10: Histogram on Monthly Bank Deposits
Source: Bundesbank Bank Balance Sheet Statistics.
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Table B.2: Effect of Unconventional Monetary Policy on Net Interest Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Fixed effects System-GMM Large banks Small banks Regional banks
Net interest, lag 0.5072*** 0.5528*** 0.2103* 0.5167*** 0.4775***
(0.0338) (0.0391) (0.1064) (0.0118) (0.0280)
Level 0.0315* 0.0074 -0.1886 0.0056 0.2241***
(0.0177) (0.0202) (0.2524) (0.0093) (0.0424)
Level, sq. -0.0080** -0.0039 0.0327 -0.0069*** -0.0264***
(0.0035) (0.0028) (0.0345) (0.0014) (0.0069)
Slope 0.0751*** 0.0519*** 0.0083 0.0641*** 0.0664**
(0.0069) (0.0072) (0.1261) (0.0044) (0.0267)
Deposit ratio * level 0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0037 0.0007*** -0.0004
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0055) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Deposit ratio * UMP * level 0.0023*** 0.0029*** 0.0028*** 0.0029**
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0014)
GDP growth YoY, lag -0.0026*** -0.0014 0.0094 -0.0022*** 0.0007
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0325) (0.0006) (0.0036)
House price index, lag -0.0023** -0.0013 0.0000 -0.0007 0.0206***
(0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0438) (0.0007) (0.0039)
Bank size, lag -0.1477*** -0.1617*** 0.2360 -0.0562*** -0.1021***
(0.0211) (0.0390) (0.1786) (0.0127) (0.0319)
Leverage ratio, lag -0.0018 -0.0225*** -0.0072 -0.0326*** -0.0205***
(0.0044) (0.0066) (0.0415) (0.0056) (0.0039)
Efficiency, lag -0.0236 0.1874*** -0.5110 0.1950*** 0.0522
(0.0395) (0.0352) (0.4624) (0.0221) (0.1397)
Loan ratio, lag 0.0019*** -0.0065*** 0.0013 -0.0037*** -0.0041**
(0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0038) (0.0006) (0.0017)
Deposit ratio, lag -0.0007 -0.0048*** 0.0375* -0.0042*** -0.0001
(0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0190) (0.0006) (0.0017)
Observations 20,485 20,485 84 17,954 1,737
Number of banks 1,599 1,599 14 1,383 155
R2 0.4838 0.2240
Autocorrelation 1 -4.581 -17.15 -2.729
Autocorrelation 2 0.0715 0.374 0.175
Notes: The fixed effects estimator uses clustered bank standard errors. The System-GMM estimator is specified as a two-step
estimator with robust standard errors. The maximum number of lags used as instruments for the System-GMM estimator is capped
at three. The regressions on small and regional banks also use the System-GMM estimator. To avoid the structural break through
the Balance Sheet Modernisation Act, the data set for large banks is reduced to start in 2010. Also, since this subset of the data
set is a small N, small T sample the fixed effects estimator is employed. ∗ ∗ ∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, and ∗ = p < 0.1.
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Table B.3: Effect of Unconventional Monetary Policy on Net Commissions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Fixed effects System-GMM Large banks Small banks Regional banks
Net commission, lag 0.6284*** 0.8798*** 0.4509*** 0.8189*** 0.8164***
(0.0431) (0.1255) (0.1435) (0.0133) (0.0229)
Level 0.0013 0.0094 -0.0054 0.0016 0.0611
(0.0106) (0.0091) (0.0597) (0.0031) (0.0380)
Level, sq. -0.0010 0.0021 -0.0022 -0.0001 -0.0076
(0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0076) (0.0004) (0.0070)
Slope -0.0281*** -0.0126*** -0.0433 -0.0176*** -0.0269
(0.0062) (0.0031) (0.0287) (0.0016) (0.0213)
Deposit ratio * level -0.0000 -0.0007** -0.0012** 0.0001** -0.0008*
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0004)
Deposit ratio * UMP * level 0.0012*** 0.0014*** 0.0009*** 0.0025**
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0011)
GDP growth YoY, lag -0.0028*** 0.0008** -0.0003 -0.0017*** -0.0048*
(0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0060) (0.0002) (0.0026)
House price index, lag 0.0036*** 0.0043*** 0.0145 0.0052*** 0.0109***
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0089) (0.0003) (0.0036)
DAX, lag -0.0818*** -0.1484*** -0.0922*** -0.2263***
(0.0167) (0.0175) (0.0042) (0.0577)
Bank size, lag -0.1535*** 0.0438 0.0867 0.0274*** 0.0148
(0.0469) (0.0865) (0.0780) (0.0054) (0.0284)
Leverage ratio, lag 0.0041 0.0021 -0.0100 -0.0107*** 0.0041
(0.0048) (0.0130) (0.0072) (0.0027) (0.0050)
Efficiency, lag 0.0470 0.0585** 0.1136 0.0331*** 0.3996***
(0.0320) (0.0293) (0.0777) (0.0072) (0.1498)
Loan ratio, lag -0.0007 -0.0049*** 0.0015 -0.0029*** -0.0053***
(0.0006) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0002) (0.0016)
Deposit ratio, lag 0.0007 0.0011 0.0105* -0.0005** 0.0003
(0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0049) (0.0002) (0.0017)
Observations 20,485 20,485 84 17,954 1,737
Number of banks 1,599 1,599 14 1,383 155
R2 0.4764 0.3770
Autocorrelation 1 -3.863 -18.32 -4.158
Autocorrelation 2 -2.391 0.254 -2.327
Notes: The fixed effects estimator uses clustered bank standard errors. The System-GMM estimator is specified as a two-step
estimator with robust standard errors. The maximum number of lags used as instruments for the System-GMM estimator is capped
at three. The regressions on small and regional banks also use the System-GMM estimator. To avoid the structural break through
the Balance Sheet Modernisation Act, the data set for large banks is reduced to start in 2010. Also, since this subset of the data
set is a small N, small T sample the fixed effects estimator is employed. ∗ ∗ ∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, and ∗ = p < 0.1.
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Table B.4: Effect of Unconventional Monetary Policy on Net Provisions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Fixed effects System-GMM Large banks Small banks Regional banks
Net provision, lag 0.0416*** 0.4764*** 0.0082 0.4607*** 0.3685***
(0.0128) (0.0353) (0.1588) (0.0237) (0.0231)
Level -0.3850*** -0.3290*** 0.3534 -0.3847*** -0.1028**
(0.0240) (0.0386) (0.3131) (0.0261) (0.0422)
Level, sq. 0.0510*** 0.0534*** -0.0747 0.0654*** 0.0091
(0.0043) (0.0063) (0.0448) (0.0041) (0.0079)
Slope 0.0133 0.0300* -0.0835 0.0708*** -0.0565**
(0.0101) (0.0172) (0.1621) (0.0119) (0.0242)
Deposit ratio * level -0.0002 0.0008* 0.0014 0.0011** -0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0070) (0.0005) (0.0002)
Deposit ratio * UMP * level 0.0019*** 0.0061*** 0.0074*** -0.0001
(0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0012)
GDP growth YoY, lag 0.0544*** 0.0498*** 0.0183 0.0596*** 0.0065
(0.0016) (0.0027) (0.0481) (0.0018) (0.0040)
House price index, lag -0.0207*** 0.0015 0.0346 -0.0052** -0.0042
(0.0014) (0.0028) (0.0454) (0.0021) (0.0033)
DAX, lag -0.1064*** -0.3738*** -0.3666*** -0.0960
(0.0259) (0.0392) (0.0296) (0.0611)
Bank size, lag 0.0155 0.0535* -0.2817 -0.1272*** 0.0467*
(0.0319) (0.0302) (0.2916) (0.0313) (0.0276)
Leverage ratio, lag 0.0067 0.0199 0.0866* -0.1345*** 0.0023
(0.0049) (0.0139) (0.0410) (0.0178) (0.0032)
Efficiency, lag -0.0541 3.4639*** -0.1873 3.6311*** 1.1478***
(0.0766) (0.2343) (0.3995) (0.1522) (0.1690)
Loan ratio, lag -0.0061*** -0.0106*** -0.0024 -0.0106*** -0.0010
(0.0008) (0.0027) (0.0065) (0.0017) (0.0011)
Deposit ratio, lag 0.0067*** 0.0207*** -0.0093 0.0372*** -0.0014
(0.0010) (0.0041) (0.0272) (0.0022) (0.0012)
Observations 20,485 20,485 84 17,954 1,737
Number of banks 1,599 1,599 14 1,383 155
R2 0.2631 0.2717
Autocorrelation 1 -21.16 -25.21 -5.820
Autocorrelation 2 -2.496 -4.678 0.401
Notes: The fixed effects estimator uses clustered bank standard errors. The System-GMM estimator is specified as a two-step
estimator with robust standard errors. The maximum number of lags used as instruments for the System-GMM estimator is capped
at three. The regressions on small and regional banks also use the System-GMM estimator. To avoid the structural break through
the Balance Sheet Modernisation Act, the data set for large banks is reduced to start in 2010. Also, since this subset of the data
set is a small N, small T sample the fixed effects estimator is employed. ∗ ∗ ∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, and ∗ = p < 0.1.
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Table B.5: Effect of Unconventional Monetary Policy on Net Trading Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Fixed effects System-GMM Large banks Small banks Regional banks
Net trading, lag -0.0784 0.0953 0.0070 0.0228 0.1562*
(0.0605) (0.0972) (0.1148) (0.0390) (0.0946)
Level -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0893 -0.0009*** 0.0037
(0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0932) (0.0003) (0.0055)
Level, sq. -0.0022*** -0.0017*** -0.0401 -0.0004 -0.0034
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0449) (0.0002) (0.0026)
Slope 0.0082*** 0.0065*** 0.1464 0.0026*** 0.0094
(0.0024) (0.0016) (0.2345) (0.0007) (0.0092)
Trading book assets * DAX -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0010 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0001)
Trading book liabilities * DAX 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0008 -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0001)
GDP growth YoY, lag 0.0015*** 0.0012*** 0.0406 0.0005*** 0.0018
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0401) (0.0001) (0.0019)
DAX, lag 0.0104** 0.0068** 0.0699 0.0026** 0.0207
(0.0045) (0.0033) (0.3717) (0.0011) (0.0166)
Bank size, lag -0.0015 0.0081 0.0699 0.0019 -0.0028
(0.0017) (0.0112) (0.1996) (0.0016) (0.0077)
Leverage ratio, lag -0.0003 0.0005 0.0251 0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0257) (0.0002) (0.0006)
Efficiency, lag 0.0030* 0.0007 -0.0271 -0.0000 0.0137
(0.0018) (0.0010) (0.1689) (0.0005) (0.0288)
Loan ratio, lag -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0010 -0.0000 -0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0028) (0.0000) (0.0005)
Deposit ratio, lag 0.0001 0.0001 0.0051 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0055) (0.0000) (0.0002)
Trading book assets, lag -0.0007 0.0024 -0.0052 0.0131 0.0023
(0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0053) (0.0091) (0.0016)
Trading book liabilities, lag 0.0014 -0.0015 0.0101 -0.0102 -0.0022
(0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0064) (0.0074) (0.0015)
Observations 9,520 9,520 79 8,279 868
Number of banks 1,596 1,596 14 1,382 150
R2 0.0202 0.3530
Autocorrelation 1 -2.893 -3.203 -2.076
Autocorrelation 2 -0.728 -0.256 -0.393
Notes: The fixed effects estimator uses clustered bank standard errors. The System-GMM estimator is specified as a two step
estimator with robust standard errors. The maximum number of lags used as instruments for the System-GMM estimator is capped
at three. The regressions on small and regional banks also use the System-GMM estimator. As fair value accounting for the trading
portfolio starts only in 2010, the data set is reduced accordingly for all estimators. Also, since this subset of the data set is a small
N, small T sample the fixed effects estimator is employed. ∗ ∗ ∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, and ∗ = p < 0.1.
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Table B.6: Effect of UMP on Net Interest Income Using Shadow Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Fixed effects System-GMM Large banks Small banks Regional banks
Net interest, lag 0.5041*** 0.5227*** 0.2178** 0.4885*** 0.4863***
(0.0344) (0.0434) (0.0859) (0.0124) (0.0274)
Level 0.0341* 0.0063 -0.5233 0.0316*** 0.2074***
(0.0180) (0.0151) (0.4002) (0.0078) (0.0403)
Level, sq. -0.0070** -0.0055* 0.0748 -0.0089*** -0.0262***
(0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0534) (0.0014) (0.0068)
Slope 0.0738*** 0.0481*** -0.0959 0.0631*** 0.0552**
(0.0069) (0.0074) (0.1574) (0.0044) (0.0275)
Deposits * (level - shadow) -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0109 -0.0005*** -0.0009***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0086) (0.0001) (0.0003)
GDP growth YoY, lag -0.0018** -0.0014 -0.0061 -0.0022*** 0.0013
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0352) (0.0006) (0.0037)
House price index, lag -0.0012 0.0012 0.0267 -0.0003 0.0229***
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0497) (0.0007) (0.0039)
Bank size, lag -0.1473*** -0.1901*** -0.0321 -0.0505*** -0.0934***
(0.0212) (0.0445) (0.3088) (0.0126) (0.0300)
Leverage ratio, lag -0.0012 -0.0235*** 0.0124 -0.0252*** -0.0222***
(0.0043) (0.0065) (0.0508) (0.0054) (0.0037)
Efficiency, lag -0.0125 0.1898*** -0.3753 0.1742*** 0.1036
(0.0367) (0.0334) (0.4084) (0.0218) (0.1419)
Loan ratio, lag 0.0019*** -0.0056*** -0.0022 -0.0032*** -0.0041**
(0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0038) (0.0006) (0.0016)
Deposit ratio, lag 0.0003 -0.0036*** 0.0318 -0.0027*** 0.0009
(0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0239) (0.0006) (0.0016)
Observations 20,485 20,485 84 17,954 1,737
Number of banks 1,599 1,599 14 1,383 155
R2 0.4838 0.2393
Autocorrelation 1 -4.485 -17.06 -2.740
Autocorrelation 2 -0.103 -0.331 0.194
Notes: The fixed effects estimator uses clustered bank standard errors. The System-GMM estimator is specified as a two step
estimator with robust standard errors. The maximum number of lags used as instruments for the System-GMM estimator is capped
at three. The regressions on small and regional banks also use the System-GMM estimator. To avoid the structural break through
the Balance Sheet Modernisation Act, the data set for large banks is reduced to start in 2010. Also, since this subset of the data
set is a small N, small T sample the fixed effects estimator is employed. ∗ ∗ ∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, and ∗ = p < 0.1.
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Table B.7: Effect of UMP on Net Commissions Using Shadow Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Fixed effects System-GMM Large banks Small banks Regional banks
Net commission, lag 0.6293*** 0.8979*** 0.4099** 0.8095*** 0.8281***
(0.0432) (0.1086) (0.1462) (0.0122) (0.0199)
Level 0.0113 -0.0005 -0.0952 0.0106*** 0.0490
(0.0104) (0.0070) (0.0644) (0.0026) (0.0392)
Level, sq. -0.0026 0.0005 0.0090 -0.0011** -0.0098
(0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0086) (0.0004) (0.0079)
Slope -0.0254*** -0.0162*** -0.0709** -0.0160*** -0.0296
(0.0062) (0.0030) (0.0242) (0.0016) (0.0219)
Deposits * (level - shadow) -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0028 -0.0002*** -0.0011***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0024) (0.0000) (0.0003)
GDP growth YoY, lag -0.0031*** 0.0004 -0.0045 -0.0018*** -0.0042
(0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0044) (0.0002) (0.0026)
House price index, lag 0.0051*** 0.0060*** 0.0216** 0.0055*** 0.0154***
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0082) (0.0003) (0.0040)
DAX, lag -0.0602*** -0.1251*** -0.0772*** -0.1832***
(0.0184) (0.0128) (0.0043) (0.0551)
Bank size, lag -0.1550*** 0.0539 0.0239 0.0209*** 0.0076
(0.0467) (0.0764) (0.0773) (0.0052) (0.0296)
Leverage ratio, lag 0.0037 0.0051 -0.0042 -0.0103*** 0.0015
(0.0048) (0.0148) (0.0073) (0.0027) (0.0056)
Efficiency, lag 0.0498 0.0568** 0.1458* 0.0319*** 0.4976***
(0.0325) (0.0252) (0.0760) (0.0072) (0.1478)
Loan ratio, lag -0.0006 -0.0038*** 0.0007 -0.0026*** -0.0062***
(0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0002) (0.0017)
Deposit ratio, lag 0.0012 0.0005 0.0086 -0.0001 0.0017
(0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0049) (0.0002) (0.0016)
Observations 20,485 20,485 84 17,954 1,737
Number of banks 1,599 1,599 14 1,383 155
R2 0.4768 0.3876
Autocorrelation 1 -4.085 -18.31 -4.226
Autocorrelation 2 -2.397 -0.0528 -2.330
Notes: The fixed effects estimator uses clustered bank standard errors. The System-GMM estimator is specified as a two step
estimator with robust standard errors. The maximum number of lags used as instruments for the System-GMM estimator is capped
at three. The regressions on small and regional banks also use the System-GMM estimator. To avoid the structural break through
the Balance Sheet Modernisation Act, the data set for large banks is reduced to start in 2010. Also, since this subset of the data
set is a small N, small T sample the fixed effects estimator is employed. ∗ ∗ ∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, and ∗ = p < 0.1.
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Table B.8: Effect of UMP on Net Provisions Using Shadow Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Fixed effects System-GMM Large banks Small banks Regional banks
Net provisions, lag 0.0451*** 0.5012*** 0.0095 0.4966*** 0.3646***
(0.0128) (0.0354) (0.2088) (0.0240) (0.0227)
Level -0.3528*** -0.2718*** 0.6316 -0.3055*** -0.1163***
(0.0241) (0.0361) (0.4799) (0.0242) (0.0430)
Level, sq. 0.0456*** 0.0464*** -0.1113 0.0550*** 0.0101
(0.0043) (0.0060) (0.0689) (0.0041) (0.0080)
Slope 0.0218** 0.0425** 0.0006 0.0794*** -0.0548**
(0.0102) (0.0167) (0.1776) (0.0117) (0.0245)
Deposits * (level - shadow) -0.0010*** -0.0024*** 0.0092 -0.0031*** -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0104) (0.0002) (0.0003)
GDP growth YoY, lag 0.0536*** 0.0503*** 0.0306 0.0583*** 0.0071*
(0.0016) (0.0026) (0.0572) (0.0018) (0.0040)
House price index, lag -0.0151*** 0.0104*** 0.0114 0.0087*** -0.0032
(0.0016) (0.0030) (0.0448) (0.0024) (0.0032)
DAX, lag -0.0413 -0.2258*** -0.1392*** -0.0848
(0.0278) (0.0412) (0.0309) (0.0593)
Bank size, lag 0.0091 0.0216 -0.0788 -0.1664*** 0.0402
(0.0329) (0.0290) (0.4272) (0.0304) (0.0266)
Leverage ratio, lag 0.0052 0.0124 0.0777* -0.1488*** 0.0020
(0.0049) (0.0149) (0.0413) (0.0179) (0.0031)
Efficiency, lag -0.0164 3.6913*** -0.2554 3.8968*** 1.1340***
(0.0774) (0.2376) (0.2209) (0.1541) (0.1694)
Loan ratio, lag -0.0059*** -0.0089*** -0.0001 -0.0075*** -0.0010
(0.0009) (0.0027) (0.0083) (0.0017) (0.0011)
Deposit ratio, lag 0.0083*** 0.0256*** -0.0098 0.0392*** -0.0014
(0.0010) (0.0041) (0.0259) (0.0021) (0.0012)
Observations 20,485 20,485 84 17,954 1,737
Number of banks 1,599 1,599 14 1,383 155
R2 0.2647 0.2810
Autocorrelation 1 -21.53 -25.40 -5.816
Autocorrelation 2 -2.664 -4.530 0.396
Notes: The fixed effects estimator uses clustered bank standard errors. The System-GMM estimator is specified as a two step
estimator with robust standard errors. The maximum number of lags used as instruments for the System-GMM estimator is capped
at three. The regressions on small and regional banks also use the System-GMM estimator. To avoid the structural break through
the Balance Sheet Modernisation Act, the data set for large banks is reduced to start in 2010. Also, since this subset of the data
set is a small N, small T sample the fixed effects estimator is employed. ∗ ∗ ∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, and ∗ = p < 0.1.
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Table B.9: Effect of Unconventional Monetary Policy on Bank Leverage Using Shadow Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Fixed effects System-GMM Large banks Small banks Regional banks
Leverage ratio, lag 0.9485*** 0.8110*** 0.9354*** 0.9703*** 0.9408***
(0.0057) (0.0261) (0.0265) (0.0071) (0.0077)
Level 0.0047 0.0534*** -0.0499 0.0300*** -0.0112
(0.0065) (0.0193) (0.0366) (0.0018) (0.0342)
Level, sq. -0.0014* -0.0071*** 0.0040 -0.0045*** -0.0031
(0.0008) (0.0026) (0.0050) (0.0002) (0.0048)
Slope -0.0021 0.0130* -0.0155 0.0039*** -0.0078
(0.0021) (0.0072) (0.0306) (0.0007) (0.0195)
Deposits * (level - shadow) -0.0003*** -0.0006*** 0.0055 -0.0003*** -0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0038) (0.0000) (0.0003)
GDP growth YoY, lag 0.0003 0.0028 0.0098 0.0010** -0.0016
(0.0008) (0.0023) (0.0085) (0.0004) (0.0068)
House price index, lag 0.0033*** 0.0082*** -0.0008 0.0030*** 0.0020
(0.0005) (0.0023) (0.0092) (0.0002) (0.0035)
Bank size, lag -0.0582** 0.4673*** 0.0418 0.0477*** -0.1046***
(0.0242) (0.1065) (0.0648) (0.0091) (0.0344)
Loan growth, lag -0.0011*** 0.0062*** -0.0002 -0.0008*** -0.0012**
(0.0003) (0.0016) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0005)
Deposit ratio, lag 0.0009 -0.0076 0.0114 0.0014*** 0.0001
(0.0006) (0.0048) (0.0085) (0.0004) (0.0014)
Observations 233,787 233,787 896 205,062 19,637
Number of banks 1,622 1,622 15 1,403 160
R2 0.9181 0.8822 0.9463 0.9112
Autocorrelation 1 -5.949
Autocorrelation 2 2.205
Notes: The fixed effects estimator uses clustered bank standard errors. The System-GMM estimator is specified as a two-step
estimator with robust standard errors. The maximum number of lags used as instruments for the System-GMM estimator is capped
at three. Since this regression is based on monthly balance sheet data, the T dimension is increased strongly decreasing the Nickell
Bias. Hence, a fixed effects estimator is used for bank group specific regressions. To avoid the structural break through the Balance
Sheet Modernisation Act, the data set for large banks is reduced to start in 2010. ∗ ∗ ∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, and ∗ = p < 0.1.
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Table B.10: Effect of Unconventional Monetary Policy on Loan Growth Using Shadow Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Fixed effects System-GMM Large banks Small banks Regional banks
Loan growth, lag 0.7971*** 0.5780*** 0.8556*** 0.8758*** 0.7318***
(0.0111) (0.0289) (0.0219) (0.0054) (0.0181)
Level -0.0085 -0.4620** -1.4451 -0.0609** -0.1284
(0.0503) (0.2276) (1.0391) (0.0270) (0.4125)
Level, sq. -0.0219*** -0.0169 0.1722 -0.0126*** 0.0421
(0.0072) (0.0328) (0.1320) (0.0041) (0.0708)
Slope -0.0864*** -0.1149 -0.7662 -0.0766*** 0.2979
(0.0246) (0.0729) (0.7466) (0.0141) (0.2222)
Deposits * (level - shadow) -0.0038*** -0.0079*** -0.0117 -0.0023*** 0.0010
(0.0006) (0.0024) (0.0637) (0.0003) (0.0026)
GDP growth YoY, lag 0.0854*** 0.1334*** 0.1075 0.0763*** -0.0766
(0.0111) (0.0295) (0.1428) (0.0069) (0.0988)
House price index, lag 0.0012 -0.0400* -0.0500 -0.0077*** -0.0064
(0.0048) (0.0241) (0.2002) (0.0025) (0.0361)
Bank size, lag 0.1384 0.4087 -0.5377 0.3733*** 0.2403
(0.1521) (0.7101) (1.5462) (0.0771) (0.2478)
Leverage ratio, lag 0.0141* 0.5324*** 0.0081 0.0337*** 0.0009
(0.0083) (0.1044) (0.0441) (0.0047) (0.0223)
Deposit ratio, lag 0.0286*** 0.0848*** 0.1812 0.0139*** 0.0393***
(0.0040) (0.0269) (0.1507) (0.0020) (0.0103)
Observations 234,154 234,154 960 205,210 19,703
Number of banks 1,626 1,626 16 1,404 161
R2 0.6478 0.7487 0.7821 0.5410
Autocorrelation 1 -8.532
Autocorrelation 2 1.676
Notes: The fixed effects estimator uses clustered bank standard errors. The System-GMM estimator is specified as a two-step
estimator with robust standard errors. The maximum number of lags used as instruments for the System-GMM estimator is capped
at three. Since this regression is based on monthly balance sheet data, the T dimension is increased strongly decreasing the Nickell
Bias. Hence, a fixed effects estimator is used for bank group specific regressions. To avoid the structural break through the Balance
Sheet Modernisation Act, the data set for large banks is reduced to start in 2010. ∗ ∗ ∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, and ∗ = p < 0.1.
Table B.11: Diff-in-Diff on Net Interest Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Net interest Net interest Net interest Net interest
Dep. ratio * UMP -0.0163 -0.0902*** 0.0069 -0.0634***
(0.0492) (0.0194) (0.0501) (0.0194)
Observations 7,965 7,965 7,965 7,965
Bank FE N Y N Y
Time FE N N Y Y
Number of banks 1,602 1,602
Notes: Treatment group is defined as banks with an above average deposit rate (Deposit ratio = 1 if > 35%). For yearly data,
a time frame from 2012 to 2016 is chosen where UMP = 1 for t ≥ 2014. Clustered bank standard errors are used if bank FE are
included. Otherwise standard errors are defined as robust. All dummies other than the interaction term are suppressed in output.
∗ ∗ ∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, and ∗ = p < 0.1.
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Table B.12: Diff-in-Diff on Loan Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln Loans ln Loans ln Loans ln Loans
Dep. ratio * UMP -0.3182** -0.1581 -0.4197*** -0.2584
(0.1235) (0.2920) (0.1243) (0.2962)
Observations 57,394 57,394 57,394 57,394
Bank FE N Y N Y
Time FE N N Y Y
Number of banks 1,600 1,600
Notes: Treatment group is defined as banks with an above average deposit rate (Deposit ratio = 1 if > 35%). For monthly
data, a time frame from 2013 to 2015 is chosen where UMP = 1 for t ≥ June 2014. Clustered bank standard errors are used if bank
FE are included. Otherwise standard errors are defined as robust. All dummies other than the interaction term are suppressed in
output. ∗ ∗ ∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, and ∗ = p < 0.1.
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C.1. DERIVATION OF THE STEADY STATE
C.1 Derivation of the Steady State
The analytical derivation of the steady state is fairly straight forward in our simple model. First of all,
we set the values for NS , NM , and NU equal to their empirical counterparts. Normalising all productivity
levels equal to one in the steady state makes Y determined by parameters only. In the second step, firms
optimise labour type demand via the FOC.
As standard in the literature
i =
1
β
.
Also, real marginal costs can easily be determined via the mark up mu
mc =
P
mu
.
Since we have a closed economy model and a fixed fraction of government consumption in steady
state, we can derive household’s total consumption easily via
Y = C +G ⇒ C = (1− g)Y.
Our next goal is to determine skilled labour demand by firms. Note that the skilled, medium skilled,
and unskilled demand are analogous in the neoclassical case1, which is why we only show the skilled
labour demand. The FOC for the demand of skilled labour was given by Equation (4.15). In steady state
this reads as
wS = mc(1− λ− κ)
1
ζ (
Y
NS
)
1
ζ .
In contrast to the neoclassical model, the steady state wage for unskilled labour in the monopsony
model is given by
wU =
mc(λ)
1
ζ ( Y
NU
)
1
ζ
(1 + ϕ)
.
Given real wages, the amount of skilled, medium skilled, and unskilled working hours, and the levels of
government spending, one can derive the steady state value of public transfers T via the budget constraint
of the government (G = T ). Aggregate profits in the economy are defined as Γ = (P − mc)Y . These
profits are equally distributed between skilled and medium skilled households. Unskilled households do
not obtain any profits since they are rule-of-thumb consumers.
To determine the distribution of consumption for each agent, we resort to the budget constraint
of skilled, medium, and unskilled households (here under the assumption that the government runs a
balanced budget).
For skilled and medium skilled we have
CS = wSNS +
1
2
Γ−
NS
N
T.
1The only difference being the respective weights of λ or κ.
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Whereas unskilled rule-of-thumb consumers do not obtain any profits nor pay taxes
CU = wUNU .
The Lagrangian multipliers for the M and S type households are analogously given by
µS = C
−σ
S .
C.2 Derivation of the Wage Setting Equation
In order to save on notation, we suppress labour specific subscripts in this section.
Rewriting (4.26) in terms of real wage and wage inflation,
Et
∞∑
k=0
(βθw)
kNt,t+kUCt+k
(
w̃twt+k
∏k−1
i=0 Π
ωw
t+i∏k
i=1 π
w
t+i
−
ǫw
ǫw − 1
mrst,t+k
)
= 0, (C.1)
where w̃t = W̃t/Wt, real wage wt+k = Wt+k/Pt+k, and wage inflation πwt+k = Wt+k/Wt+k−1.
Log-linearising the previous expression around steady state yields
̂̃wt = (1− βθw)
∞∑
k=0
(βθw)
k
(
m̂rst,t+k − ŵt+k +
k∑
i=1
π̂wt+i −
k−1∑
i=0
ωwΠ̂t+i
)
. (C.2)
Considering the relationship of the marginal rate of substitution as,
mrst,t+k
mrst+k
=
(
Nt,t+k
Nt+k
)ϕ
=
(
W̃t
∏k−1
i=0 Π
ω
t+i
Nt+k
)−ǫϕ
. (C.3)
Applying first order approximation around steady state,
m̂rst,t+k = m̂rst+k − ǫϕ(
̂̃
W t − Ŵt+k +
k−1∑
i=0
ωΠ̂t+i)
= m̂rst+k − ǫϕ( ̂̃wt −
k∑
i=1
π̂wt+i +
k−1∑
i=0
ωΠ̂t+i). (C.4)
Plugging this into (C.2) and rearranging terms, we obtain
̂̃wt =
1− βθw
1 + ǫϕ
∞∑
k=0
(βθw)
k (m̂rst+k − ŵt+k)
+ (1− βθw)
∞∑
k=0
(βθw)
k
(
k∑
i=1
π̂wt+i −
k−1∑
i=0
ωΠ̂t+i
)
.
Consequently,
̂̃wt − βθw ̂̃wt+1 =
1− βθw
1 + ǫϕ
(m̂rst − ŵt) + βθw(π̂
w
t+1 − ωΠ̂t). (C.5)
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The log-linearised form of (4.21) can be written as
Ŵt = (1− θw)
̂̃
W t + θwŴt−1 + θwωΠ̂t−1,
or equivalently,
̂̃wt =
θw
1− θw
(ŵt − ŵt−1 − ωΠ̂t−1 + Π̂t). (C.6)
Plugging (C.6) into (C.5) and using π̂wt = ŵt − ŵt−1 + Π̂t yields
(1 + β)ŵt = βŵt+1 + ŵt−1 + βΠ̂t+1 − (1 + βω)Π̂t + ωΠ̂t−1+
+
(1− βθw)(1− θw)
θw(1 + ǫϕ)
(m̂rst − ŵt) . (C.7)
C.3 Log-linear Version of the Model
The FOCs for consumption of optimising households (skilled and medium skilled) equals. For conve-
nience, only the skilled cases are shown here
µ̂S,t = eu,t − σĈS,t.
For unskilled rule-of-thumb consumer we have
ĈU,t = N̂U,t + ŵU,t.
Marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour
eS,t + eu,t + ϕN̂S,t = m̂rsS,t + µ̂S,t.
Unskilled do not have wage setting power, hence
ŵU,t = eU,t + ϕN̂U,t − σĈU,t.
In the case of a binding minimum wage, (wU,t <
w−wU
wU
) the unskilled wage becomes
ŵU,t = w = αwU .
The Ricardian households’ Euler equation for bonds reads as
µ̂S,t = µ̂S,t+1 + ît − Π̂t+1 + δĈS,t.
Wage setting by skilled households is
118
C.3. LOG-LINEAR VERSION OF THE MODEL
(1 + β)ŵS,t = βŵS,t+1 + ŵS,t−1 + βΠ̂t+1 − (1 + βωS)Π̂t + ωSΠ̂t−1+
+
(1− βθw,S)(1− θw,S)
θw,S(1 + ǫSϕ)
(m̂rsS,t − ŵS,t) .
The production function of firm i is given by
Y
ζ−1
ζ (Ŷi,t− êAt) = +λ
1
ζ N
ζ−1
ζ
U (ê
AU,t +N̂U,i,t)+κ
1
ζ N
ζ−1
ζ
M (ê
AM,t +N̂M,i,t)+(1−λ−κ)
1
ζ N
ζ−1
ζ
S (ê
AS,t +N̂S,i,t).
Labour demand of firm i from type ℓ for the neoclassical benchmark equals
ŵℓ,t =
1
ζ
(Ŷi,t − N̂ℓ,i,t) +
ζ − 1
ζ
(
(êAt) + (êAℓ,t)
)
+ m̂ci,t.
In this version of the model, while the steady state wage in the case of monopsony is lower the
log-linearised labour the demand of unskilled labour is unchanged. Thus, in case of monopsony we have
ŵU,t =
1
ζ
(Ŷi,t − N̂U,i,t) +
ζ − 1
ζ
(
(êAt) + (êAU,t)
)
+ m̂ci,t.
Equilibrium in the goods market is given by
Y Ŷt = CSĈS,t + CM ĈM,t + CU ĈU,t +GĜt.
The Taylor rule of the central bank is defined as
ît = φiît−1 + (1− φi)
(
φyŶt + φΠΠ̂t
)
+ vt.
Finally, the New Keynesian Phillips Curve is
Π̂t − χΠ̂t−1 =
(1− θ)(1− θβ)
θ
m̂ct + β(1− θ)(Π̂t+1 − χΠ̂t).
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